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About the JLS

The Journal of Literature and Science (JLS) is a peer-reviewed academic journal presently published annually. It is hosted by the Research Centre for Literature, Arts and Science at the University of Glamorgan. Each issue appears online only and is free to access. Each individual essay within an issue is made available in PDF format for download.

The journal is dedicated to the publication of academic essays on the subject of literature and science, broadly defined. Essays on the major forms of literary and artistic endeavour are welcome (the novel, short fiction, poetry, drama, periodical literature, visual art, sculpture, radio, film and television). The journal encourages submissions from all periods of literary and artistic history since the Scientific Revolution; from the Renaissance to the present day. The journal also encourages a broad definition of ‘science’: encapsulating both the history and philosophy of science and those sciences regarded as either mainstream or marginal within their own, or our, historical moment. However, the journal does not generally publish work on the social sciences. Within these confines, essays submitted to the journal may focus on the literary and scientific productions of any nation or group.

All essays should be interdisciplinary in focus, offering an original view of both the literary or artistic subject matter and the science or sciences under consideration. While essays on individual examples of literary and artistic production are welcomed, these should also seek to show the wider significance of their analyses and interpretations. The journal does not publish essays focused exclusively on literature or art, or exclusively on the history and philosophy of science.

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Introduction: The Archaeological Imagination

Alexandra Warwick and Martin Willis

Archaeology is the latest born of the sciences. It has but scarcely struggled into freedom, out of the swaddling clothes of dilettante speculations. It is still attracted by pretty things, rather than by real knowledge. It has to find shelter with the Fine Arts or with History, and not a single home has yet been provided for its real growth.

(William Mathew Flinders Petrie, Methods and Aims in Archaeology vii)

What can be called the archaeological imagination long precedes archaeology as a practice. Although histories of archaeology like to mark particular moments as the birth of the science, all acknowledge that those moments are preceded by the existence and even the practice of an archaeological imagination (Daniel). For example, many cite the temple of Larsa in what is now Iraq, which contains a stone inscription recording the work of the ruler Nabonidus (556-539 BC) who, curious about the ruin, caused it to be excavated and restored and attempted to establish something like a history of its construction and use (Schnapp 18). Despite the prior existence of what might be called an archaeological curiosity or wonder, the science of archaeology is deeply marked by the conditions of its emergence in the nineteenth century. As Julian Thomas has pointed out, the science is creatively shaped by its contemporary cultural and linguistic resources, and the nineteenth century presents a particularly dense set of such interactions (Thomas 153). What this reveals, as Flinders Petrie recognised in 1904 in the above epigraph, is that the archaeological imagination is not contained by its professionalization or its own institutions. And likewise, the archaeologist is not untouched by that which the profession often tries to resist: Howard Carter’s reply in 1922 when he was asked what he could see through the tiny gap in the door of Tutankhamen’s tomb was not “convincing evidence of the funerary practices of the eighteenth dynasty” but “wonderful things” (Silverberg 89).

What is the archaeological imagination? As the writers of the six articles that follow reveal, there are numerous different kinds of imagining taking place in the widest of engagements with archaeology, and these are the product of varied imaginations. Certainly there is no clear division between the professional and rational on the one hand and the creative and imaginative on the other. Rather, explanation and interpretation are as often a part of imaginative responses to archaeology as is the wonder expressed by Carter or indeed by artists or writers of fiction and poetry. At the same time, various imaginative responses to archaeology (whether curatorial, literary, or visual) are employed to extend the explanatory, or rather are brought to bear when the empirical knowledge of scientific archaeology is felt to be unable to capture the entirety of the archaeological experience. In this way, different imaginations offer an argument about the limitations of certain kinds of rational explanation and in doing so lay claim to other truths of archaeological discovery.

As Sophie Thomas reveals, and Mirjam Brusius confirms, archaeological objects (such as those discovered by the adventurer Belzoni or by Layard) retained their status as wondrous and sublime objects when their scientific demarcation was
unknown (often because a science of archaeology was still in its infancy). Without an explanatory framework the archaeological object was understood within an already existing cultural imaginary: in this instance the paradigms of literary romanticism. Yet, even after the emergence of scientific archaeology imaginative responses to new discoveries were still a necessary component of the archaeological legacy. In particular, as both Shawn Malley and Alex Warwick argue, museums became a locus for the interweaving of the creative with the curatorial. In spaces of exhibition the imagination and the empirical both contributed to archaeological culture: by inviting the viewer to enter the imaginative space of the dream or by evoking an image of Britain that is little more than an imagined nationalism.

Indeed for Malley, as well as for Debbie Challis, Victorian archaeology inspired an imaginative refashioning of Britain and Britishness. In the Victorian imagination ‘the East’ was always exotic, often in an explicitly Orientalist schema, and the relationship between the originating sites of archaeological objects and their place within British curatorial spaces (the museum, but also the theatre), said as much about Britain as it did about Assyria or Egypt. Both the curated object, and also various poetries written in contemplation of it, very often safeguarded archaeological spaces within a specifically British cultural heritage, suggesting British survival and even progress against Eastern decline and entropy. Malley argues that this was testament to the Victorians’ desire to exhibit not archaeological objects but themselves. Challis’s reading of the use of ancient Greek dress in both theatrical presentations and in campaigns for national health certainly reinforces this view. Moreover, Challis shows how Greek costume – visualised from empirical archaeological evidence – allowed for a fresh imagining of the British ‘body’ in various forms: the sexualised body of Victorian women, the healthy body, and the metonymic body of the nation itself.

While the mixing of a curatorial, poetic and artistic imagination spoke to contemporary Britishness rather than to archaeological objects and their former cultural lives, other literary responses offered a differently imagined sense of time and its disjunctions. Virginia Zimmerman notes how imaginative verse often employs archaeology to comment on the complex relationships between the past and the present. She argues that unlike archaeological work itself, poetries of archaeology are able to display both the connections and fractures between the archaeological past and their own contemporary world. The poetic imagination, by compressing time in these ways, strikes out also into the future to ask questions of the meanings of archaeological discoveries for periods yet to come. It is the power of the poetic imagination, then, that enables archaeology to offer fresh insights into time’s extended continuum rather than being limited to an understanding of the past alone.

Other imaginative constructions of archaeology work similarly to activate the relationship between the past and present. The visual imagination, in particular, often explores the relationship between the viewer and the archaeological sites and objects upon which they look. To see the materials uncovered by field archaeology is often a precursor to imagining them as active and alive in the present, both as human and non-human actors in the viewer’s own culture. As Warwick notes, imperial gothic fictions often bring to life the mummified bodies of ancient cultures or endow the material objects of such cultures with supernatural power. Likewise travel writers such as Amelia Edwards or adventurers like Belzoni (as Thomas discusses) find themselves actively imagining the coming to life of statuary or figures depicted in wall paintings. (Willis 115-41) Such imagining of the reinvigorated life of
archaeological objects brings them into direct contact with the Victorian present while also transporting the viewer (or reader) into an imaginatively reconstructed past.

Nearly all these examples of an archaeological imagination can be regarded as positive contributions to the legacy of archaeology: all of them, in different ways, extend archaeology’s influence into other spheres of social, political and cultural life. Yet the imagination is not always so generous in making plain archaeological knowledge; it can also obscure or disguise important (but largely negative) social and political consequences, or construct a consciously artificial archaeological culture for specific ends. The latter is neatly exemplified by Brusius’s detailed discussion of the role of objects, engravings, photographs and museum display in recording and archiving archaeological finds. While it may be expected that the various technologies of image-making capture a material reality objectively (and in the case of the photograph without the conscious and subjective intervention of the artist or sketcher) in actual fact the processes of recording objects are just as often subject to ideological or cultural manipulation. As Brusius argues in her analysis of objects and images sent to the British Museum from Layard’s excavations at Nineveh, archaeological images and the display of these images alongside objects in the museum were imaginatively constructed. Their meanings remained multiple, and their status questionable. Rather than delimiting truths about archaeological objects, such images added to the plurality and instability of archaeological knowledge. This, of course, was also true for the photograph of archaeological objects: the apparently objective image captured by the camera was not only as subject to imaginative reconstruction as the artist’s sketch, it also disguised that fact by promoting itself as a neutral image-maker that could be relied upon as a source of empirical authority.

The imagination succeeded in supporting other elisions of archaeological truth. Warwick reveals how dream visions of archaeological objects and sites – in poetry, popular fiction and public exhibition – entirely obscures the labour of archaeological field work and writes out the involvement of multiple communities (both Eastern and Western). While this clearly says something about archaeology as an imperial project, Warwick stresses the fact that what is actually hidden by the imagination is the powerful role played by capitalist modernity. The imagination, in this context, worryingly depoliticises both the science of archaeology and its multiple social influences.

When, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Flinders Petrie lamented the fact that archaeology had found “not a single home” in which to flourish, he was speaking specifically about a home for scientific archaeology within a strong disciplinary institution. Considering his contribution to archaeology’s extended influence it would be surprising if he did not also recognise that the archaeological imagination had multiple homes in diverse areas of social and cultural life. It is recent scholarship that has begun to recognise that such diversity is not a sideshow to the important work of scientific archaeology but works rather to enlarge the continuum of archaeological knowledge. As the articles in this special issue attest, the meanings of archaeology are enhanced by the different imaginations brought to bear on its sites and objects. Poetry and fiction, museum and commercial exhibits and shows, popular technologies, diaries and travel narratives, dramatic theatre and art all imagine archaeology differently, yet all contribute to the powerful role it plays both within and outside its specific scientific communities. Their imaginative visions of archaeology offer means of additional interpretation and find new, creative truths yet they also provide a means of escaping or hiding from archaeology’s more ambiguous roles in Victorian social and cultural politics. What the following articles reveal, then, is that
the archaeological imagination is plural and constitutive of new knowledge but equally has the capacity to elide or disguise such knowledge: enhancing fact with fancy, but also relieving fact of its discomfort.
Works Cited

Displaying Egypt: Archaeology, Spectacle, and the Museum in the Early Nineteenth Century

Sophie Thomas

To capture something of how Egypt appeared to the early nineteenth century traveller, one could do worse than stand in the shoes of Giovanni Battista Belzoni when he caught his first sight of the ruins of Thebes. Faced with a “forest-like assemblage of ruins of temples, columns, obelisks, colossi, sphynxes, portals, and an endless number of other astonishing objects,” Belzoni remarks that it is impossible to describe, and “absolutely impossible to imagine the scene displayed, without seeing it” (108). Belzoni’s amazement reflected and in turn shaped a passionate interest in Egypt, or more particularly Egyptian antiquity, that became a prominent feature of early nineteenth century cultural life. The term ‘Egyptomania’ is frequently applied to that fascination, which found expression in a variety of ways: in increased activity around the excavation and collecting of antiquities, in the growing collections of the British Museum, in Egyptian-inspired architecture and design, in the work of writers and artists, and in the way Egypt featured in forms of popular visual spectacle, such as the theatre, the panoramas of Barker and Burford, and later, in moving panoramas that simulated the experience of travelling up the Nile.

To some extent, Egypt provided a fresh supply of scenes and objects for antiquarian and picturesque tastes largely inherited from the eighteenth century. As Jeffrey Richards has observed, Egypt appealed to the Romantic interest in the ruins of the past, particularly given the monumental nature of Egypt’s physical remains, and also to an interest in the occult, fuelled by the exotic customs, cultural practices, and religious beliefs of ancient Egyptians (17). Nevertheless, there were new conditions in play and a key factor in the ‘rediscovery’ of Egypt was a practical one: as it became more open to foreign visitors, travel naturally heightened awareness of the ‘far away,’ and offered the means of bringing the distant into uneasy proximity with the near. In the 1840s, the overland route to India was established – through Egypt – which increased the number of its visitors, firmly associated Egypt with British Imperial ambitions, and provided a popular subject for the touring panoramas that featured highlights of the route (Connor 3-4). The revival of interest in the ancient world, while linked thus to the dynamic interactions of geography and politics, is at the same time a factor in the emergence of archaeology as a scientific discipline of considerable popular interest. Increasingly, we find a close connection between travel, public or commercial museums, and popular visual spectacles where Egyptian sites and artifacts were featured. The archaeological subject, as featured at a spectacle or an exhibition, makes a particularly fitting bridge between these domains, since the drama of discovery is front and centre: a drama involving unveiling and unearthing, and the lifting or opening of objects to sight.

This essay will explore the dialogue between archaeological activity in Egypt, the treatment in British museum collections of the objects it produced, and the use of visual spectacle in popular representations of Egypt and Egyptian artefacts, such as William Bullock’s 1821 exhibition of Belzoni’s finds from the tomb of Pharaoh Seti I. The focus is on the early nineteenth century, when the excitement about Egypt that followed Napoleon’s military expedition of 1798-1801, coupled with the relatively accommodating nature of Egypt’s rulers and escalating demand from European
collectors, led to largely unregulated exploration of key Egyptian sites. It was in this context that Belzoni, former strongman and engineer turned archaeologist-adventurer, undertook pioneering excavations at Abu Simbel, Giza and Thebes. Moreover, in this period before the emergence of Egyptology as a distinct field of study, and well before the establishment of a dedicated department at the British Museum for Egyptian and Oriental Antiquities in 1866, there is persistent uncertainty about the status of these marvellous curiosities from a lost civilization, and a tendency to regard them as primarily wondrous and sublime. At a time when the modern museum was finding its feet as an institution wary of the competing attractions of the entertainment industry, Egyptian artifacts shed light on the inevitable entanglements of science and sensation in modes of collection and display, and in the manner of their public presentation.

‘Rediscovering’ Egypt
Traditionally, interest in Egypt drew from its importance in the bible and from classical associations. In the early nineteenth century, however, this interest was closely connected to Britain’s relationship with France during and after the Napoleonic wars. For example, Nelson’s victory over the French fleet in 1798, at the Battle of the Nile, provoked a patriotic vogue for decorative obelisks, sphinxes and crocodiles – as well as a panorama representing the event. Even though a number of British and European travellers had travelled considerable distances up the Nile in the eighteenth century, it has been argued that the real ‘rediscovery’ of the pharaonic monuments took place at the turn of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign (Belzoni 18). These monuments became widely known from the extraordinary efforts of the team of scholars and artists accompanying Napoleon, who documented them for the Description de l’Égypte – an ambitious, multi-volume work, which took until the 1820s to complete. Dominique-Vivant Denon, a key figure in that enterprise, published his own account of his travels and discoveries, which proved highly influential, not least in popularizing a definitively Egyptian style that had a substantial impact on everything from interior design to theatre sets in Britain. Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt also involved the acquisition of many significant objects that were promptly confiscated when the British Army defeated the French in 1801. The first Egyptian antiquities held by the British Museum, such as those deposited with the collections of Hans Sloane in the mid-eighteenth century, had consisted of small objects such as figures of gods, scarabs, and amulets (James, The British Museum 4). Now, the colossal statues and sarcophagi, with their broader public appeal, began to arrive in England and their massiveness was in itself a source of fascination, since it bodied forth a degree of power, of sheer physical might, that induced a feeling of “awe-stricken amazement” (Gidal 180).

Interest in Egyptian antiquities, it has been argued, reached a peak in the years around 1820, which was largely due to the activities of Belzoni, whose “achievements in Egypt in the years 1815-19 caught the imagination of the British public to a degree unrivalled until the discovery of Tutankhamun’s treasures a century later” (Conner 56). Under contract to the British Consul-General, Henry Salt, one of his first extraordinary feats was to remove the massive granite head of Rameses II from the Ramesseum at Thebes and transport it down the Nile to the port of Alexandria, from whence it travelled to England; it was installed in the British Museum in early 1819. Reports of the discovery of the twelve-ton head and its imminent arrival were widely disseminated in the periodical press, an advance notice that famously inspired the
sonnet writing competition between Shelley and his friend Horace Smith that produced “Ozymandias.” The head was however a mysterious object. Known first as the ‘Memnon Head,’ it was received by the trustees of the British Museum without much initial enthusiasm, and only later would it become a central piece in the museum’s Egyptian collections: Joseph Banks noted, in a letter to Salt, that it was explicitly not placed “among the works of Fine Art,” by which he meant the collections of prized Greek and Roman antiquities in the Townley galleries (Moser 101). Elliott Colla has suggested that this reaction to, and treatment of, the Memnon Head may be seen as marking a transition between antiquarian discourses, in which such objects were known primarily as curiosities, and nascent archaeological discourses that would ultimately legitimise Egyptology as a scientific discipline (28, 60-63).

This sensational success however was only the beginning. In 1817, Belzoni located the entrance to the great temple at Abu Simbel. In the Valley of the Kings, near ancient Thebes, he discovered and entered six royal tombs, including the tomb of Seti I (1294-1279 BC), the entrance to which was buried six metres underground. The most magnificent of the royal tombs in the Valley, it was found to contain thirteen rooms, “almost all covered in superb wall paintings in painted relief in a state of pristine freshness” (Pearce 109-110). It was here, in the burial hall, that he discovered the magnificent alabaster sarcophagus that was purchased by the architect and collector John Soane (in whose London house, now a museum, it remains). Belzoni spent over a year making drawings and taking wax impressions of everything in the tomb. Later, in 1818, he located an entrance to the second pyramid at Giza, which was thought to be a solid structure. Belzoni was acting upon a hunch based on close observation of the features of the pyramid, followed by some exploratory digging. The entrance, once discovered, gave onto a passage leading to a burial chamber. After further remarkable discoveries at Thebes, Belzoni was engaged in the removal of an obelisk from the temple of Isis on the island of Philae.

Despite his implication in transactions that were viewed with some scepticism in London, not least because of uncertainty about the value of Egyptian antiquities, in both aesthetic and economic terms, Belzoni’s activities captured the popular imagination. He was a colourful figure: exceptionally strong and energetic, of “colossal stature, shaped like Hercules” (Belzoni 29). As a professional strong-man known as the “Patagonian Samson,” his most famous act at Sadler’s Wells had been the “human pyramid,” in which he lifted and carried as many as ten men around the stage (29). These super-human feats were also characteristic of his work in Egypt, with the excavation and collection of artifacts that were themselves gigantic. As Judith Pascoe has noted, the stupendous nature of his archaeological discoveries sat well with the Romantic privileging of the vast as a source of sublimity, an association long established by Burke and Kant – who used an Egyptian pyramid as an example of a structure evocative of the sublime – in the eighteenth century (Pascoe 114-38).

Throughout his Narrative, Belzoni uses the language of the sublime to convey what clearly cannot be conveyed to his readers; this is evident in his astonishment and wonder at the sight of Thebes, noted above, and in many other instances when he finds himself transported by the sights he encounters, with all attempts at description baffled. In a rare moment of solitude at Karnak, he finds himself inside the temple at sunrise: “I was lost in a mass of colossal objects, every one of which was more than sufficient of itself alone to attract my whole attention. How can I describe my sensations at that moment!” Belzoni presents these objects to his readers in turn: a “forest” of decorated columns; the gates, the walls, the pedestals, all adorned with
historic scenes of battle, triumph, sacrifice, feasting; the red granite sanctuary with its obelisks; “the high portals, seen at a distance from the openings to this vast labyrinth of edifices; the various groups of ruins of the other temples within sight; these altogether had such an effect on my soul, as to separate me in imagination from the rest of mortals, exalt me on high over all, and cause me to forget entirely the trifles and follies of life” (166-67). For a sense of this scene, Belzoni refers his readers to the accompanying plate (see Fig. 1) showing an overview of the ruins of Karnak, taken from the top of the pylon on the west side of the temple. Here, the shadows of the ruins lengthen over a sweeping expanse of rubble and sand:

Fig. 1.
(General View of the Ruins of the Great Temple of Carnac, discovered by G. Belzoni).
© The Stapleton Collection / The Bridgeman Art Museum.

Staging Egypt
The impact of fresh archaeological activity in Egypt in the early nineteenth century could be felt in many aspects of popular, visual culture. Numerous satiric prints captured the spirit of the political moment, and made liberal use of motifs such as pyramids, mummies and crocodiles; James Gillray in particular was a tireless caricaturist of the French cultural appropriation of Egypt under Napoleon, while Thomas Rowlandson’s “The Antiquarians” and “Modern Antiquities” (1806) mocked the obsession with ancient Egypt that followed. A number of theatrical spectacles attempted to capitalise on British nationalist pride in their use of Egypt as both subject and setting, such as an operatic production featuring Egyptian scenes and costumes, The Egyptian Festival, that was performed at Drury Lane in 1800, and the simply named Egypt (1801), which launched the career of the brilliant scene painter J. H. Grieve (Conner 29). At the Lyceum in 1802, Mark Lonsdale’s Aegyptiana was mounted: a spectacle in three parts, it consisted of “eighteen scenic pictures, upon a large scale, with explanatory readings” (Altick 199). The first part, from which the show took its name, featured commissioned paintings drawn from Denon’s Voyage. As a handbill enthused, “this Part of the Evening’s Entertainment, intended to give an amusing Turn to Information, and to exhibit Fact in its most picturesque Form, will be
relieved by a few Productions of Fancy, uniting the more sportive Efforts of Poetry, Painting and Spectacle” (199). In short, it was an ambitious attempt at a multi-media theatricalisation of Egypt that aimed to satisfy an “antiquarian fetish for the non-modern” (Ziter 33).

In these early decades of the nineteenth century, an inherently theatrical engagement with Egypt was also apparent in the domestic sphere: in furniture and interior design, in Egyptian themed rooms, and in the architectural features of buildings. The potential public appeal of these developments was not lost on William Bullock, whose purpose built museum on the south side of Piccadilly, constructed in 1812, integrated Egyptian forms in several ways. The startling façade offered an eclectic imitation of a pylon gateway to an Egyptian temple, with the addition of large windows surrounded by mock hieroglyphs (see Fig. 2). On the basis of this exotic façade, the building became known as the ‘Egyptian Hall,’ and was a landmark in the popular entertainment industry right through the nineteenth century. Furthermore, in 1819, Bullock had one of the principle rooms remodelled in an Egyptian style: the supporting columns were decorated with bands of hieroglyphs, lotuses, and Hathor heads, and the ceiling with signs of the zodiac. The museum provided the perfect setting for Belzoni’s exhibition in 1821 of his collection of Egyptian antiquities and drawings – an exhibition popularly known as “Belzoni’s Tomb,” since the central draw was a recreation, as an advertisement in The Times proclaimed, of “the beautiful tomb discovered by Mr Belzoni in Thebes” (qtd. in Pearce 111).

Belzoni’s exhibition opened to great acclaim in the spring of 1821, and was viewed by nearly two thousand on the first day alone. The exhibition featured a large number of Egyptian antiquities – indeed fourteen cases of them, which The Times...
referred to as “a multitude of collateral curiosities,” including two mummies, and many larger pieces such as the lion-headed statues of the goddess Sekhmet. More memorably though, it replicated in full size two of the chambers of the tomb of Seti I: the Entrance Hall and the ‘Hall of Beauties,’ a room fourteen by twenty feet, covered with symbolic representations of the pharaoh and his associated gods. The rich colours of the tomb were carefully reproduced, and the whole presented under lamplight, so as to mimic the sensory conditions under which Belzoni had first entered it. The exhibition also featured a scale model and drawings of the entire complex, complete with copies of the spectacular paintings that had been taken by Belzoni with the help of Alessandro Ricci. Also on display were scale models of the ruins of the temple of Erments, the great temples of Ysambul and of Rameses II at Abu Simbel, the portico in the temple of Isis at Philae, and of the second or Chephren’s pyramid, along with a cross-section showing its internal passages and tunnels.

This popular exhibition staged as far as it could the experience of visiting the tombs recently excavated in the Valley of the Kings by situating the statues, sarcophagi and other objects on display, in a theatricalised recreation of the scene. As Gillen D’Arcy Wood has argued, it offered a sensational simulacrum of the putatively real, rather than the rationalised and disinterested display of artefacts, divorced from historical context and setting, that one might encounter at the nearby British Museum. It offered the experience, in short, of being inside the tomb, not exactly as a corpse, but as a visitor to an ‘underworld’ that allowed one to imagine, if not recreate, the experience of the archaeologist-explorer in the act of first discovery. Belzoni’s compelling narrative of his exploits, published in 1820, was available to readers before the exhibition opened, as was a companion volume of forty-five plates, many of which foreground the activity of discovery. Plates 9-12, for example, represent the finding of the burial chamber inside the Pyramid of Cephrene, and feature figure(s) with torches, clearly Belzoni and his assistants, at the very moment of entry; similar representations are offered for the interior of the temple at Ybsambul (see Fig. 3). Such scenes must by definition be ‘restaged’ after the fact, and aim to capture something of the excitement of crossing over into the previously unknown.

These, and other representations of the invisible or hidden Egypt – Egypt indoors – form an interesting counterpoint to the numerous plates of exterior scenes and views that the volume also includes. These often also contain figures, perhaps to provide a sense of scale or local atmosphere, though often they represent Belzoni and his guides as surveyors of the scene. In this way, acts of observation and discovery intersect. The spectators in Belzoni’s plates pay close attention to Egypt’s wonders, and foreground visual response in a way that cues that of a reader or museum visitor. Whether or not visitors to Bullock’s Egyptian Hall were this attentive, the success of Belzoni’s dramatic exhibition can be measured in the interest it spread in ancient Egypt as well as in archaeology among the general public (Altick 245). Through exhibitions such as Belzoni’s, which presented Egypt as mysterious and spectacular, visitors at least felt they acquired access to the past. This access, with all its imaginary force, is clearly a product of the inventive interplay of artifacts and scenic – or theatrical – recreation.
Fig. 3.

Viewing Egypt
Patrick Conner, in his introduction to the exhibition catalogue *The Inspiration of Egypt*, observes that in the early nineteenth century – which was dominated by the archaeological activities of figures such as Belzoni – artistic representations of Egypt tended to focus on the monumental, and on outdoor scenes. This meant a preponderance of landscape views of temples and pyramids, for example, and the production of *capricci* that brought monuments into imagined proximity with one another. By mid-century however, he suggests, the domestic life of the Egyptians, as revealed in tomb paintings, was of increasing interest, and the Egyptian interior began to capture the imagination (Conner 3). Arguably, this is already evident in the popular success of ‘Belzoni’s Tomb,’ and in the interest aroused by the objects piling up at the British Museum. A compelling addition, however, to the ways in which people at this time could encounter Egypt was provided by Robert Burford’s London Panorama. While the nature of the medium lent itself best to broad, topographic views, and Egypt was in general approached in this way, it is noteworthy that panoramic paintings, displayed in their purpose-built rotundas, offer interior spectacles reminiscent of the tomb of Seti I – even though they are contrived to make their painted walls vanish into an illusion of the outdoors. Although Conner’s suggestion is broadly accurate, it makes some sense to consider representations of ancient Egypt throughout this period as animated by a tension between the power of the interior, particularly but not only the temple or the tomb, and the desire to recreate the impressive monumentality of its antique sites from a more comprehensive vantage point.

The panorama featured, as the name coined in 1787 by its inventor, Robert Barker, indicates, a three hundred and sixty degree view of its subject that simulated...
the experience of being on the very spot. This illusion was created not just through the immersion of the spectator in a complete visual field, and through sheer size and life-like scale, but also by a documentary faithfulness to the details of the scene. Panorama rotundas were in general lit from the top, with a central viewing area entered from below so to preserve the full impact of the illusion. The success of any given panorama was highly dependent on the innate suitability of its subject, which was invariably promoted as exemplary by the pamphlets that accompanied each show. Since so few of the actual canvases still exist, their historical recreation is largely dependent on reports, reviews, and on these pamphlets themselves, which contained a key-map or diagram cross-referenced to the descriptive text.

Panoramic representations of antiquity, of antique cities or scenes of particular archaeological interest, form a distinct strand with their own appeal (Thomas). Such panoramas were numerous in the early years of the nineteenth century, beginning with Barker’s “Battle of the Nile” and “Constantinople” at the turn of the century, and continuing through the early decades of the century with scenes, some frequently repeated, of sites such as Rome, Athens, Pompeii, Thebes and the Great Temple of Karnak, Jerusalem, the Temples of Baalbec, and Cairo with the Nile and the Pyramids. To a considerable degree, the popularity of these scenes directly reflected the excitement that accompanied the archaeological discovery of Near Eastern and Classical antiquities over the same period (Altick 182). Like other countries with strong links to antiquity, Egypt was promoted on the basis of its historical and cultural importance, yet as the promoters of the 1835 panorama of “The Great Temple of Karnak and the Surrounding City of Thebes” claimed, “no other country presents to the observations of the curious so great a number of monuments of high antiquity, or so many vestiges of the earliest civilization of man” (Description...Karnak, 3).

The 1835 panorama of Thebes and Karnak was painted by Burford and his team of panorama painters on the basis of drawings of monuments undertaken by Frederick Catherwood during the 1830s. Egypt was particularly remarkable for its former magnificence, presenting as it did what had largely become a landscape of ruin – at least in the case of ancient sites in the area around Thebes (see Fig. 4). The scene depicts a variety of monuments, with the Temple of Karnak forming the foreground, in a broad view extending east across the desert towards the “immense and picturesque mountains of Arabia,” and west across the Nile, as fertile corn-fields and plantations of palm give way to barren sands and finally to the “pointed mountains of the Libyan chain, by which the view is closed” (7). The temple, one of the oldest, most extensive, and best preserved, is taken as “a fair illustration of all these monuments of grandeur” (5). In front of the monumental ruins that punctuate the landscape, both near and far, the scene incorporates an element of contemporary human interest – a caravan of pilgrims travelling from Cairo to Mecca are preparing to camp for the night – and is depicted strategically at sunset, with the “magic hues of the setting sun” catching “the projecting masses of the temples, [...] the obelisks and the white rocks – touching them with the varied and glowing tints of the rainbow” (7). Both the human scene and the time of day are clearly chosen to emphasise transience and temporal contingency, particularly given that they are set amid these vast, ruined vestiges of the past.
Fig. 4.
John Burford. Key Map from Description of a View of the Great Temple of Karnak and the Surrounding City of Thebes.
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The booklet accompanying the panorama examines each element of the scene, setting out what is or can be known, relaying ancient and recent associations, historical and religious significance, and architectural and aesthetic detail. The informative, educative emphasis of the descriptions offsets the overall framing of the scene in the introductory pages, which (as is also typical of the panorama tracts) deploys the language of the sublime, and more particularly, the sublime of ruin. Speaking of the site as a whole, the tract notes that there is no one point from which “the eye can embrace the whole of these extraordinary remains at one time” (5) – even though this is precisely what the panorama as a form sets out to achieve. The response of viewers to the panorama is thus modelled by this characterization of the scene as one ideally calculated to induce astonishment and awe.

The tract opens, to this end, with an extract from the third canto of Salt’s rhapsodic poem, “Egypt” – a passage recounting the arrival at Karnak or “old Diospolis,” whose ruins, in their mutilated grandeur, “cast / Ev’n still a vivid radiance o’er the past.”

Columns, and temples, porticos sublime,
O’erpower th’ astonished senses with their vast
And solid masses—unsubdued by time. (3)

The scene of ruin, as encountered by visitors and contemplated by the “learned and ingenious of later ages,” is considered sublime because of the sheer magnitude of its remains: “it is difficult to describe, and impossible, without inspection, to form an adequate idea of the vast extent, ponderous massiveness, and gigantic appearance of these majestic ruins” (4). Still, the text persists in doing so, enumerating the relevant structures and objects that, though “shattered and detached,” still forcibly convey their original brilliancy (4). The language of sublimity is elicited by these forms for other reasons too, not least because of the extraordinary exertions required to create and erect them, but also because of the pull of the unfathomable, which is implicit in the way so many of Egypt’s archaeological wonders resist our attempt to unfold or decipher them. Thebes is, moreover, venerated particularly for its ancient or even pre-ancient pedigree, for “the date of its destruction was far anterior to the foundation of most other cities” (4); it is “doubly interesting” for being not simply associated with Greece and Rome, but a source for the “arts, sciences and learning” of those nations (7). The net effect on those who behold these ruins is apparently a kind of ecstatic seizure. The pamphlet cites for its authority not only Sonini’s claim that he experienced “an ecstasy which suspended his faculties, [and] rendered him immovable with rapture,” but also Denon’s extraordinary declaration, in his Voyage, that “the whole French army, coming suddenly in sight of the ruins, with one accord stood in amazement, and clapped their hands with delight, as if the end and object of their glorious toil, and the complete conquest of Egypt were accomplished and secured, by taking possession of the splendid remains of this ancient metropolis” (4; Denon 1:117). This was precisely the kind of delight aimed for by the spectacular illusions created at the Panorama, and thus it is perhaps no accident that such a scene of response is staged, as it were, in the companion text.

The interest of such panoramas is highly dependent on the power of ruins – not just as visual spectacles that depict ancient scenes in their current forms, but also as imaginative spectacles that appeal to the capacity of the viewer to supply additional material from memory or fantasy. Yet even comparatively modern and metropolitan scenes could confound the visual and conceptual faculties in a way that blended familiar aesthetic discourses with new experiences. Another popular subject for
panoramic representation was the city of Cairo and its surrounding area, including the pyramids, which featured twice at the Panorama – first at Henry Aston Barker’s Leicester Square Rotunda in 1809 (painted from drawings made by Salt), and later, under Burford’s directorship, in 1847. The central feature in the foreground of these views was the city itself, which, with its numerous mosques, presented an exotic landscape of minarets and rooftops. The scene of the city is characterised in the 1847 booklet as “singularly confused” to the European eye – the “innumerable details” and the “fantastic forms” of its architecture present a chaotic landscape resistant to visual mastery (Description...Cairo, 3).

The key objects of archaeological interest however were the pyramids, mysterious and vast, “stupendous works,” which have evoked “unbounded admiration and interest”: “These enigmatical structures, four in number, which antiquity extolled amongst its wonders, and which for size, sublime unity of design, solidity of construction, and the severe simplicity of their once sacred forms, which renders them everlasting [...] are the most mighty monuments of power and pride ever raised by man” (7). These and other works of the pharaohs have become of special interest because of the Herculean efforts of a more contemporary set of men: because of the “indefatigable and toilsome researches, and valuable discoveries of Salt, Belzoni, Cavigilia, Howard Vyse, and others”. Belzoni’s remarkable discovery of an apartment containing a sarcophagus in one of the pyramids is noted (7). So while the interest of Cairo is itself framed in terms that are broadly similar to other foreign cities, which were popular subjects for the panorama (Constantinople, Lisbon, Damascus, and Athens were other cities featured in the 1840s), the archaeological details are nevertheless foregrounded very particularly as a source of interest, and in a way that resorts to the language of the sublime, even as a way of capturing experience in and of the present.

The spectacular displays of faraway objects and places at the panorama required the collaboration of many, not least a whole team of painters working on the immense canvases. The panoramas of Thebes, Karnak and Cairo depended on the work of artists travelling abroad who gathered the necessary visual material: Frederick Catherwood in the case of Thebes, and David Roberts in the case of Cairo. Catherwood, who also prepared material for Burford’s panoramas of Jerusalem and Baalbek, and lectured about them, was a gifted documentary artist with a taste for travel. Similarly, David Roberts, a distinguished scene painter and later member of the Royal Academy, prepared drawings specifically for Burford’s panorama of Cairo. Perhaps inevitably, then, many pioneering Egyptologists were also travellers and artists – such as Salt, John Lewis Burckhardt, or William John Bankes. Some, such as Catherwood, also became involved directly in the production of panoramas. Visual documentation was thus a prominent feature of their relationship to sites of archaeological interest and activity. Indeed, the emerging practices and assumptions of archaeology are clearly, in the first part of the nineteenth century, embedded in practices of looking and observation (one might recall here that it was Belzoni’s capacity to ‘read,’ after close study, the features of the second pyramid that enabled him to deduce the existence of the buried entrance) – practices that are closely associated with the visual culture industry at ‘home,’ from Royal Academy exhibitions to Leicester Square panoramas.

**Animating Egypt**

Visual spectacles, inspired directly by increased access to countries such as Egypt, became increasingly sophisticated as their creators reached for more effective ways to
replicate the experience of foreign travel. The development of the ‘moving’ panorama offered an improvement upon the inherently static panoramic image, by not simply reproducing the experience of being in a particular place, such as an ancient archaeological site, but of moving through it. In contrast to the freedom of movement on the viewing platforms at the Panorama, the audience now sat facing a large continuous canvas unfurling across a set of rollers, which in thus passing before its viewers aimed for a comprehensive experience of totality that incorporated a simulation of mobility. The 1849 moving panorama of the Nile, an enormous popular success, took its viewers on a journey up the river from Cairo and back again. The accompanying booklet describes the route in detail: travelling up river, the viewer faces the west bank and takes in such important sites as the “once celebrated city of Memphis; the pyramids of Dashour, […] ; Girgeh, formerly the capital of Upper Egypt; the temple of Dendera, commenced by Cleopatra; the Memnonium, or temple of Ramses II, with its gigantic or sitting statues; Edfou, the Apollonopolis Magna of the Romans, one of the largest temples in Egypt; the ‘Throne of Pharaoh,’ as the remarkable group of rocks, near the Island of Philae, is termed by the Arabs” (Gliddon 9). By now the viewer has ascended 800 miles to the second cataract at the border dividing Nubia from Ethiopia, and will “turn” and descend, this time facing the eastern bank. The key sights on the return to Cairo are “Derr, the capital of Nubia; a portion of Thebes; Karnak; the tombs of Beni Hassan; the Lybian Desert; the Pyramids; and the Sphynx” (9). These scenes were presented as a succession of visually rich tableaux, with the first depicted at sunrise, and the last at sunset. While certain scenes were especially admired, contemporary reviews noted that it was the relations between particular sites that the panorama so effectively allowed the viewer to grasp.\[11\]

Since so many important archaeological landmarks were located close to the Nile, the wonders of Egypt lent themselves to a spectacle of this kind. The Literary Gazette claimed that “this panorama may be safely pronounced one of the most interesting and instructive exhibitions that ever sought the patronage of the public”. Typically, the review extolled its excellence ‘as a work of art, independently of the information it conveys’ (qtd. in Gliddon 10), but the framing of the spectacle as an educational one cannot be overlooked, since the accompanying booklet offers an extended survey, a snapshot, of Egyptological knowledge at mid-century. The producers of the ‘Moving Panorama of the Nile,’ including James Bonomi whose own drawings had been used in its production, sold the panorama to George Gliddon, a noted Egyptologist, to use during a lecture tour in the US; they created a duplicate so the popular show could go on at the Egyptian Hall. For its American tour, Gliddon inserted five additional pages of introductory material to support his lectures; the second half of the booklet had already been devoted to a set of appendices, on geology, geography, philology and a historical chronology. Moreover, it also supplemented the antiquities by offering a full portrait of what the viewer sees now – with descriptions of villages, animals, vegetation, and the local inhabitants of the present day.

The activities of replication, information and supplementation performed and celebrated by the moving panorama of Egypt are presented in response to the very difficulty of those tasks, a theme repeated in the review extracts from the London press that fill the first eight pages of the booklet. The Art Journal for September, 1849, for example, emphasises the efforts of modern researchers to tap into Egypt’s mysteries, and stresses its resistance to this kind of revelation: it is impossible, the review suggests, to reconcile the past, and its legendary status, with the present.
However, the panorama appears to fill a certain gap. While it cannot collapse or bridge historical time, it can nevertheless act as a supplement to the objects of archaeological interest that do remain, including those already residing in museums:

It may readily be supposed that [Egypt] offers peculiar points of interest to a nation who, like ourselves, possess so many fragmentary portions of its ancient grandeur as we have stored up in the halls of the British Museum, where they are regarded with wonder by the thousands who, year by year, visit that establishment; and it will as readily be presumed that these thousands would desire to see somewhat more of the land whence these fragments have been conveyed. Let such then pay a visit to the ‘Moving Panoramic Picture of the Nile’ now open at the Egyptian Hall, which gives as perfect a representation of the various localities as can be effected by any pictorial display. (9)

In what might seem a surprising symbiotic gesture, coming as it were from the other direction, visitors to the British Museum collections were treated to an exclusive offer, a “Ticket of Favour,” that granted two people admission to the “Panorama of the Nile” at half-price (see Fig. 5).¹² The suggestion that a visit to a moving panorama would offer a suitable supplement to an inspection of objects in the British Museum implies that such objects could be profitably encountered in the broader environment from which they came, even if that can only be simulated. Implicit here is an approach to museum space that reflects changes taking place on the nineteenth century stage, where there was a recognition that “meaning did not naturally emerge from the presented object but was instead generated in the relation of the object to its display or acting environment” (Ziter 4). This particular example, though, unlike the staging of ‘Belzoni’s Tomb’ at the Egyptian Hall nearly thirty years previously, refers the public to an environment beyond the museum’s walls.

Fig. 5.
Ticket of Favour for Admission to the Panorama of the Nile (c.1850).
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Stephanie Moser notes that by mid-century a more contextual approach to presenting Egyptian antiquities had been adopted at other European museums, but it would seem that the British Museum was more comfortable supporting such efforts elsewhere (184-85). The Museum was, for example, involved in the creation of the Egyptian Court at the Chrysali Palace at Sydenham, which from 1854 until it burned down in 1936, offered a very compelling blend of spectacle and public education (Richards 18). Like Belzoni’s Tomb, its reconstruction of immense monuments lavishly recreated the impression of immediate experience, and aimed to transport the visitor back in time (Moser 200-201). While the British Museum, where the Egyptian antiquities were – and remain – a central draw, resisted any temptation to theatricalise the context in which the objects were displayed, a conversation nevertheless emerges between its approaches and those of the entertainment industry. In the case of Egyptian artifacts, whose increasing numbers necessitated several major renovations in and additions to exhibition space in the first half of the nineteenth century, it is possible that the museum’s promotion of the moving panorama in 1849 and its involvement in the Chrysali Palace reflects a lingering view of those objects as curiosities whose place in the museum’s dominant aesthetic and scientific paradigms remained unclear. Their strangeness, which links them to the unfathomability proper to the discourse of the sublime, is in fact still celebrated as a provocative source of wonder (James, *The British Museum* 3).

While Egypt was undeniably a site of growing archaeological awareness, much of its power over the nineteenth-century was thus as spectacle. An older Thomas De Quincey, reflecting back upon his first encounter with the bust of Rameses II at the British Museum, remembers it as “simply the sublimest sight which in this sight-seeing world I had seen” (Leask 110). A tendency to represent Egypt not just as an exhibition but as though it were an exhibition becomes if anything more pronounced at the world’s fairs later in the century, and reflects a connection between processes of colonisation and an emergent, modernist, metaphysics of “world-as-exhibition” explored by Timothy Mitchell (xiii). What this paper has called ‘archaeology’ is certainly, in the early nineteenth century, some distance away from the systematic exploration and documentation of a total site that the discipline would come to involve: at this stage, more energy was spent on removing choice objects to the cultural institutions of western European capitals. In spite of this, the urge to locate these objects in a broader environmental context is present in all the instances examined here. Archaeology, as a discipline finding its feet in the first half of the nineteenth century, clearly emerges from a set of adjacent cultural practices, in the activities of travel, observation, and reproduction that also secured Egypt’s place in early nineteenth century visual culture.
Notes

1. John Gardner Wilkinson’s *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians* (1836) is thought to have largely consolidated this taste.

2. I use the term, accordingly, rather loosely, and recognise the proximity between ‘archaeology’ and ‘antiquarianism’ in the nineteenth century. For a good historical discussion of these terms, see Robin Boast, “The Formative Century, 1860-1960” in Cunliffe et al. 47-56.

3. On the details of Napoleon’s campaign, its key figures, and its impact, see also James, “Napoleon and Egyptology” 149-157.

4. See Belzoni’s vivid descriptions of this enterprise: 31-2, 102-4, 110-15, 168. Good overviews of Belzoni’s activities and discoveries can be found in Starkey and Starkey, and in Sattin.

5. There were a series of such articles published in the *Quarterly Review* between 1817 and 1819; and in 1819, the *Annals of the Fine Arts* published at least two articles on Egyptian antiquities. “Ozymandias” which takes as its title the Greek name for Rameses II, was first published in *The Examiner* on 11 January, 1818.

6. On Egyptomania in architecture and design, see Carrott, Curl, and Humbert et al. (esp. 253-56).

7. The original notice appeared in *The Times* 31 March 1820.

8. 30 April, 1821. See the “Description of the Egyptian Tomb Discovered by Giovanni Battista Belzoni” (London, 1822), reproduced as an appendix in Pearce, 119-20.

9. The various sources I am drawing from here include the 1822 Description, and information in Pearce 112, Conner 68, and Altick 245. Pearce helpfully includes a number of the plates and plans for the exhibition.

10. Edward Ziter argues that the effect was to offer “the ancient as a generalised essence rather than a network of specific practices, objects, and architecture” (148).

11. For example, *The Spectator* 4 August 1849.

12. The copy in the British Library is undated but thought to date from early 1850.
Works Cited


*The Times* 30 April 1821: 3.


Ninevah 1851: An Archaeography

Shawn Malley

Nothing could induce me to stay out here another year. I have been placed in every manner of inconvenience and annoyance and find myself again reduced to my own resources.

(A.H. Layard to Ambassador Stratford Canning, 12 August 1850)

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The present possessions of the Museum are in almost every room crowded together, and piled over each other like goods in a warehouse, and it is almost impossible to attempt correct classification, or satisfactory arrangement, which shall be instructive to visitors, or to isolate in any degree those objects to which it is desirable to direct particular attention. [...] As to arrangement and proper explanation of [the Assyrian sculptures], it is quite out of the question.

(Keeper of Antiquities Edward Hawkins, “Report to the Trustees of the British Museum”, 3 July 1851)

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We always need to go beyond the object we have found, following it in becoming something else. It cannot be brought down to the results of empirical and analytic treatment. There is a necessary creative component in coming to know – being open to the other, receptivity, metaphor, the circumlocution, writing the genuine and generating object. Because meaning is ultimately unsayable, poetry is necessary.

(Michael Shanks, Experiencing the Past 135)

In the spring of 1851 the renowned ‘discoverer of Nineveh’ Austen Henry Layard abandoned his excavations in Mesopotamia for lack of resources, personnel support and clear directives from the British Museum. He returned to London in the summer to find the museum staff themselves desperately trying to sort through the cases of artefacts he had unearthed for them. Bulking large, they certainly provided no small measure of gratification to the Trustees, but little provision had been made for their arrival. Scattered and stockpiled throughout the building – on the front porch, in the main entrance and in a basement room accessed by a jury-rigged wooden staircase – the material remains of Assyria stymied all sense of museal logic. (Jenkins 158-70) Edward Hawkins’s directives to “classify,” “isolate,” “instruct” and “direct particular attention” were clearly secondary to the Trustees’ desire to accumulate. In 1851, the museum was indeed forced to consider its purpose and identity as a warehouse, and its contents as goods.

By sardonically ascribing commercial value to the artefacts, Hawkins was certainly freighting the material remains of Assyria with the institutional authority of his office. But for a nation simultaneously celebrating its cultural, scientific and commercial ascendancy at Hyde Park, his joke demands that we consider the often contradictory ways the Victorian museum-going public came to value these trophies gathered from the distant outposts of British influence. The Great Exhibition itself begs certain questions about the rhetorical processes guiding the Victorian
acculturation of Assyria into Britain. What were the implications of simultaneously collecting the Assyrian past and exhibiting Britain’s imperial present and future? How did the tensions between the displays of progress and civilisation and the nationalistic, imperialist and commercial enterprises that sustain these cultural imperatives influence and reflect the reception and domestication of Assyria at mid-century?

While the British Museum is unquestionably the central authority in the archaeological project, Hawkins’s concerns about proper display – the disparity between collection and classification – resonates in the circulation of Assyria outside of the hermeneutic controls of the British Museum. For in 1851 the nation was in the throes of Assyriamania. In this year John Murray released an abridged ‘Popular’ edition of Layard’s best-selling *Nineveh and Its Remains*, dioramas of Nineveh opened at Thomas Burford’s Leicester Square Panorama and at the Gothic Hall on Oxford Street, and the great city was the subject of many published poems, sermons, lectures and non-fiction works. If, as Hawkins avers, the British Museum sacrificed scholarship to commerce, the ideological attachments to Assyria were being rigorously debated in the competitive market of popular culture.

This article examines two groups of popular cultural documents composed during the Great Exhibition year. The first consists of a short expository piece published in Charles Dickens’s magazine *Household Words*, entitled “The Nineveh Bull,” and a poem by Walter Savage Landor, “To Layard.” These works help expose the archaeo-imperial contexts of excavating, transporting and displaying prize Assyrian artefacts. The second group consists of three poems that bear the simple title “Nineveh,” composed by Rugby student K. Blake, William Hunt of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and Edward Henry Bickersteth, Curate of Banningham, Norfolk. While none of the Nineveh poets is particularly distinguished, their works are by virtue of the topicality of their subject and their engagement with the temporal and political problematics endemic of displaying antiquity and modernity in 1851.

The apparently distinct realms of the material and the written – of exhibition and narration – have attracted in recent years the attention of theorists interested in tracking the transformations of artefacts in time and space. Poststructuralist literary theory and the linguistic turn in historiography have stimulated a growing awareness among archaeologists that material culture is not independent of, but intimately connected to, language: that archaeology “has to be written” (Tilley 11). Classical archaeologist Michael Shanks’s portmanteau term “archaeography” (Homepage) is germane in this regard. Championing the semiotic coexistence of things, narratives, images and metaphors, archaeography encourages mutual respect between the creative and curatorial sensibilities needed for working with the material past, self-reflexivity about the ways and reasons why we create meaningful relationships with old things, and, moreover, democratisation of scientific discourse to include non-specialist voices and audiences in the making of material culture from archaeological remains.

Shanks contends that an archaeological sensibility (“working on remains to translate, to turn them into something sensible – inventory, account, narrative, explanation, whatever”) (Homepage) is indelibly embedded in the matrix of everyday life. He states in his “archaeological manifesto” that archaeography is deeply “committed to hybrid practice where art becomes scientific research, where the academy becomes an art studio, where pedagogy mingles with outreach into the community and industry, where practice can be research, where old disciplinary divisions give way to a committed address to matters of common human concern” (Homepage). In this way, archaeography invites us to consider the range of sensual
experience that archaeologists too often take for granted: the desire to make the past speak, the sense of connection between place and past events, the drama and thrill of discovery, performances of the past and historical identity, discontinuities and continuities, entropy, and the contemporary mise en scène occupied by archaeologists, archaeographers, and artefacts alike.

Several ramifications emerge for the present article. If Shanks draws popular culture into the archaeological process, then the subjective experiences of the past in popular culture leave behind an important layer of archaeological experience. Archaeography allows us to trace archaeological sensibilities in time. The creative responses to Assyria in Victorian England are thereby part of the historical record they seek to document. What follows is a further ‘archaeography,’ a reading of the Victorians reading the artificial world Layard exposed for them. Their poetic engagements help to see beyond the rather unhelpful catalogue numbers and provenance information that to this day greet the visitor to the British Museum, and to appreciate the social relationships that lay behind such classificatory schema: the tensions between the Victorian desire for possession and the pressures of mapping their historical identity across millennia. Through these literary encounters, we can see how the stones of Assyria appeared alongside the displays of the Great Exhibition as important signifiers of a British people simultaneously and assiduously claiming their inheritance and laying the foundations for their legacy.

Appearing in the February 1851 issue of *Household Words*, W. H. Stone’s “The Nineveh Bull” is a minor yet highly imaginative contribution to the cultural reception of Assyria. The article is a short narrative that chronicles the life cycle of Layard’s famous human-headed bull discovered in the northwest palace of the mound at Nimrud: from its carving to its installation in the palace of Ashurnasirpal II, from the fall of the city to its years of “slumber”(469) underground, and from its excavation to its restoration in London. Tidy and reductive, the story of discovery and domestication engages a wide range of ideological investments in the bull by employing prosopopeia, making the human-headed bull speak to and for Dickens’s readers. But the success of the conceit – of a speaking human-headed bull – depends upon overcoming the central archaeological problem that artefacts are by their very nature inert, incommunicative things.

Shanks’s portmanteau term “mute-ability” – of “mute stone speaking through the work of the archaeologist” (Homepage) – is certainly apropos. For the voice invests “metaphoric processes” into our relationships with artefacts. The animating voice resists the enervating processes of decay by reintegrating artefacts into the flow of time and forging meaningful patterns of ownership. For Dickens’s readers, the bull literally speaks ‘household words’ through Stone: is rendered familiar and knowable through the poetics of historical discourse and desired historical identity.

The specific nature of the story is crucial for transforming the mute object into a communicative being. “The Nineveh Bull” is an originary tale that consolidates Britain’s place in the march of civilisation through a reinvestment in the sacred soil of scripture; but such associations are created through disassociation of the artefact from the ‘other’ historical experiences of the people who occupy the territory in the expanse of time between the fall of the city and its ‘discovery’ by Layard. The bull’s memory is decidedly European. As if awakened from a dream, the bull remembers its native country being visited by the Persian king Cyrus, the Athenian historian Xenophon and Alexander the Great, brief punctuations of civilised interest in a geographical region traversed by Arabs: “at times a dark figure flitted by, cursing me as the unbelievers’ idol.” Stone transfers ownership and intelligibility to Layard, who
appears as a “lord among them.” Salvaged from their ignorance, the bull “rejoiced in spirit, for I saw he knew me and knew my history; I was again awake and restored to the world” (469). In the absence of contextual archaeological data, the bull’s identity is fully cast in the truth of scripture and the revelation of racial and cultural superiority that the biblical narrative re-enforces.

But what can the artefact actually say about the present that is not buried in the kind of past it is made to testify to? This problem is deeply embedded in the ways Western archaeologists have framed their narratives. Rosemary Joyce observes that “archaeology has exploited two chronotopes extensively. One of these is evolution (or progress), the other discovery (or experience)” (34). In “the chronotope of discovery, the writer is positioned inside, even at the centre, of things. Like progress, discovery is ideological.” In Stone’s narrative, the artefact confronts Arab incredulousness and hostility, thereby standing in for the absent archaeologist. “Actions over time are,” states Joyce, “subordinated to the timeless moment, a moment in which the significance of things is pinned down” (35). The romance of discovery is crucial for asserting the need for dispossession and for what Johannes Fabian calls “the denial of coevalness” that typifies the colonial and anthropological discourse employed by Stone (31).

In excavation acts, rarity is also established for the object through a dialectical rhetoric of loss and recovery. The acquisition of Assyria begins at the moment of disassociation of local communities from objects; the Arabs shoulder the burden of loss – what is intellectually lost on them can be taken away – so the experience of discovery is important for getting time moving again, for establishing the chronotope of progress and the imperialist paradigm of Western inheritance. As museologist Eilean Hooper-Greenhill observes, “meanings may change radically as the object is moved from one site of semiosis to another. As the moves take place in time, and across space, earlier meanings may be lost or recovered, overlaid by new significations, or reinterpreted by different interpreters” (153). Stone’s story thus kick-starts the narrative of movement from its original physical and interpretive ground by employing forces upon the object, even if, in this instance, they are ‘primitive.’ But primitivism is itself a modern production and a way of seeing the object in relation to the activities around it. As ‘living ancestors’ (albeit degenerate), the Arabs are important for establishing continuity with the past and for locating the artefact’s authority as old and otherly; yet they are themselves cleared away like the shifting sands as the monuments are brought within the scope of British heritage. The narrative of relocation requires the translative action of contemporary forms of scientific knowledge draped in pleasing images of the antique aura of the East. The artefact is thus legitimated as an artefact within the poetics of dislocation.

The sensual logic of speaking and hearing is clearly a means of embodying the social experience of modernity in relation to the past. Like the Crystal Palace, the story is deeply committed to the imperialist project of gathering and displaying the products of the world. But it also documents certain cultural anxieties about the very modernity it ostensibly celebrates. While Stone’s bull pays lip-service to the terrible lessons of empires – it exhorts its new custodians, “boast not, ye vain-glorious creatures of an hour. I have outlived many mighty kingdoms, perchance I may be destined to survive one more” (469) – the bull remains confident in its bondage, caged in, as Frederick Bohrer puts it, “a narrative of captivity” (174). The bull’s very entropic history and warning are secondary to the narrative of enslavement itself, indeed to the powers of narrative enslavement. Simon Knell reminds us that “objects are ‘made to speak,’ [. . .] but in this ‘conversation,’ is the object active or passive? Does it embody and communicate some aspect of ourselves or is it simply a slave to
our words and thoughts?” (7). Stone shies away from the disturbing implications of Assyria that he rather programmatically raises for those with the power to mobilise expeditionary teams and naval and commercial vessels, as well as the geopolitical and imperialist investments that these scientific activities depended upon and supported.

Walter Savage Landor’s poem “To Layard” probes more deeply into the troubling ideological territory opened by Stone. His 36 verse line encomium to the archaeologist considers the ways ownership is caught up in sensitive issues of representing the archaeological reality of decay, ruin and entropy. Like “The Nineveh Bull,” the poem tries to cement past and present in a continuum, but for Landor this impulse functions as a sign of loss. The cultural imperative to forge solidarity with the past in an age committed to the progress of technology and commerce engenders solipsistic confusion. By negotiating the passage of time and space from antiquity, Landor’s poem raises the sneaking suspicion that England is being held ransom by its own history.

The poem is at first glance a lament for a world that can no longer value heroic deeds nor impart upon the poet the power to immortalise heroes. The present age is defined, rather, by the absence of poetry, though not individual acts of heroism. In this case, Landor reads the conditions of Layard’s early return to England and abortive expedition as the mark of an age that can produce but not properly appreciate Layard’s national sacrifice:

No harps, no choral voices, may enforce,
The words I utter. Thebes and Elis heard
Those harps, those voices, whence high men rose higher;
And nations crowned the singer who crowned them.
His days are over. Better men than his
Live among us: and must they live unsung
Because deaf ears flap round them? Or because
Gold lies along the shallows of the world,
And vile hands gather it? (1-9)

While the issue of Layard’s fame is by 1851 clearly misplaced, the range of interests drawn into the poem is symptomatic of the deep tensions underscoring the archaeological project itself. While the poem celebrates Layard as discoverer of Nineveh – “who raisest cities from the dust, [. . .] And rescuest thrones and nations, fanes and gods, / From conquering Time” (13, 16-17) – the ways of knowing Assyria are deeply embedded in the conditions of modernity, which the poet characterises as vain, corrupt and bureaucratic. The poem is divided against itself, on the one hand invoking Layard’s name in an old-fashioned encomium and, on the other, indicting a deaf-eared, gold-digging age bereft of poetic sensibility.

The poem at this point retreats to a meditation of waste itself, to the inevitable conclusion that archaeology is the science of entropy:

Cyrus raised
His head on ruins; he of Macedon
Crumbled them, with their dreamer, into dust:
God gave thee power above them, far above;
Power to raise up those whom they overthrew,
Power to show mortals that the kings they serve
Swallow each other, like the shapeless forms,
And unsubstantial, which pursue pursued
In every drop of water, and devour
Devoured, perpetual round the crystal globe. (27-36)

The poem comes full circle, for the archaeologist is ironically the prophet of corrupt modernity. The “crystal globe” – i.e. a solar microscope, a kind of magic lantern that enables the projection of microscopic images onto a screen – is a scientific instrument that both contains and projects the microbial lessons of entropy, of power destroying power. The entropic lessons Layard draws from the ruins of Assyria are actively at work in the microscopic concerns of the present. For Stone, entropy is neutralised through voice, but for Landor, the terrible lessons of history in a scientific age are decidedly and irrevocably ocular and exhibitionary.

The three “Nineveh” poems of 1851 conflate Landor’s underlying criticism of a modern world divided against itself and the imperialist domain of British acculturation playing out in Stone’s narrative. Collectively, they offer a fairly orthodox picture of contemporary Mesopotamia as a modern wasteland and tangible sign of God’s wrath. The poems amplify the British ability to read the landscape, uncover its treasure, and draw appropriate conclusions that at once validate the archaeological operation as a worthwhile colonial enterprise and as a warning against imperial hubris based on the biblical stories of Nineveh in the books of Jonah (God’s mercy) and Nahum (God’s wrath). While the archaeological tension between decay and resurrection is neatly resolved through deference to Scriptural interpretation, each poem nonetheless engages the ontological horrors of archaeological indeterminacy that we find in Landor’s cool, scientific image of cellular destruction. Their archaeological ‘poetics’ is firmly, if unconsciously, based in archaeology as a science of decay. Each mediates and orders entropy by locating it as an active process at work in the past and in the degenerate present of the East. But decoding these fragments within the Christian worldview under which colonialism and Western civilisation spread unquestionably threatened the pretences of a stable political and moral world that collecting artefacts attempted to reify.

Blake’s “Nineveh” is arguably the most straightforward of the three poems. Its 260 blank verse tour de force of the city’s rise and fall begins conventionally with an evocation and documentation of “great Nineveh” at its height. Blake invites the reader to contemplate the sensuous delights of the city, to imagine how the:

gay terraces,
[And] hanging gardens, radiant with bloom,
Filled all the wind, the dreamy loitering wind,
With delicate odours, till the very air
Reeled in the vapours of the dim noon-tide,
A tremulous fragrance, interfusing all.
And all the broadway of her wondrous walls
Resounded to the tramp of mailed feet,
As ceaselessly beneath the burning sun
Her sentinels kept watch; below the while
Flowed through her streets the stream and hum of men;
And gazing upward at the giant works,
Or lost in wonder [. . .]. (41-53)
The sense of wonder and enchantment is firmly Orientalist. But this introduces a troubling paradox of the East in the Victorian imaginary: its attractiveness is a sign of its demise. Exoticism is always on the brink of collapse:

Like ripe fruit shaken from autumn boughs,
Such was great Nineveh; her outstretched arms
Vexed the nations, as she fought and won,
Doing blind service; knowing not the while
That death was treading on the heels of sin.

[. . .] O what words,
What winged, armed, words, can weave a tale
Of sadder moral, or breathe more of death!
Of utterest death, and blank oblivion! (72-76; 83-86)

For Blake, the term oblivion conveys the dual sense of destruction and ignorance (‘oblivious’). In the immediate context of the historical fall of the city to the Medean army in 606 BCE, the city’s ignorance is an affront to a vengeful God. But ignorance needs a modern analogue to connect the biblico-archaeological landscape to European interest. Assyrian ignorance in antiquity bypasses the European reader and settles once again on the Arab. The site is now occupied by “the thoughtless Arab’s tent, / The wandering wild Arab’s shifting home” (90-91). As in Stone, Arabs bear the modern burden of archaeological indeterminacy that the European can experience and enjoy, but ultimately overcome:

Little thought Nimrod that that realm should shrink
And shiver into nothing, and be lost;
And that his children in the after-time
Should lightly tread upon the entombed ruin,
And raise bare huts o’er sunken palaces,
Unwitting of the splendour underneath;
Till that a stranger, magically wise,
Should come and disinter the ancient wonders,
And lay his finger on forgotten things,
Troubling the surface of the wind-laid plain
With mystic trench; and from some broken stone
Or column should divine and re-create
Temples, streets, palaces, and terraced walls. . .
The grand dead past that shames their present down. (99-116)

The poem folds back onto itself, validating through ‘mystic trenches’ the original evocation of gay terraces and hanging gardens of the corrupt city in its prime. In British hands, archaeology and poetry conspire to raise and raze the city perpetually. Yet the formation of historical and scientific knowledge is always subject to interrogation. As Frederick Bohrer observes, “the relations of difference through which the exotic is communicated are not bi-directional, but hierarchically structured” (16). In this way Blake eludes archaeology’s central problem of decay by feeding it into a moralistic reading of Nineveh’s destruction: that it was destroyed as a sign of God’s blessing on England, its “splendour” preserved for the “magic” of its agents to disinter and transplant as signs of prosperity and communion with the divine. The
poetics of remembrance are wrapped up in the religious sensibilities of its readers; the poetics of exoticism, in the spatial orientation of England as global leaders.

Such easy and self-satisfied extrapolations, to borrow from Lander’s image of the solar microscope, tend to project what they magnify. If England is the screen for Nineveh’s resurrection, it cannot easily escape self-identification with, in Blake’s words, the “grand dead past that shames their present down” (116). While the poem conventionally resolves with a meditation on time and a reminder to be good and God-fearing, the energy of discovery and recreation inescapably confirms the unyielding force of entropy in the world. As in Landor and Stone, the British themselves are agents of entropy, for knowledge of Assyrian splendour pulled out of the ground and shipped ‘home’ to England has made the country older as well as wiser. The imagined relationship between God and humanity that Blake grafts onto the excavations is inevitably haunted by absence, is a projection of desire for immortality and a need to escape or rewrite or evade a similar fate by conflating archaeological knowledge with Christian piety. The poem ends with a question that attempts to close this hermeneutic circle:

‘[. . .] the glad earth
Shall clap her hands and burst in singing forth
Over thy ruin; and the sun shall rise
And see no comforter, no mourner there.’ –

So spake the prophet [Nahum] centuries ago:
Is not his prophecy a history now? (190-95)

But with the arrival of the “magically wise” Layard, the prophecy demands material proof. The God of the poem is merely a god of archaeology speaking through broken pieces retrofitted by historical discourse; the remains of Nineveh must be safeguarded poetically within and as Scriptural discourse. The evolutionary thrust of Blake’s archaeology inadvertently opens up a hybrid position wherein the artefacts resist the discourses that seek to render them intelligible.

Alfred Hunt’s “Nineveh” – a poem of nearly 200 heroic couplets – follows a similar trajectory of evocation of the lost world, the fall configured through contemporary Arab ignorance and degeneration, and meditation on the lessons for England. Assuming a bardic persona, the speaker evokes the enchantments of the past and the mordant pleasures of contemplating present waste. For Hunt, Nineveh is England’s latest ‘City of the Dead’: “Tis but a shapeless mass, yet something there / Tells a wild tale of ruin and despair” (11-12). Of the three poems, Hunt’s “Nineveh” is the most sumptuous in its evocation of Nineveh. The poem has a museum-like quality, an inventory of extinct life. The speaker-cum-cicerone is the genius loci of the ruins:

The spirit of eld is on me, as I stand
On Zagros’ brow, three thousand years expand
Their mythic glories, and the days appear
When all was life – all joy – all beauty here.

Oh gorgeous vision! when this sunlit plain
Rippled in golden seas of ripening grain:
When the far-ranging eye enraptured, traced
One citied wilderness, one people waste:
One maze of spire, and pinnacle and shrine
Sparkling along the dimmed horizon’s line.
Temples were there, on piled-up mountains raised,
Whose eaves with gold, whose walls with vermeil blazed:
With aisles on aisles in lustrous long array . . . (75-87)

The speaker continues in a similar vein for several pages. What is interesting
is not so much what Hunt says about the city as the nature and circumstances of his
poetic resurrection. Hunt’s golden age of course never existed, and his imaginative
reconstruction is only slightly encumbered with material Assyria. His post-
archaeological Nineveh is an Orientalised Xanadu poised on the distant margins of
British faith and, moreover, British markets. The poem’s antiquarian positioning is
important for connecting the lost world to contemporary concerns:

And flowing round two sides, a lordly tide
Reflected silken-sailed flotillas’ pride.
And quays beheld with richest hand unrolled
The wealth of Ind, and Ophir’s ruddy gold.
Earth’s tribute-offerings, over land and sea,
Bright Queen of Cities, found their way to thee!
For thee the ‘Desert-ship’ high-laden came
Through moving sands, and reddening spires of flame,
Bearing rare gems, and pearls and corals gay
And bales of rustling silks from far Cathay,
To deck they crimson-clothed bazaars, and feed
Wealth’s pampered pride and languid luxury’s need. (101-12)

The underlying irony is that Nineveh’s wealth, which is the cause of its decadence and
downfall, is the very reason why England is so attracted to the East. The reference to
the ships, quays, tide and Queens are self identifying markers of England’s own
empire and wealth. India lingers on the margins of the poem. The land is haunted by
Alexander, the “youthful conqueror, speeding on / To grasp the gorgeous Orient’s
dazzling crown” (198-99), Layard, the “bright-eyed stranger [ . . .] from Frangistan /
Master of mightiest spells,” picks it up (210-11). The “Spirit of eld” sounds
suspiciously like the ‘Spirit of commerce’.

While the poem retreats to the conventional ‘Lest we Forget’ motif as a way to
rescue its readers from too close an identification with the horrors of Eastern
effeminacy (“languid luxury”) (192) and entropy (“‘Tis but the sport of time hath
flashed the light / Of our world’s noonday on millennial night”) (229-30), the burden
of remembrance for the modern reader lies heavy upon the poem nonetheless. The
Assyrian threat cannot be so easily contained within the biblical narrative, and the
poem certainly promotes identification with the imperial history it tries to circumvent.
For the speaker ultimately confronts emptiness:

Where now those nations? though the sunbeam shines
Once more through palace courts or temple shrines,
Where once in sacred calm, or restless strife,
Throbbed the full pulses of their mighty life.
They rise not now! those senseless gods alone
Survive, to frown in everlasting stone
   Relics of awful memory! since your day
Time’s whirling wheels might almost own decay! (274-81)

The collection of artefacts – and their poetic arrangement – offers a formidable bulwark against Eastern entropy, pride and decadence; but the paradox remains and the magic of archaeology conferred upon Layard casts its own spell: the flattering discourses of God, Queen and Country that attract the British gaze to the city are mirrors of England’s own imperial hubris.

Of the three Nineveh poems, Edward Bickersteth’s is arguably the most complex engagement with the poetics of ruination. It is the longest – 35 Spencerian stanzas framing a narrative section of heroic couplets – and the most mordant. Like Blake and Hunt, Bickersteth treats Nineveh as a sign of entropy and moral degeneration, but unlike them, the archaeological materials do not lend themselves to revival, to a temptation to parade Nineveh before the reader. In this sense, the poem is the most honest engagement with artefacts: they are ultimately things cut off in time. The tone is elegiac, but there is no longing for this lost world, no desire nor need to marvel at its bygone glories. And this is precisely the ideological message for the curate. Nineveh was not built to last. It stands unequivocally as a sign to “man [of] the eternal truth of God!” (468). The poet speaker asks “Who shall repaint her vanished scenes of glory, / Or weave her shattered woof of fragmentary story? (98-99).” The conventional answer is the poet. But the speaker likewise resists this urge. For the poem is a vast encomium to destruction itself (“Woe to the land of Assur!” is repeated five times in the opening five stanzas). The speaker invites the reader to consider how “Gloom settles on those silent wastes of snow; / The colours fade like dreams, and all is wan, / Save intermittent starlight, dimly glimmering on” (106-108). The speaker conflates prophecy with archaeological processes of decay, entropy and waste:

Time digged thy grave, and heaped the dust on thee
Soon died the echo of the dying groan;
And travellers, who came thy wreck to see,
Asked, and received no answer – Where is Nineveh? (454-57)

The concluding stanzas offer archaeological proof of the divine presence guiding evolutionary time, but where Blake and Hunt confidently raise Nineveh in order to destroy it and draw the appropriate lesson of being faithful servants of God, Bickersteth’s Nineveh is firmly and confidently buried.

In this regard Bickersteth resists the temptation to imagine self in these ruins. The temporal trajectory for England lies, rather, in the future. Contemplating “the evening of the world,” (458) the speaker translates biblical archaeological into the millennial promise held out to the Christian faithful. Archaeology is entirely compatible with Scriptural narratives of the end, rather than the beginning:

Men throng all paths of knowledge; Science dives
   Below the ocean’s bed, the mountain’s base,
And from the bowels of creation rives
   The monumental stones which dimly trace
   Earth’s primal story – then she soars apace
Above our little orb, and speeds afar
   Mid distant planets her unwearied chase,
Skirting their track as in a seraph’s car
From luminous world to world, from gorgeous star to star. (476-84)
Similar to Landor’s image of the solar microscope, the archaeological lessons are projected outward. The very cosmos mirrors earthly activity. In the penultimate stanza the speaker asks: “Who shall recall to life the things that were? / Or wake the spectral forms of thy vast sepulchre?” (519-20). The answer, like Landor’s, is in the form of negation:

No, while the ages of the shattered world
Roll slowly to the final term of time,
There shalt thou lie in desolation, hurled
By vengeance from that pinnacle sublime
Whereon thou satest in thy glory’s prime (521-25)

Unlike Blake and Hunt there is no pleasure in contemplating archaeological time and ruination. Enveloped in the scientific drive to chart progress in time, space and knowledge, archaeology is an active means of shaping and mapping the future. While all three Nineveh poets arrive at the same conclusion – that the stones of Assyria reveal the divine hand at work in earthly affairs – Bickersteth uncompromisingly locates England’s own end in the archaeological poetics of waste.

In this essay I have been arguing that the literary engagements with archaeology and ruination inspired by Layard’s excavations help us appreciate the flexibility and complexity of Nineveh at mid-century as a spatial and temporal signifier of a desired national identity, as well as the cultural anxieties of identification through the backward-looking science of archaeology. Nineveh was a means of looking both outward and inward. In Hunt and Blake, the archaeological poetics of entropy respond to a desire to venture out, to reclaim imaginatively a distant spiritual homeland. As a sign of British agency in Mesopotamia, archaeology resonates in the larger imperial context of the Eastern Question itself. Claiming archaeological territory was an important diplomatic and rhetorical exercise for a Christian nation committed to protecting its commercial interests in, and religious connections to, the Ottoman East. The power to excavate stones and to shape them into meaningful narratives is undoubtedly an expression of the political power to reinvest the dead world with the living presence of God and God’s people, who have returned to the cradle of civilisation to protect its history and shepherd it into a new age of Western, global modernity.

In Bickersteth, Stone and Landor, on the other hand, entropic discourse describes a society whose global vision was turned intensely inward and homeward on itself at Hyde Park. The contemporary imagery enveloping the Crystal Palace—the beacon of technological progress and moral and social harmony – illuminates the Victorian project of raising Nineveh. Assyrian archaeology and the poetic encounters with the biblical landscape it inspired can not make much sense outside of the cultural discourses of material and commercial progress on display at the Great Exhibition. If Nineveh seemed to be rediscovered by divine authority – as a reinvestment of God back into history and into the material conditions of modernity – its reappearance is also the product of a desire to collect and exhibit, to stockpile “the past in plain view,” because we need, in the words of Jean Baudrillard, “a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin to reassure us as to our ends” (76). But like the disastrous war in the Crimea that was to shake Victorian society to its very core, such archaeological and imperial investments are always haunted by the ghost of the past, the shadow of entropy that has historically fallen over great empires. Archaeology as
the science of entropy inevitably haunts the objects and the narratives of return that they are conscripted into.

Archaeologists and archaeographers like Michael Shanks maintain that our semiotic engagements with material remains are fuelled by the desire to document social identity. The literary reflections on Assyria in 1851 leave behind an impression for us to follow, of the imagined relations between the self and the self that was, a self that was also located in the temporal and spatial differentiation from others and firmly located in the rhetoric of Victorian modernity, commerce and colonialism. This ‘archaeography’ of Nineveh in 1851 has endeavoured to show that the cultural responses to Layard’s excavations is also an archaeography of the cultural desires that can in part explain the Victorians’ need to exhibit themselves to the world.
Notes

1. He conducted two expeditions from 1845 to 1847 and 1849 to 1851. For details of Layard’s departure from Mesopotamia refer to Larsen, 286-90. Other narrative histories of Layard’s excavations include Fagan and Waterfield.

2. The long list of 1851 publications includes Walpole, Vaux, Ferguson, Layard as well as a number of anonymous texts. For a study of the aesthetic reception of Assyria in Europe, see Bohrer.

3. By 1851 the best selling author of Nineveh and Its Remains (1849) was a household name. He would go on to translate his archaeological fame into a long and distinguished career in politics and diplomacy.

4. For a survey of the City of the Dead motif in English literature see Wallace.
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Misfit Objects: Layard’s Excavations in Ancient Mesopotamia and the Biblical Imagination in mid-nineteenth Century Britain

Mirjam Brusius

In 1852, an engraved image caught the attention of the readers of the Illustrated London News. The engraving showed the impressive entrance of the newly-built British Museum in London (see Fig. 1). A large ramp leads up to the museum entrance and is surrounded by workmen and gentlemen, presumably curators, who witness a spectacular scene: on the ramp, an enormous sculpture of a winged lion is being trundled into the museum. This image became iconic for the successful integration of such archaeological finds into the British Museum. What the engraving did not depict are the difficulties and the failures the excavators and trustees of the British Museum were facing at the excavation site and in the museum. The winged lion was uncovered as part of the excavations of the British adventurous explorer and collecting antiquarian Austen Henry Layard (1817-1894) in Ancient Mesopotamia, a land previously mainly known through the Bible. Layard undertook his first excavation in Nimrud (that he first mistook for Nineveh) in 1845. The shipping of artefacts to Britain, especially of the Great Bull and Lion, was documented as a national event in the Illustrated London News. For its readers in Victorian Britain, the lion was thus much more than an impressive and colossal statue. The sculpture was the first of a row of materialised proofs – the most valuable of which were excavated objects bearing inscriptions – that were meant to confirm what had hitherto been subject to peoples’ imagination and religious belief. In October 1848 the first cargo arrived at the British Museum. Layard returned to England in the same year, where his book Nineveh and its Remains (1849) became a bestseller. Reviews of Layard’s book in the popular press promoted the idea that the Victorians were uncovering their own past by digging in the archaeological remains of places mentioned in the Bible. Above all, the book conveyed the impression that the excavations were designed as a purposeful enterprise with a clear goal. In contrast to the parallel French excavations, for which museum display and the expansion of the national collection was entirely the driving focus, in Britain the enterprise was a mission to trace biblical accounts.

In 1800, the Bible was a virtually unchallenged canonical text in the intellectual and religious life of the western world (geology being the only, but not uncontested, challenger, with respect to the age of the earth). Alongside classical sources the Bible remained the main source for a history of Mesopotamia until 1845 when excavations started. The Victorian view on the biblical land was also shaped by artistic depiction of Mesopotamia: paintings and drawings focussing mainly on Babylon’s ambivalent role. The mid nineteenth-century therefore materialised the Bible to a hitherto unknown extent. Besides the excavated objects, photographs of biblical sites also helped shape and alter the imagination of the biblical land. These objects and depictions enhanced and prohibited biblical imagination at the same time. On the one hand they seemed authentic guarantors of the biblical past and thus seemingly rectified the imagination. On the other hand, their unstable status – we need to keep in mind that both photography and archaeology were still in their infancy and their ontology was unfamiliar – did not allow clear answers to the question of what archaeological truth, by comparison with imaginative truth, might reveal.
Layard’s excavation at Nimrud laid the groundwork for an academic discipline later to be called ‘biblical archaeology,’ which explored how the Bible related to the discoveries in the region. This discipline would later institutionalise and rationalise the study of the Bible. However, when Layard, in 1853, listed some fifty-five rulers, cities and countries appearing both in the Old Testament and the excavated Assyrian texts in one of his publications, archaeology did not yet exist as a discipline (*Discoveries*). Finding artefacts, nevertheless, made history and the Bible real, tangible, objective and accessible. They offered the opportunity for a reassessment of the imagination while at the same time creating a new image of the biblical lands, based on an increasing knowledge of the objects that were taken to Britain.

Given that Layard hoped to find biblical objects, it is not surprising that research on the excavations has long been preoccupied by the question of how the discoveries in the region related to the Bible. What exactly was it that Layard and the British Museum, which supported the expedition, were hoping to find? And once the objects were in the British Museum, how were they hoping to gain new knowledge through these finds? Indeed, what tends to be less studied is the fact that these objects were initially without a clear status. More than that, they also threatened to destabilise European canons once they became the subject of further investigation. In other words, confirmation of the classical European canon and the proof of biblical truth did not always work. It is such instability that this article will investigate, by paying close attention to two subjects: first, the uncertainty involved in Layard’s excavations when ‘looking’ for suitable objects. Second, the potential these objects had not just to confirm, but also to destabilise, threaten and even dethrone both the European canon and peoples’ imaginative understanding of the biblical land.

At the time when the objects Layard had excavated arrived in London, the museum's trustees began to lay out the plan for the modern structure by dividing the museum into different departments and appointing keepers to look after these specialised sections. This, however, was a difficult undertaking as far as the finds from Mesopotamia were concerned. Though the winged lion aroused remarkable
interest at first, many other items from Mesopotamia did not go on display because
the trustees of the museum did not know where to put them nor what to do with them.
These objects – some of them oddly shaped, curious sculptures, others illegible and
undeciphered cuneiform tablets – seemed not to fit already existing ideas of display
and canon formation previously shaped by art objects from places such as Greece or
Egypt. Lacking preparation in respect to their display and cultural contextualization,
the imaginary role the objects Layard had excavated were supposed to take on had to
be defined and created upon their arrival.

Therefore, in looking again at the image of the lion’s entrance to the
British Museum from the Illustrated London News, what is more interesting for the
purposes of this article are the broken pieces in front of the building hardly visible on
the foreground. The impressive façade of the museum is less intriguing than its
doorsteps, representing the threshold between the outside and the inside of the
museum, of which the objects were meant to become a part. This article will therefore
focus more on the chaos in the museum's storage area than the organised exhibition
space visible to museum visitors. The article will thus not discuss curatorial decisions
about where the lion would be displayed once in the museum, but rather that of the
curators wondering where to ‘place’ it both actually and epistemologically, indeed
how it might be characterised and imagined. In examining the arrival of
archaeological objects within the realms of peoples’ imagination of biblical truths,
this article thus examines the period when the objects had just been excavated but
were not yet part of a systematic collection in the museum. It is obvious from the
excavation’s archives that neither instruction before nor after the excavation followed
a clearly determined logic. Contemporary histories of the expedition, for example
Layard’s own Nineveh and its Remains, retrospectively narrated the finds and their
arrival as an organised and well-thought out event. But it is clear that the excavations
formed a temporal and spatial event during which the excavated objects seemed to
have ‘no status’ and their meaning was still negotiable. Indeed, this negotiation did
not stop when the objects left Mesopotamia but continued once they had arrived in
Europe.

On the Building Site
The historian Krzysztof Pomian claims that objects entering a museum start their
second life: they become ‘semiophors’ (carrier of signs): objects with two faces that
mediate between the visible and the invisible to which they refer (32). But the state of
the British Museum between 1850 and 1870 reveals that the meaning of objects after
they had been excavated was neither neutral, static nor clear once they had entered the
museum or the exhibition space. The museum was just another step in the selection
and classification process of the Mesopotamian finds; it was in a way an extension of
the field. This become particularly apparent in an incident that took place around the
same time as Layard left London for Mesopotamia. In 1843 Christian Jorgensen
Thomsen, keeper of the new National Museum of Denmark, visited the British
Museum. Thomsen was famous for having introduced a new chronological scheme
(the Three Ages Classification System of prehistoric chronology) that he used for
classification when new objects arrived at his museum. Thomsen instituted a
standardised record for each group of finds. This approach was new, and it sought to
turn archaeology into a measurable practice.

In London, however, things were different. When Thomsen visited the
metropolis he was unimpressed “by the British antiquities everywhere covered in dust
and not much esteemed” (qtd. in Briggs 227-226). Furthermore, he reported that the
The British Museum is an utter shambles! Only the Egyptian and Roman antiquities are beginning to be improved [. . .]; but there is no prospect of this for their national antiquities. I demonstrated at length to Hawkins [. . .], about the importance of paying them more regard than has previously been the case. They promised they would, but the situation is awkward. (qtd. in Rowley-Conway 796)\textsuperscript{5}

Worsaae concluded that British archaeologists must take greater care in recording the location of excavated items. His visit shows that practitioners at the British Museum were clearly aware of the Three Age System but felt no need to adopt it. Thomsen and Worsaae found themselves and their ideas entangled within conflicted groups: a complex network of associations and societies that could not even agree on the most trivial decisions. It was therefore less surprising that the reactions to new classification systems came across as apathetic and uninterested. What is more, the Assyrian finds that were to arrive were certainly no easier to classify than anything already held by the museum. This incident illuminates the context for Layard’s excavations and the arrival of his excavated objects. But how did the excavations in 1845 at what he thought was the biblical city of Nineveh actually work?

**Objects Without Status**

In 1845, with archaeology still without disciplinary foundations, methods of excavation were precarious and knowledge on the site and the finds very much restricted to the imagination. What exactly Layard and his team imagined they would find in Mesopotamia is not obvious. Certainly the main inspiration for the excavations was the Bible itself, intertwined with mostly sumptuous fine art images of an ambiguous Mesopotamian past. But how would the discovered objects themselves fit with this image? How were selection criteria to be defined, if knowledge on the objects was unknown and the inscriptions on the many clay tablets and slabs were unreadable because they had yet to be deciphered? Processes of familiarization with the finds and new excavation criteria happened gradually. Layard and the trustees in London at the British Museum had to figure out step by step what it was they were actually interested in according to their vague idea of an imaginary biblical orient. The objects were not supposed to create a new imaginative view of Mesopotamia.
Rather they were supposed to fit neatly with what had previously been shaped by scripture and art.

In 1846, Layard informed the British Museum about the discoveries he made at Nimrud and in the neighbourhood (CMM 9 Aug. 1845-17th April 1847). When describing the nature of the objects, his terminology was vague and general. Layard reported, for example, that “sculptures of interest had been discovered in the excavations,” (CMM 11 Nov. 1848) that nothing “of importance” was discovered or that he had “discovered eight chambers, but found nothing capable of being transported to England,” (CMM July 1847) but the meaning of the adjective ‘capable’ in this context remained unclear. Layard thus refrained from being more specific in terms of what exactly it was he was looking for or what he had imagined he had found; perhaps because it was not clear to himself.

According to the museum the selecting process required “an experienced eye” (Letter To Unknown Recipient 20 July 1848). But the kind of experience that was needed was not specified. Soon the museum realised that Layard – though a respected Antiquarian with an interest and knowledge in Western art – had no expertise in order to fulfil the different tasks that were required, such as drawing sculptures or choosing clay tablets with inscriptions and copying them. Lacking an alternative, however, they asked him to do so nevertheless. Being aware of his shortcomings, Layard admitted that he was not “accustomed to the copying of cuneiform inscriptions, and that therefore some steps should be taken for the preservation of the monuments he might discover, otherwise they would be entirely lost” (CMM 29 Jan. 1848).

From the numerous sculptures discovered, those selected were deemed to deserve a place in the museum. What made them achieve this status is not accounted for in more detail. Once Layard reported that “a very fine and well-preserved pair of human headed winged bulls had been discovered,” and expressed hopes that the trustees would authorise the attempt at “moving [. . .] those splendid specimens”. He further reported a “curious discovery” of sixteen copper lions, all in one spot, and number of alabaster vases with cuneiform inscriptions (CMM 29 Nov. 1848). Decisions on what, how and when such objects would be transferred back to Britain were mainly subject to chance. Located both under the ground and also beyond peoples’ imagination of the biblical land, it was impossible fully to imagine the quantity, quality and the nature of the material that might, in theory, be discovered. Lacking criteria for selection, comparison to objects Layard had already excavated and their reception in London was the only ‘tool’ available. External forces, such as the competition with the French, were also an important factor and made the selection of objects appear random. At one point Layard was sure that the “excavations had been attended with considerable success, that his finds were exhausted but that he was afraid to leave off, as the French Consul would immediately carry on the work” (CMM 11 March 1848). Uncertainty did not only concern the other colonial power, but also the degree of discovery, so that Layard could only guess at the location of any future excavations. He reported that “only a portion of the great Mound at Nimrud had yet been explored, and that several similar Mounds existed from which it was reasonable to expect that many most interesting objects might be obtained” (CMM 11 Nov. 1848).

While the excavators were thus slowly familiarizing themselves with the surroundings and the finds, the actual problem was that the mere excavation of the finds did not suffice in making sense of them. In order to accommodate the finds to peoples’ beliefs and already existing cultural imagination, their semantic value had to be recognised and defined. This process did not take place without obstacles.
Elsewhere in this volume, Shawn Malley has shown how the excavated objects were ultimately reanimated and imposed with meaning through writing. In poetry and other texts the silent objects were brought to life and Victorians offered the opportunity to imagine the context and the surroundings from which they derived. But these ideas were still committed to literary frameworks and detached from the actual finds. The objects themselves remained a challenge that nobody knew how to face. Moreover, the fact that some of them bore inscriptions made them more obscure and resistant to either rational categorization or the imagination.

Hidden Evidence
Besides the monumental sculptures ornamenting the gates of the palace, Layard was mainly instructed to send inscribed slabs back to the British Museum (CMM 24 Oct. 1850). Other than the ‘curious’ sculptures, inscribed slabs and the clay tablets had an immediate cultural value for people in Britain. The problem that hindered this value, however, was that nobody could read the script. First attempts at cuneiform decipherment had only just started and fundamental historical and biblical questions remained unanswered. It was not known which language these wedge-shaped scripts (impressed into clay with a reed) represented, and it was uncertain to which linguistic family they belonged. As items carrying inscriptions they all appeared alike and remained impenetrable. Thus, no valuable insight could be gained from their first appraisal, which is why they were classified and determined according to their origin and specific visual features.

This was also the reason why the selection of objects (as far as the clay tablets were concerned) was more a matter of chance than procedure. For Layard, it was the potential of the exhumed objects that counted. But even the nature of this potential could not be named; though it was clear that it could be manifold in theory. Hence, the uncertainty on the status and value of the finds applied especially to the undeciphered clay tablets. Several finds offered more uncertainty than proof. Some important biblical figures that were expected to appear, for example, remained entirely untraceable. That said, it would be misleading to assume that the excavators had not the slightest idea what they expected to find. Rather they imagined finding proof of a particular and canonical idea, such as a significant biblical narrative. The objects, however, seemed to resist any such imaginary frameworks and instead took on a life on their own. As agents in an already unstable environment, they were especially powerful because their meaning was hidden in the realms of undecipherable texts that required knowledge and expertise in order to be understood.

After Layard had returned to Nineveh, he discovered some 30,000 cuneiform tablets and fragments, located in and around the palace and neighbouring buildings. These tablets became known as the significant Koyunjik Collection, named after the main mound at Nineveh. Lacking decipherment skills to read the clay tablets, however, the excavators did not have a clear procedure for dealing with these objects. Layard accordingly noted that the walls were covered with “inscriptions in an unknown language.” He used the visual criteria of form and outline in order to make conclusions about the objects’ value. Even though he tried to find corresponding structures, the inscriptions looked “precisely similar” to him (Layard, Nineveah 34, 29, 332). That said, excavations did not take place in order to decipher. Rather, decipherment was an unexpected and additional challenge of the expedition.

While Layard was unable to decipher such objects, the then consul in Baghdad, Henry Creswick Rawlinson was an emerging expert in decipherment, if not in excavation. The trustees had hoped that through Rawlinson’s knowledge, given he
worked on the decipherment of the script at the same time, the finds “may be soon made to contribute to the increase of historical knowledge” (CMM 24 April 1847). Not having the expertise himself – especially as far as the cuneiform inscriptions were concerned – it was thus not Layard, but Rawlinson, who was supposed to make sense of the finds. But this semantic process did not take place before the objects arrived in the museum. They had to be selected first. Until then, and even when they were in the museum, their meaning had to be evoked and imagined.

After 1852, when decipherment progressed and knowledge about the finds increased, expectations of which finds might be of particular interest became more specific. Layard thus expected “the removal to England of several series of bas-reliefs remaining in different chambers at Kojunjik, and amongst them the Sculptures representing the Siege of Lachish.” As well as some “fine pavement inscriptions from Nimrud” (CMM 12 June 1852) Layard described the finds as “valuable and interesting”, one chamber representing the Siege of Lachish “with the name of the King himself”. He ensured that “the slabs can easily be removed; and that the cost will be inconsiderable: and above all that the matter is more urgent in as much as the Agents of another power are now near the spot” (CMM 22 Jan. 1853). The other power Layard meant was, of course, the French and to surpass them was especially significant in this case. Lachish was one of the chief cities of the kingdom of Judah. It was captured by the Assyrian King Sennacherib (704-681 BC) and mentioned in the Bible, which is why in Layard’s view the sculptures were “among the most important which have been excavated.” The next goal consisted of finding other objects “of great interest” and “more material alike.” Even though he could not read cuneiform, Layard made transcripts of the inscriptions that were sent to the museum. This implied errors in the copying process. Some of the inscriptions were therefore preferably detached from the original sculptures or, if not bodily removed, photographed or even cast. Layard, who had perhaps consulted cuneiform experts in London, later stated that he was satisfied “in respect to the identity of the King, and to the general accuracy of the interpretation of the inscriptions” (CMM 12 June 1852).

When Layard retired from archaeology in 1853 and took up politics again, Rawlinson took over responsibility for the British excavations in Assyria. Rawlinson regarded the excavations of sculptures as exhausted. His interest lay clearly in the inscriptions. Rawlinson was thus the immediate pioneer of a shift from object-based to text-based archaeology in Mesopotamia. The inscribed slabs and tablets became a challenge of an even greater extent for re-assessing the imagined biblical lands. The meanings of the inscriptions were ultimately less ambiguous than the images or sculptures and therefore gave the promise of truth about the imagined sites of biblical narratives.

Accordingly, in 1855 an official rule demanded that artefacts were selected, “according to quality, state of preservation, legibility, historical and scientific value, variety, chronological succession as aim.” Explicitly looking for ways of identifying the kings who constructed the palaces, the British Museum encouraged Rawlinson “to make any use he thinks proper of the information he derives from the Antiquities which pass through his hands” (CMM 9 Jan. 1847). Expectations that the inscriptions would match the imaginary scenes evoked by biblical narratives were thus high. Yet some finds offered more uncertainty than proof: prior to 1850, for example, King Pul was considered to be the first Assyrian conqueror, followed immediately by King Tiglath-Pileser, based on biblical testimony. However, he remained untraceable in all excavated objects. Therefore some believed him to be identical with Tiglath-Pileser. Such sources did not only challenge the exclusivity of European canonical traditions.
and became problematic events in Western intellectual discourse, they also challenged the imagination and provoked a reassessment of the imaginative biblical land and biblical narratives.

Later, in the 1870s, the status of biblical account reached its highlight when the most problematic event concerning biblical proof took place: the discovery of an Assyrian account of a ‘Deluge’ myth (now known as the eleventh tablet of the Gilgamesh epic) by George Smith. Smith had identified fragments of a broken version of the story of the flood described in Genesis and had been employed by the British Museum to join fragments of the flood tablet. This Assyrian-Babylonian flood myth bore some very close resemblances to the flood described in Genesis. Consequently, public interest was high and Smith was paid by the Daily Telegraph in 1873 to travel to Mesopotamia to search for further flood-related material. The narrative on the tablet, however, proved to be substantially different from that of the Bible in key details and thus challenged the Old Testament account as testimony of a unique, worldwide event, which (according to some) had left traces in the geological record. The tablets containing the flood myth are one example of how inscriptions resided unremarked within the museum until someone started working with them. At the time of their excavation, their value lay merely in the potential of the script, which made them both valuable and dangerous at the same time. Still, around 1900, for example, one of the curators of the collection of Henry Wellcome admitted: “[my] knowledge of cuneiform is so slight that it was difficult to tell the best to buy. I based my judgement however to a large extent on the condition they were in, and the legibility of the characters.” Wellcome had no “idea as to whether they will be worth working on or not” (Thompson).

From the Transit Zone to the Museum

“A large Bull and Lion entire, the Obelisk described in a former letter, between 70 and 80 Bas reliefs, the copies and impressions of a considerable number of inscriptions, and an interesting Collection of bronzes, pottery, and small objects of Assyrian art, and should have above two hundred, probably about two hundred and fifty drawings almost all of complicated and highly interesting subjects” (CMM 24 April 1847). This list contained what Layard had forwarded to Bagdad in 1847. The challenge began, as Julian Reade points out, much earlier, before objects entered the museum. They began during transportation due to “the sheer difficulty of lifting, packing, handling and conserving small unstable antiquities, since the expertise did not yet exist and treatments were speculative” (18). The logistics of the Empire provided further challenges. Layard packed the finds and hoped for the cases to be floated to Baghdad where they proceeded to Bombay to be shipped, as soon as the river rose. The bull and lion, however, were thought to weigh nearly 20 tons and thus remained in Bussorah due to insecurities about how these should be transported to England. Some proposed that the heavy sculptures and reliefs should be sawn in pieces and rejoined in England. It happened frequently that Layard reported of objects that had been “destroyed by the shameful manner in which they had been treated at Bombay” or that “some valuable objects” had been stolen. Many of them simply went astray (CMM 29 Jan. 1848).

The British Museum was also constantly short of money and space as the excavations took place, and the trustees did not know how to handle the arrival of new objects. They had to limit the import of new artefacts by trusting recommendations of colleagues in the field. In order to do this, workers were at one point instructed to gather only those objects that “either from superiority of workmanship, or from
historical connection, or from elucidation of the peculiar manners of the age are most remarkable.” The trustees concluded that anything merely equal or inferior should not be sent to Britain (Rawlinson, Letter to Ellis). The definitions of inferiority and superiority were ill-defined. The Mesopotamian objects were just an additional problem in an already cramped collection. The challenges did not therefore end once the objects had arrived in Britain; in some ways they had only just begun. The problem the trustees in London were now facing was how to organise, classify and store all the new objects.

The first hurdle consisted of finding an appropriate space for the finds (Reade 617-18). The excavated items were first exhibited in the British Museum, though its trustees were not properly prepared for their storage or display. Ideas related to the question how these objects could be displayed were rather conflicted due to their exotic origin. As Frederick Bohrer aptly notes, “they were something between a proper object of study, a trophy, and a curiosity” (“The Times and Spaces” 203). Display became a serious problem, not only in terms of space, but also in terms of intellectual organization. It was not obvious how the objects could be arranged, especially in relation to Hawkins’s “scientific principles,” a chronological arrangement in which collections of Ancient Sculptures, and “the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Grecian Monuments would be placed in three parallel lines through which Visitors would pass in succession” (CMM 24 Oct. 1850, 12 April 1851). But should the Assyrian objects be with the Egyptian sculptures? Did they deserve to be right next to the Greek marbles? Or right in between the two? Bohrer thus infers: “The works were still essentially a curiosity in the British Museum, if not actually a burden” (“The Times and Spaces” 204). Were they art at all or mainly entertainment?

When, for example, the bull and other antiquities arrived, Hawkins wished them in the centre of the famous West Wing, but the spaces were occupied. The Trustees thus directed the bull to be placed temporarily in the Hall. While the Nineveh slabs were thought to be “invaluable” and protected by glass, the exotic sculpture was to be “protected by a sufficient fence” (CMM 26 June 1852, 8 Oct 1850). This promoted the idea that it was not only the bull who had to be protected from visitors, but also that visitors had to be protected from the bull. The fluid and polysemantic nature of both the sculptures and tablets, however, made them even more valuable as objects containing several potential meanings simultaneously.

Hawkins’s plans did not take shape for several years, partly because the new objects kept arriving and the exhibition space became more and more crowded. It was noted several times that “immediate preparations for the erection of an adequate Gallery” for the Assyrian objects should be made (CMM 18 Aug. 1851), but Hawkins’s power was limited and had to be exercised in accordance with the wishes of the trustees, who seemed to rely on Hawkins when nobody quite knew how to proceed. Hawkins, for example, asked the trustees for instructions as to where the large Bulls and Lions from Assyria were to be erected.” The trustees stated that they were “unable to give any definite instructions until they receive from Mr Hawkins a detailed report of the manner in which he proposed to arrange the Assyrian Antiquities.” They demanded that Hawkins “should without delay suggest for the consideration of the Trustees, the places in which he deems that those large objects may be most advantageously placed” (CMM 11 Oct. 1851). It seems that everyone tried to shift the problem to another authority. A sub-committee was formed to solve the ongoing problems (CMM 22 Nov. 1851). While they were still looking for solutions another bull and lion arrived, so that space now had to be created with “as little delay as possible” (CMM 28 Feb. 1852).
While the large sculptures and slabs were at least comparable to previous museum objects from Egypt or Greece, one problem remained. How should the small cuneiform tablets be displayed? On the one hand they were of immense cultural value due to their content, but was the museum an appropriate place to exhibit script that no museum visitor could read? Hawkins and the trustees consulted cuneiform experts to enquire what might be the best mode of exhibiting smaller objects from Nimrud and Koyunjik, but the clay tablets never found a proper home outside the walls of the museum storage, where experts continued their work of decipherment (CMM 9 June 1855). The problem of placement continued for years, and when in 1856 another 94 packages of Assyrian Antiquities arrived, the museum was urged to re-think its structure in order to display at least a portion of the newly arrived Assyrian Sculptures (CMM 12 April 1856). There was simply too much material and too few ideas about the meanings of the objects, either in the present or in a more enlightened future.

The production of visual imagery that contextualised the objects was one way of trying to bring order to this confusion. Their function was to evoke and enhance the image that Layard’s reports described in words. They were meant to rationalise and control the hybrid meanings of the finds. The pictures, however, actually set yet another imaginary framework: of an ordered, Orientalist project. One watercolour drawing by Frederick Charles Cooper depicts the scene described in Cooper’s diary: the lowering of the Winged Lions in the Palace of Ashurnasirpal (see Fig. 2).\(^{13}\) The drawing emphatically visualises the clarity and goal-directedness his diary entries suggest. The image contains an illuminated group lowering the gateway in the centre of the image, a second group of workmen in the front of the image, decoratively arranged locals on camels on the left, and a differently dressed person with a cap briskly outstretching an arm just above the lowered figure on the right; presumably Layard. Its precise, almost symmetrical composition suggests a clearly organised space. As Bohrer has rightly articulated, Cooper’s images with workmen usually standing in groups clustered according to their function make his images a “paradigm of the well-ordered worksite,” with the work itself being placed under authority and carried out in a sequence (Orientalism 189). They were thus far more than documents of an archaeological expedition: they encompassed the visual report of a travelling witness to the Orient. Images of this kind mark the fact that the British had been there while at the same time accounting for the popular imagination of what constituted the Orient. They did not, however, offer any fresh truths about the objects depicted, but rather provided yet another imaginatively constructed layer of meaning. These pictorial accounts, then, did not stabilise the meaning of the objects but reinforced their statuslessness and their imaginative plurality.
Conclusion

Even though the excavators did not know exactly what they were looking for, the retrospective reports that were communicated to the public made excavation look ordered and rational. Layard’s publications and the visual material involved in these retrospective narratives support this idea. Like the text in Layard’s books and numerous newspaper articles, the pictorial images shaped the reception of the archaeological enterprise. The pandemonium and uncertainty involved during the event itself do not enter these retroactive recordings. Literary and visual tools were needed to account for prevailing ideas of an imagined biblical Orient but did nothing to enable a greater understanding of the independently existing finds.

Though the museums embodied the reconfiguration of the order of objects, in London, the story continued. Thomsen’s and Worsaae’s reports of their visits reflect the disorder and dispute between antiquarian societies, but also the ongoing conservatism and apathetic reactions of the trustees in the museum whose attitude seemed defiant. Furthermore, the complex relationship to the collection curators, commissioners and the public denied the potential for change (Bohrer, Orientalism 111). The museum was also facing major problems in defining the status of the new objects, but also in organizing the collections, keeping track of their origins, and even appreciating that these finds represented a thoroughly new artistic and cultural tradition. When Hawkins took Prince Albert on a tour through the museum he explained that these objects were “without a price”; nobody could buy them and they cost the country nothing (Larsen 111, 92). Pearson’s description of the institution might be partly right: “In London, the disorder and chaos of the excavations was symbolically transported from primitive origins as Nineveh arrived in packing cases...
and overflowed from the steps of the British Museum. [. . .] The newspapers, the reviews, and the exhibited reconstructions all enter into a network of cultural relationships with the attempt at a ‘disciplined’ Museum display” (58). The objects were certainly meant to enter a “larger world for reasons of physical as well as ideological efficacy,” where they could be evaluated, studied and circulated (Bohrer, “The Times and Spaces” 216). The practical transposition of these high aims was challenging and disorder continued within the walls of the museum. This applied especially to the vast Koyunjik collection of cuneiform tablets, which was characterised by disorder from its inception (Walker 186-87). Though presenting a historically significant part of the collection, hardly any tablets were on display. The museum thus created its own Assyrian reality, distinct from the actual interests of antiquarians concerned with biblical record and decipherment. But in the storage area an efficient system to allow the handling of the objects did not exist either. In short, when the objects arrived in the museum, they by no means entered a ‘disciplined’ space that opposed the disorder of the excavations. The collection at the British Museum thus remained a set of polysemantic items; the museum itself made it impossible for objects to remain uncontested in their meaning and even in their importance. The problems this caused for the imagined biblical and Oriental world was precisely their intransigent nature as museum objects: they were not imaginary accessory parts, not semiophors, nor metaphors, not analogies nor even symbols. They were simply the very things themselves: objects without singular status that might exist within the cultural imaginary but whose multiple instabilities and their resistance to knowledge placed them in a position of such ambiguity that even the imagination failed to make sense of them.
Notes

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3. See Brusius.

4. See also Rowley-Conwy, From Genesis to Prehistory: the Archaeological Three Age System and its Contested Reception in Denmark, Britain, and Ireland.

5. See also Malley, "Nineveh 1851: An Archaeography" in this volume.

6. The abbreviation “CMM” refers to the British Museum Committee Meeting Minutes held on microfilm at the British Museum, London. See bibliography.

7. See also Layard, Nineveh and its Remains 343.

8. See Rawlinson.

9. An assumption which was later confirmed by the German Assyriologist Eberhard Schrader. See Holloway, "The Quest for Sargon, Pul and Tiglath-Pileser in the Nineteenth Century" and "Biblical Assyria and Other Anxieties in the British Empire" 8-12.

10. See Damrosch.

11. Thanks to Ruth Horry.

12. See also Larsen, 99-107.

13. See also Curtis.
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Fashioning Archaeology into Art: Greek Sculpture, Dress Reform and Health in the 1880s

Debbie Challis

Drapery in sculpture and art has a function. It acts as clothing: as a way of both seeing and yet obscuring the figure. It draws attention to the body while covering it. It often lies next to a nude as fallen clothing. It plays a part in the narratives of sculpted story telling. It indicates how the female form should be seen and what parts of the body should be made visible through the draped veiling. Drapery has been an influential artistic conceit in the Western world since early antiquity and artists have revisited the form and function of drapery and the body since the early Renaissance. Gillian Clarke has argued that classical drapery is so prevalent in European art that “classicists tend to think of it not as clothing but as an example of Greek and Roman art” (105). Drapery has long been an ‘artistic conceit’, a device showing artistic flair and rendering. This is brought to an apogee in the large paintings by the contemporary artist Alison Watt. The contours of flesh hidden by the folds of cloth are searched for in vain as there is no body hidden. Alison Watt’s work is a study of cloth, of folds, of voids, of form for its own sake. It is what Anne Hollander has referred to as empty drapery (36), or, perhaps more positively as Gen Doy ventures, arranged cloth as art (230). The natural instinct to look for the body beneath the drapes is dictated partly by the use of drapery to show off the body, particularly in the work of nineteenth-century artists. By the end of the nineteenth century, Greek sculpture and the clothed female form was being used in an ideological and social battle – the battle for the uncorseted body.

The influence of Greek sculptural ideals and Greek clothing are relatively well known, as is the connection between the aesthetic and Pre-Raphaelite artists and dress reform (Newton; Cunningham). The exhibition The Cult of Beauty. The Aesthetic Movement 1869–1900 at the Victoria and Albert Museum in 2011 made these connections through a display of clothing, dress manuals and other items. The Cult of Beauty also illustrated the influence of Greek clothing on contemporary art and dress reform through the display of two ‘Tanagra’ terracotta figurines, on loan from the British Museum, as part of the section on “Grecian Ideals.”1 In 1879 the writer on fashion in clothing and furnishings Eliza Haweis included four sketches of these ‘Tanagra’ terracottas to illustrate how Greek women dressed using “numberless folds to both reveal and conceal the body” in her dress reform book The Art of Beauty:

How gracefully the dress followed the movements of the body, may be perceived better from the small coloured clay figures in the British Museum [Greek Room], than even from marble statues, for they represent their ordinary domestic manners and are not carefully posed and idealised goddesses. (46)

Dresses on display in The Cult of Beauty showed how there was an attempt to shape fabric to reveal natural contours through artful drapery and bodices with minimal or no boning (Ehrman 206).

The principal artists of the mid to late nineteenth century led a revival of classicism in painting and sculpture in Britain, which was a major influence on the theatre, decorative style and fashion in this period. However, it was the dramatic
archaeological ‘discoveries’, which had been brought to public attention and benefited the British Museum, that created an atmosphere in which there was a desire to reconstruct or recreate ancient Greece visually. Kate Flint points to “the development of the visualisation of experience” that continues through the nineteenth century; linking this experience to the “more permanent display of material” in museums and the “growing number of art exhibitions” (3). This development of a “visualisation of experience” is crucial for understanding the reception of classical antiquity during this period. The Greek court at the Crystal Palace in Sydenham, along with the other Fine Arts Courts, is a good example of the desire to make the vision of antiquity corporeal and create an arena through which the past could be physically experienced and observed. Emphasis on accuracy in the staging and costumes of the plays performed in the 1880s, considered at the end of this article, was due to increased knowledge about the material culture of ancient Greece brought to light by archaeological excavation and museum display.

As this article will argue, these archaeological discoveries and the subsequent displays arising from them provided a new visual and material culture of archaeology that inspired a British re-fashioning both in clothing and identity. The work of imagining the impact of classical Greek dress – on the body, health, and national fitness – provoked new ways of considering British civilisation both in relation to the ancient world and to existing cultures of nationhood in the 1880s. In the dress reform movement, and in the use of costume for stage drama a new creative fashioning of Britishness (and especially female Britishness) emerged. It must be noted, however, that this imaginative renegotiation of what it meant to be British in light of recent archaeological discoveries was largely undertaken within a small group of intellectual and social elites. Those involved in both the dress reform movement and the promotion of Greek sculpture as representing the aesthetic and physical ideal included curators at the British Museum, such as Alexander Murray, Charles Newton and Reginald Stuart Poole; artists, such as G. F. Watts, Henry Holiday and Walter Crane; writers and figures of society, including Eliza Haweis, Oscar Wilde and his wife Constance. It was therefore in relatively small urban and academic circles that ‘South Kensington Hellenism’ flourished.

There was also a link from dress reform to physical fitness and a greater emphasis on health. Writers on dress and hygiene reform placed emphasis on the need for women to be fit and active for their roles as future mothers of a healthy nation and race of people. Pamela Gilbert argues in *The Citizen’s Body* that the discourse of hygienic and sanitary reform was articulated as a form of control and was linked to greater socio-political questions:

> The management of the social body through public medicine and discourses of health became the principal discourse with which to negotiate these new questions of citizenship and the Condition of England, of the fit individual and problematic masses. The development of this discourse identified the healthy body and healthy desires as the basis of political fitness. Over the course of this period, the citizen became not only a moral product of education but also a physical product of good domestic hygiene. (3-4)

Wearing a tightly laced corset for long periods is likely to damage the body and make pregnancy unsafe or difficult to achieve. Gilbert’s Foucauldian argument around control and citizenship is a useful one in considering dress reform, while acknowledging that rational dress was a rebellious reaction against an unhealthy
orthodoxy in fashion. Greek dress was considered to allow women’s natural contours and shape to be revealed as well giving them more ability to move and be physically active. Charles Kingsley makes this point in his 1873 lecture “Nausicaa in London: Or, the Lower Education of Woman,” in which he quotes the passage in The Odyssey in which Nausicaa plays ball with her female companions on the beach (62). J. Moyr Smith makes this explicit with regard to Greek clothing in his book Ancient Greek Female Costume in 1882: “Though more fully clad in most parts of Greece than in Sparta, the costume of the young girls and women was such as allowed the body to develop its natural beauty, and permitted a graceful freedom of motion” (17).

This promotion of unconstrained movement through rational or hygienic dress aroused the interest of the medical press and professionals as is made clear in the 1884 Health Exhibition. However, the ideal of Greek clothing revealing the fit body as illustrated in sculpture and other artworks was not simply an aesthetic style or a rational alternative to the corset. It was also an ideal related to the perceived physical perfection of the racially fit body as exemplified in Greek sculpture (Challis 2010).

**Grecian Robes**

Concern in artistic circles about the ugliness of contemporary dress was not new to the 1880s or the aesthetic period. The toga-clad naval heroes in St Paul’s Cathedral in London attest to the desire of neo-classical artists of the early nineteenth century to clad their subjects in more pleasing antique attire. The antiquarian collector and designer Thomas Hope (1769-1831) published books promoting classical design for the home and in dress, including Costumes of the Ancients (1809) and Designs of Modern Costumes (1812). During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there is a strong classicism in fashion, particularly for women, and Hope’s suggestions for clothing in his books exemplified high fashion at the time. Gen Doy has pointed out that critics writing on art and aesthetics since Johann Joachim Winckelmann in the mid eighteenth century have commented on the ugliness of modern dress. For example, Georg Hegel wrote that “Greek clothing is the ideal modern for sculpture and is to be preferred by far to the modern” (Doy 22). Pre-Raphaelite artists, and others, advocated dress along more classicising and medieval lines during the 1850s and 1860s (Cunningham 104). G. F. Watts’ early portrait of Sophia Dalrymple (c. 1851-3) illustrates his admiration of her unusual taste in plain classical dresses and, as Barbara Bryant notes, “the thick folds of Sophia’s dress corresponded to the drapery of antique sculpture, a touchstone for Watts” (83). Watts would return to this theme publicly in the 1880s through an article advocating the wearing of classical influenced dresses designed to follow the natural forms of the female body.

A decade after this portrait the classicising style of costume became more pronounced in art through the paintings of various artists, such as Frederic Leighton, Lawrence Alma Tadema, Albert Moore and James McNeill Whistler. Elizabeth Prettejohn points to the classical influences in three paintings by Whistler (Symphony in White, No. III), Moore (The Musicians) and Leighton (Spanish Dancing Girl) all on display at the Royal Academy Exhibition in 1867:

Moreover, all three include classicising elements, such as clinging, intricately folded drapery and poses reminiscent of the Parthenon marbles, but without antiquarian strictness: Leighton’s ‘Spanish’ dancing girl wears draperies that closely imitate classical Greek sculpture, with crossing cords and a heavy overfold at the waist; Moore’s setting includes palm fans and a ‘Japanese’-looking spray of flowers; and Whistler’s picture combines a Japanese fan with
another asymmetrical spray of foliage and curious ‘Regency’-style dresses, with high waists and puffed sleeves. (137)

The transparency of the body beneath the drapery is a clear reference point to the female reclining figures from the Parthenon pediment sculptures. This is obvious in Albert Moore’s Beads (1875), which depicts two young women reclining asleep in different positions on a soft fabric bench with their legs, breasts, nipples and small folds of their stomachs clearly visible beneath their white diaphanous Greek clothes. Robyn Asleson points out that “the snaking movement of the drapery exaggerates the curves of the anatomy which is clearly seen beneath the transparent gauze fabric” (133). Similarly G. F. Watts’ Ariadne in Naxos, now in the Guildhall Art Gallery London, from the same year depicts Ariadne sitting staring out to sea in rolls of draped Greek clothing showing the lines of her body but has less fleshy detail. In all these paintings the poses struck of young women curled up or languorously reclining would not have been possible in the corseted fashion of the period. These paintings rebel against the restraint of movement in modern clothing.

The Parthenon sculptures associated with the classical Greek sculptor Pheidias were increasingly influential and the influx of classical art into Britain through the mid nineteenth century, such as the sculptures from Nereid Monument in Lycia and the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus in Bodrum, only served to emphasise the importance attributed to Greek art (Challis, From the Harpy Tomb). The increased use of the Pheidian figural type in art works, classical history subjects and the depiction of everyday life in Greek and Roman antiquity was part of the classical revival of art that took place in Britain from the 1860s until the end of the nineteenth century. Athen Leoussi argues that nineteenth-century classicism was “the result of scientific positivism and specifically of the idealisation by the life sciences of the body of the ancient Greek athlete as healthy” (79), which became preoccupied with the physical health of the modern nation in comparison. The anthropological account of the ancient Greeks taken from ancient sculpture became the racial and physical ideal of modern Europeans in handbooks on art and physical development; Pheidian figural sculpture became the “embodiment of European type” (Challis, “The Ablest Race” 112). The athleticism and Greek styled modelling of G. F. Watts’ Cecil Rhodes Memorial in South Africa has been read by Michael Hatt “with its nude hero celebrating what was for Watts the triumph of Aryanism in the Dark Continent” (43).

The depiction by Moore, Leighton and other artists of languorous women in Greek robes emulating classical sculpture placed greater emphasis on the female body as well as the male for the importance of the physical health of the nation. By the 1880s these artists and their interests were so well known as to be regularly parodied. For example, a cartoon “Art in Olympus: Or the Academia of the Gods,” by Edward Linley Sambourne, in Punch in 1886 depicts Leighton as Zeus in the centre of Olympus, with caricatures of various artists taking the guise of different gods around him, such G. F. Watts as Saturn (see Fig. 1). All the artists are posed in front of the Acropolis with a nude female model attempting to cover herself in folds of drapery that reveal, rather than hide, her naked body. These ‘Olympian’ artists were responsible for creating an atmosphere in which Greek clothing was fashionable and adaptable to the arguments of dress reformers, as well as popularising the physical ideal depicted in Greek sculpture.
Healthy Dress, Healthy Body

While Greek forms in art reached new heights of popularity in the late 1860s and 70s, dress reformers were also becoming more vocal. Again, dress reform was not an entirely new crusade, for example the doctor Andrew Coombes wrote treatises on it as early as 1834. By the late 1860s the large domed skirts of the crinoline were out of fashion and instead the so-called ‘S-shape’ or Grecian bend became fashionable. (The ‘S-Shape’ was later used to describe the shape of the Edwardian corset in the 1900s). This shape thrust the breasts out to the front and pushed the buttocks out at the back with the ideas of transforming the wearer into “an unctuous version of the Winged Victory of Samothrace” (Newton 37). The illustrator Frederick Barnard published a cartoon in 1869 “‘Oh Stay!’ or, Graces versus Laces,” unfavourably comparing the natural curves and waistlines of the Greek style Graces and Venus peering into a corset boutique which illustrated the ridiculous bodily form of the ‘Grecian bend’ (Barnard 120). Charles Kingsley singled out the ‘Grecian bend’ for ridicule in “Nausicaa,” deriding its ‘Grecian’ epithet and pouring scorn on the ‘chignon’ (or hair-piece designed to make the hair look bigger at the back), hats and shoes that went with the fashion.

Dress reform was part of a wider movement around sanitary conditions and healthy living. Charles Kingsley’s lecture “Nausicaa in London” on dress reform opens with his musings upon visiting the British Museum:

Fresh from the Marbles of the British Museum, I went my way through London streets. [. . .] Above all, I had been pondering over the awful and yet tender beauty of the maiden figures from the Parthenon and its kindred
temples. And these, or such as these, I thought to myself, were the sisters of the men who fought at Marathon and Salamis; the mothers of many a man among the ten thousand whom Xenophon led back from Babylon to the Black Sea shore; the ancestresses of many a man who conquered the East in Alexander’s host, and fought with Porus in the far Punjab. (58)

The emphasis is clear; the natural female forms Kingsley has seen in the British Museum belong to the mothers and sisters who have bred the greatest civilisation in the world. Kingsley compares the sculpted female forms to the contemporary ugliness he sees on the streets around him, which he condemns; advocating a form of physical education for young women as well as the wearing of less bodily restrictive clothing. Arguably, Kingsley’s ideas on the physical education of young women to equip them better for motherhood and a healthy life correspond to Gilbert’s reading of defining health in the mid-nineteenth century as a set of hygienic practices appropriate to middle-class tastes with domestic life seen as the perfect conduit for bridging national identity between the population as a whole and the individual(8). Kingsley argues that adapting Greek games for women will enable them to “earn the gratitude of the patriot and the physiologist” by improving their “physique, and therefore ultimately of the morale, in the coming generation of English women” (73). Greek dress, it is stressed allowed women to show their natural curves and carry out physical exercise with a view for preserving and enhancing future generations.

Dress reformers also supported Kingsley’s arguments. Eliza Haweis commented a few years later in her book The Art of Beauty (1878) that “no generations of care have made the British body beautiful like the Greeks was” (33). In her chapter “What Stays Costs Us,” Haweis depicts a tyrannical corset and its affect on the ribs and spine and organs deforming the body, compared to the natural figure seen in the Greek sculpture of Venus (48).

Dress once expressed the person, it now disguises it; well, disguise may sometimes be necessary – but when dress carried its anatomical fictions as far as evasion may be carried, as far as falsehood, it ceases not only to be respectable, but beautiful as well. (17)

Similarly G. F. Watts argued in his article “On Taste in Dress,” first published in Fortnightly Review in 1883, that the Greek canons of human proportion were perfect and so small waists in women created by the corset were not natural (Watts 203). Watts’ stance was supported by Ada S Ballin three years later in her The Science of Dress:

If our girls were taught the laws of health and a few of the principles of art as known to the ancient Greeks, they would soon see ‘what a deformed thief this fashion is,’ and would laugh at the squeezed in waist, the crinoline, and the foot mangles and crushed by high heeled and pointed boots of recent times, as much as we now, who call ourselves civilised, ridicule the Australian with his nosepeg, or the Bongo negro, who drags his lips down with a plug. (3)

Ballin juxtaposes ideas of barbarism and civilisation, comparing different forms of clothing and fashion that are all inferior and less ‘civilised’ than the Greeks. Ballin warned against tight lacing in pregnancy and stays for nursing mothers:
[Stays] not infrequently hinder the development of the breasts to such an extent that they render it impossible for many mothers to perform their natural duties to the young infants who are dependent on them for the only nourishment which is suitable and wholesome for them. (165)

The naturalness of Greek clothing for the well-being of the body is equated with the naturalness of motherhood and the wholesome health of future generations. The dress and the flowing forms of drapery depicted in Greek sculpture are equated with the practice of real women and the achievements of ancient Greece.

Greek Dress in Practice

Despite this idealisation of Greek clothing, there were limitations on how much it could be practically applied. Eliza Haweis noted that Greek clothing was not suitable for the British climate, nor for most women due to their physical differences to the ancient Greeks:

Some adaptation of the Greek dress, the most perfect of known costumes has been suggested as meeting all needs. The simple Chyton would be pretty enough for young and finely moulded women, but for the many it would be too trying and monotonous. Robust and lovely as is the pure English type, the race is too mixed as I have said to endure one costume; long-limbed and short-limbed, the small waisted and the heavily built, could not be equally set off by such a dress, any more than fair and dark can submit to one colour. The Greek pallium, sufficiently padded to brave an English winter, would be too heavy to be popular, and far too expensive for the poorer classes. (27)

Despite this the designer John Moyr Smith published Ancient Greek Female Costume in 1882, which included an informative essay and 112 drawings taken from Greek sculpture in the British Museum and the Louvre. Such detailed descriptions of ancient Greek female dress influenced designs for aesthetic dress. ‘Tadema tea gowns’, influenced by the ‘Victorian in togas’ paintings of Lawrence Alma-Tadema and worn at home as informal wear, became fashionable in society from the late 1870s. A review of aesthetic dress in Harper’s Bazaar in November 1881 shows one dress in the neo-Greek style that “combines the classic characteristics with the requirements of modern fashion” set off by an “Etruscan gold necklace and bracelets being a reproduction of the gold ornaments excavated by Professor Schliemann” (Blum 129). Moyr Smith reproduced drawings of a gold diadem and bracelet, found by Schliemann at Mycenae and Troy respectively, as testament to the “great skill of the Greek, Phoenician or Trojan jewellers” and referred to Schliemann’s volumes Mycenae and Ilios (Moyr Smith 51). Clearly there was enough commercial interest to make replica jewellery.

The enthusiasm for Greek art and aesthetics was significant enough to be mocked in Punch, as well as other periodicals, and was also part of the aesthetic movement satirised in Gilbert and Sullivan’s opera Patience (1881). For example, a cartoon by George du Maurier appeared in Punch in 1880 depicting a group of admiring women listening to the dandified art critic Prigsby comparing a head in a painting to Greek sculpture. The satire is as much directed at the pretentious female admirers as the aesthetic art critic. In other cartoons Du Maurier was ambivalent about aesthetic dress and in “An Impartial Comment” unfavourably contrasted the unhealthy thin waist and corset that was high fashion to aesthetic dress. In 1883 H. D. Trail satirised the enthusiasm for all things ancient Greek in an article for the Fortnightly...
Review titled “South Kensington Hellenism: A Dialogue between Plato and Lander.” Trail targets South Kensington due to the ‘Hellenic’ lectures taking place at the South Kensington Museum and the rehearsals for a Greek influenced drama, The Tale of Troy, taking place nearby. In reference to the revival of Greek drama that was beginning, Landor proclaims “their Hellenism is a sham product redolent of that modern and modish suburb in which its latest festival was held” (118). Traill’s critique is directed at the Olympian artists and Hellenists behind the revival of Greek tragedy, and appears to be mainly directed at “the enthusiasm of young women.” His attack and that of du Maurier’s can be attributed to as much misogyny as to any cultural criticism.

The private production of George Warr’s Tales of Troy; or Scenes and Tableaux from Homer (Warr was professor of Greek at King’s College, London) that Traill referred to was performed in Greek and English in the private house of the builder Sir Charles and Lady Freake in South Kensington in 1883. Charles Newton, Keeper of the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities at the British Museum, advised on props and costume, even lending his house in Bloomsbury for the female members of the cast to be “coached in their Greek by Professor Warr, each and all became the willing slave of Watts and [John] Millais, Tadema, [Edward] Poynter and [Edward] Burne-Jones who flung themselves into the task of supervising scenery and costume” (Beard 38). Newton apparently directed some scenes of the play himself and in rehearsals “decked them (the actors) out in the appropriate, archaeologically bona fide ornaments” (Beard 52). Charles Waldstein helped coach the ladies in Greek, while the daughter of Reginald Stuart Poole (Keeper of Coins and Medals at the British Museum) was responsible for costume (Mirrlees 1). Two students and lecturers at the British Museum, Jane Harrison and Eugénie Sellars were among the female cast members (Sellars playing Helen in English and Cassandra in Greek and Harrison playing Penelope). The performance in Greek was staged to raise money for King’s College extension lectures for ladies, as Charles Newton’s lectures on Greek Art at UCL in 1880 had aimed to do for University College London. Warr had lectured in Ancient History at the South Kensington Museum in 1879, in a series of lectures for ladies. It is therefore ironic that one of the main criticisms of the performance in the Illustrated London News is the Greek pronunciation by the predominantly female cast.

The magazine does not reproduce any scenes but gives a “few examples of Greek female costume, with the portraits of several gentlemen engaged in the business of this performance” (“Greek Plays” 547). Leighton is pictured surrounded by ladies in Hellenic dress and Newton is in the top left-hand corner. The women are defined by costume not their performance or personality. An image of the play from the Illustrated London News show, or rather ‘display’, the women in classical costume, apart from the servant who is pictured holding drapery rather than wearing it (See Fig. 2). The men, bar one, are in formal nineteenth-century dress illustrating their distinctiveness from the women surrounding them. The Illustrated London News image illustrates interest in classical costume, both as fashion commodities and as examples of ‘artistic’ dress. This stress on draped dress is also part of a wider artistic representation of women in drapery, acting as voyeuristic fantasies of women clothed but in diaphanous drapery, unshackled by corsets. This image from the Illustrated London News is arguably representative of the depiction of women and the female body in the late nineteenth century. On the one hand it illustrates an interest in the revival of Greek theatre and on the other it fetishizes the natural free flow of drapery on the female body, treating the women as sexualised anatomical models.
In the same year the Rational Dress Association put on an “Exhibition of Rational Dress,” which showed practical examples of rational dress including a “Greek fancy dress” by I. H. Nathan, an Egyptian and a Japanese costume lent by Frank Dillon and catalogue entry one was a selection of art fabrics from the shop Liberty:

No. 1 Liberty’s Art Fabrics
Messr’s Liberty have made it their special study to revive the materials so much in favour with ancient Greece, having at the same time due regard to the requirements of modern times. (King)

‘Arabesque’ dress and Japanese dress and fabrics were also influential on the rational dress movement. A section on dress and costume formed part of International Health Exhibition in 1884, which was held on the exhibition buildings around the Albert Hall in South Kensington and covered home, food, sanitation for all classes as well as dress. The Exhibition was a great success, being prolonged from its closing date of 1 August to October, and was popularly known as the ‘Healtheries’ (Newton 92). As well as having a section on rational dress and on costumes through history, the designer Edward W. Godwin addressed the Health Exhibition of 1884 on hygiene and beauty in dress, promoting the adaptation of Greek style dresses over woollen undergarments. In the same year Godwin was asked to direct the new Costume Department at Liberty and adapted past costumes to modern needs, including interpretations of Greek clothing (Adburgham 63). Godwin, along with G. F. Watts was also a member of the Anti-Tight Lacing Society.

The Exhibition and “Group 2 – Dress” was reviewed by the medical press, including The Lancet and British Medical Journal. Much of The Lancet’s review is taken up with an overview of the historical costumes, commenting that tight lacing does not appear to be as bad in the past as it is now, and of the firms who have supplied clothes designed for safety use, such as for firemen (33). The section exhibited by the Rational Dress Society showed ‘divided skirts,’ clothes for athletics and appeared to be essentially the same as their exhibition of the previous year. Even the Official Guide to the exhibition noted that the display had “more reason than artistic sense” and considered that the “prejudices of fair sex [caused] considerable difficulties to their subjects” (31). The Lancet also noted the models showing deformities caused by dress, and in particular tight lacing, as well as exhibits by the Sanitary Woollen System Co. (Dr Jaegar) illustrating the hygienic benefits of wool next to skin. The interest of the medical press illustrated the interest of the medical profession in ‘rational dress’ for women. Dr George Wilson had written Healthy Life and Healthy Dwellings. A Guide to Personal and Domestic Hygiene in which he promoted Greek gymnastics for women in order to improve the physique of future generations as well as adapting Greek and Roman dress for modern use (Newton 92). In this way artistic, medical and reformist attitudes converged around Greek dress and the healthy and most beautiful body.

There was a return to Greek theatre a few years later with George Warr’s abridgement of the Oresteia, which was performed twice at Prince’s Hall with one performance of the Tale of Troy in 1886. The proceeds of these performances went towards extension lectures for women at Kings College and University College, University of London. Charles Newton again acted as archaeological advisor. The scenery was put together by Walter Crane from sets previously designed by Frederic Leighton, G. F. Watts and Henry Holliday for a tableau at the Hellenic themed Royal Academy Ball of the previous year. Crane and Warr published an illustrated translation of the plays in Echoes of Hellas, in which many of the illustrations were based on the stage sets and performances of Tales of Troy and the Story of Orestes. More important in terms of theatre practice and public impact, however, was Helena in Troas, a pastiche by John Todhunter and staged with a mixture of professionals and amateur actors in the same year. Helena in Troas was performed at Hengler’s Circus on Argyll St, usually the home of a horse circus, and was turned into as near a copy of an ancient Greek theatre as possible. Edward W. Godwin, who had lectured on dress at the
'Healtheries,' produced a play performed in ‘the round.’ Alexander Murray, now Charles Newton’s successor as Keeper of the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities at the British Museum, acted as archaeological adviser. Murray, in a letter to Godwin, Murray points out that Greek theatre was a semi-sphere but makes suggestions for a performance in the round (Murray). This was the first attempt in Britain at reproducing a Greek theatre with a similar use of stage space as the ancient Greeks. Casts of bas-reliefs from the Theatre of Dionysus in Athens and casts from the frieze of Bassae (on display in the British Museum) were incorporated into the set. This design may have been influenced by Richard Wagner’s concept of Gesamtkunstwerk; a total work of art which combines music, poetry, dance, stage modelling and costume. The Festspielhaus at Bayreuth, erected by Otto Brockwald, followed an amphitheatrical design influenced by Wagner’s adulation of Greek tragedy (Pitenis 159). The setting of Hengler’s Circus was also due to the vogue for the archaeological costume drama depicted in so many paintings and the increased knowledge about the material culture of ancient Greece (see Fig. 3).

Godwin was responsible for the set and costume, and his designs enabled enough stage space for a large chorus, another attempt at reviving an authentic reproduction of Greek visual experience. Godwin made notes on each costume and character, for example Helena (played by Miss Alma Murray) wore a fawn colour tunic, a gold metal flat girdle, a white mantle with bands of decoration, gold sandals, her hair was weaved with gold fillets, gold earrings and a snake amulet. All this information reveals the care taken over the costumes, which was related to Godwin’s promotion of Greek dress as healthy and artistic. Photographs in the Theatre Museum archive show Godwin’s designs rather incongruously recreated in the English countryside. The actor Beerbohm Tree played Paris, while Constance Wilde, an amateur, was a chorus leader. Dorothy Dene, Leighton’s model and an aspiring actress, was also among the cast. Despite the setting of the play in Troy and Schliemann’s recent high profile excavations, Godwin wrote in the programme that the play was firmly positioned in the style of fifth-century BC Greece: “My intention has been to give the story staged surroundings like those which I suppose a play on such a subject may have received at Athens or Corinth in the days of Sophocles” (Godwin). 3
Reviews in the *Athenaeum, The Times, Morning Post, Standard Saturday Review* and *Illustrated London News* for *Helena in Troas* concentrated on the accuracy of the set and costume, drawing attention to the visualisation of classical Greece rather than the performance or acting (daily papers tended to be more positive than the weekly journals). *Punch* mocked this chorus in “classic bathing costumes” looking “limp, but classic to the last” (“Mr Todhunter’s Helena” 261). The *Illustrated London News* commented on the performances of the Greek plays:

Fig. 3.
The archaeologists are revelling just now in the fields of Grecian art. Eminent members of the Royal Academy are arranging tableaux vivants from the old Homeric legend: distinguished authorities at the British Museum are consulted as to what Aeschylus or Sophocles would have done had either been commissioned to write a play for an Athenian Manager, a modern horse circus is turned into a theatre as it might have stood on the Acropolis. (“Greek Plays” 524)

Many of these distinguished authorities and artists attended the performance on the first afternoon, including Lord Leighton, Sydney Colvin, Charles Newton as well as figures from the theatre such as Henry Irving, Ellen Terry and Oscar Wilde. Wilde unsurprisingly, given his wife was chorus leader, gave the production a glowing review in the Dramatic Review and commented that Godwin turned the facts of archaeology in to “art” (161). Despite reservations about the script and acting, the next issue of the Illustrated London News included a full page spread of five illustrations from the performance of Helena of Troas, with an emphasis on the set and theatre. Both the Illustrated London News and Athenaeum advised readers to go to special performances of the play put on for the benefit of the British School of Athens, which began operations later that year (“Greek Plays” 564). Helena in Troas was a vivid example of the desire for visualising ancient Greece in the late nineteenth century and promoting Greek influenced aesthetic style and healthy fashion.

Aftermath: Aglaia
This promotion of the healthy body immortalised in Greek robes continued into the 1890s, during which time mainstream fashion demanded ever smaller waists. In 1893 the short lived magazine Aglaia: The Journal of the Healthy and Artistic Dress Union was published and edited by the artist Henry Holiday. This journal was produced by the Union for the Propagation of Sound Ideas on the Subject of Dress, which was founded 2 July 1890. The cover of Aglaia depicted the three Graces in flowing Greek dress by Henry Holiday, who wrote in the Introduction that:

Dress is needed for play as well as for work, and above all it should be healthy, so that we seek the aid of all the Graces. Thalia, moreover, was a Muse as well as a Grace – the pastoral Muse – and presided over an occupation as indispensable to us as to the primitive peoples of our race, which provides us with our best and healthiest form of raiment. (3)

Later in “The Artistic Aspect of Dress,” Holiday wrote that the best dress belonged to the Greeks in the classic period and European nations from the twelve to fourteenth centuries: classical and medieval dress, as was of course then fashionable in Pre-Raphaelite art. Holiday published drawings showing distortion caused by a corset on models in artistic positions based on Greek sculpture entitled “Nature Proposes, But the Corset Disposes.” Holiday connected the body of the ancient Greeks to the artistic and architectural symbols of their civilisation, writing that harmony nature has provided “he can adorn nature with his works, as the Athenians did when they erected the Parthenon and Propylea on the Acropolis” (Holiday 30). This first copy of Aglaia also had a doctor, W. Wilberforce Smith, writing on “Corset Wearing: The Medical Side of the Attack” in which he warned of the impact of corsets on healthy conception and pregnancy: “This unmeasured damage to fitness, handicapping women in the race
of life and hindering them in performing the best and noblest offices of their sex, probably constitutes the greatest of the evils of corset-wearing” (7).

Medical, hygienic and artistic views again coalesced, but appeared to have limited impact on mainstream fashion. There were only another two issues of Aglaia in 1894 and though they included articles and art work by Hamo Thornycroft, G. F. Watts, Walter Crane, Albert Moore, the actress Lily Linfield and retailer Lasenby Liberty, the magazine clearly had a limited circulation.

The main impact of the idealisation of Greek sculpture and the figural form as shown through drapery and rational dress is still to be found in the art of the period, rather than in any discernible change in mainstream fashion. Practical changes were made due to an increased number of women working and playing various sports, such as lawn tennis and cycling, and such change rapidly increased during World War One. However, a teaching kit in the archives of the former cast gallery at the University of Liverpool gives an intriguing glimpse of the increased importance placed on clothing for understanding the form and function of Greek sculpture and the domestic lives of the ancient Greeks. Models of Greek Dress for Lay Figures was produced by The Educational Museum of the Teacher’s Guild of Great Britain and Ireland on 74 Gower St WC in 1896 and includes one hand written book and A Catalogue of the Historical Section. It sold at 11s and gave examples of the dresses and directions for use in order to instruct children on Greek art and Greek domesticity, including replicas of an Ionic Chiton, Short Doric Chiton, Long Doric Chiton Himation and Chlamys. It shows the seriousness with which dressing up was taken, but it is also revealing of the continuation of the cultural importance of archaeological discovery on future generations of Britons, and especially British women.

Indeed the artistic, social, and medicalised responses to the discovery and display of Grecian antiquities show that turning archaeology into art offered far more than a creative outlet for understanding ancient sites far removed from Britain. Instead the material culture of ancient Greece allowed for an imaginative reconsideration of Britain itself, and especially of the British body and the manner by which it signified the robustness of a healthy, civilised body politic.
Notes

With thanks for expert advice from Daniel Milford-Cotton, Victoria and Albert Museum, London.

1. These terracotta figurines are called ‘Tanagra’ after the site in Boeotia, Greece, where great numbers have been found. They became popular at the end of the Fourth Century BC and are in fact found throughout the Hellenic world over the next three centuries.

2. Reproduced in Ormond, 255.

3. The designs and photographs for the play can be seen in the Theatre Museum archive.
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“Mr Todhunter’s Helena in Troas at Hengler’s Circus.” Punch 29 May 1886: 261.


“Time Seemed Fiction” – Archaeological Encounters in Victorian Poetry

Virginia Zimmerman

For the Victorians, archaeology integrated a plethora of cultural remains from a range of times into the material landscape of their own culture. Containing objects from assorted pasts alongside objects from the present, that landscape became anachronic. Whether Roman, Middle Eastern or Early British, an artefact is a sign of the past from which it has emerged and the present in which it makes new meaning. Jean Baudrillard argues, “The antique object no longer has any practical application, its role being merely to signify” (74). This article examines three poets who considered the significance of archaeological objects. In particular, Thomas Hardy, Dante Gabriel Rossetti and Emmeline Fisher wrote about encounters with artefacts and took those encounters as occasions to re-imagine time. Victorian studies and history of science have paid little attention to archaeology, and poetry that engages with the rich symbolic field of archaeology has received even less notice. The poets considered here reveal that archaeology prompted not only reflection on the accomplishments and longevity of the British Empire but also reflection on the nature of time itself.

An archaeological object is temporally and geographically removed from its original context and meaning. Indeed, this dislocation is part of what it comes to signify. What’s more, the artefact represents the very fact of anachronism and prompts those who encounter the object to cast away a linear notion of time. Writing of an object as a repository of cultural memories, Catherine Crawford asserts that while key moments in an object’s history can be pinpointed (i.e., when it was created, when it was sold, when it was defaced by an invading army, etc.), the artefact accumulates different meanings over time, and a palimpsest of significances is written (literally or figuratively) on its surface (14). Thus, the archaeological artefact does not represent a specific moment in time but rather a collection of moments and also time itself. The single object conflates an array of times, representing them at once. In this way, time ceases to appear as a line, stretched from them to now: the object reveals an alternate model in which multiple times co-exist. Using the phrase “tempo-object,” Paul Ricoeur emphasises this notion of an object that endures and continues to signify over time (26). For Ricoeur, as well as for Hardy, Rossetti and Fisher, an object’s origin is far less interesting than its endurance, and its accumulated significance, the palimpsest Crawford describes. Duration and the palimpsest may seem to be at odds, but archaeology and the Victorian poets who encountered archaeology put them together.

Duration describes the experience of the object; it does not capture the experience of the archaeologist (or in the case of this article, the poet) who abruptly encounters the object in his present. He may immediately realise that the object has existed all these many years from the time of its creation to the present of its excavation, but that is the life of the object independent of any interpreter. More interesting is the experience of the person who comes upon the object and is probably not interested in what it has meant or done for all the years between its inception and the now. The poetic speakers who are the subjects here are interested in what the object means in the precise moment of encounter. Writing of an encounter between a fossilised trilobite and an imperilled character in his novel A Pair of Blue Eyes (1873),
Thomas Hardy describes an alternate model of time: “time closed up like a fan before him” (209). This notion of time closing up can be layered with the notion of duration: the line of time folds back on itself and past and present meet. The archaeological object signifies this meeting, and this is the model of time depicted again and again in poems about archaeology: the object signifies the past, but it also signifies in the present, and the point where those two significances meet is the point of interest for the poet, and for this article.

Thomas Hardy’s sonnet “In the Old Theatre, Fiesole” was published as one of the “Poems of Pilgrimage” in Poems of Past and Present (1901). The poem describes an actual archaeological encounter that took place when Hardy and his wife visited an amphitheatre in Italy in the spring of 1887 (F. Hardy 251). Hardy uses the short space of fourteen lines to muse on the encounter. The speaker-poet is approached in the theatre by a child who hopes to sell him a coin she has found there. It is a Roman coin, and the speaker marvels at the fact that he has uncovered identical coins in his “loam” at home in England. That the coin connects modern England with Ancient Rome suggests the collapse of time Hardy described in A Pair of Blue Eyes. Yet, when he notes how, “better than all books, [the child] had raised for me / In swift perspective Europe's history” (6-7), Hardy suggests duration.

The single, small, even common object reveals in its face and its very presence a broad sweep of history. It signifies the reach and also the ultimate fall of the Roman Empire: “her act flashed home / In that mute moment to my opened mind / The power, the pride, the reach of perished Rome” (12-14). With “the image of Constantine” (4) impressed on its face, the coin recalls an imperial past. When Hardy thinks of the presence of like coins in his land in England, he thinks of the reach of that empire, but the coins, the ones in England and in Italy alike, have become debris dredged up by ploughs or the eager scrambling hands of poor children who hope to make a profit. Thus, the coin signifies at once the former greatness of the Roman Empire and the decline of that empire’s symbols into rubbish. When Hardy writes of “the reach of perished Rome,” he conveys this paradox: Rome reached far, a fact of its greatness, but thus the signs of its fall also reach far. Indeed, the coin as a symbol of perished Rome reaches all the way to England, reminding archaeologists and poets that empires fall and that the British Empire could meet a similar fate. Hardy does not imagine British coins uncovered by children in faraway lands, but such imaginings are the logical extension of the poem’s point.

The archaeological encounter that is the subject of Hardy’s “In the Old Theatre, Fiesole” involves the interpretation in the present of an object that has lain dormant for thousands of years. It signifies the past from whence it comes (Constantine, Rome, Empire), and it signifies the present in which it has new meaning as a familiar artefact. But most interesting to Hardy, it signifies the meeting of past and present, a temporal conjunction reinforced by the geographical element of the poem. The coin brings together England and Italy just as it brings together the past and the present. The emperor Hardy chose, Constantine, has a name that suggests duration, or constancy. Thus, Hardy subtly invokes the image of the time line, the coin constantly enduring just beneath the surface of the soil these two thousand years, even as he suggests alternate models of time. Yet, in the poem’s first line, he writes, “I traced the Circus” (1), choosing a word for the form of the amphitheatre but also a word that immediately brings into the poem images of cycle and return. He leads off with an image that invites the reader to think of the coin as returning, not as having existed all the while. So the coin brings circle and line together: past unquestionably occurred before present, but in a symbolic space, past and present can co-exist.
Writing of Hardy’s use of archaeology in *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886), Bharat Tandon claims, “If archaeology aspires to reconstruct diachronic explanations from synchronic discoveries, fiction can display both at once” (475). Hardy’s poetry, perhaps more than his fiction, displays synchronic and diachronic models of the relationship between past and present. Past, present and sometimes future collapse fan-like onto an archaeological object and, meta-textually, into the poem itself.

In another sonnet inspired by his trip to Italy, “Rome: Building a New Street in the Ancient Quarter,” Hardy draws no explicit connection between the Roman and British Empires, but he intertwines imagery of past and present, showing how the workmen (and the visitors) encounter the past even as they build toward the future. Progress and ruin co-exist. Gillian Beer describes how, in general, Hardy conjoins decay and continued life, a paradox central to this poem. Beer writes, “A pervasive theme of Hardy's writing is how things decay, yet how fully and abruptly they are alive” (90). This is another way to imagine the collapse of time: at one site, a visitor can witness decay and life, past and present. Archaeological depths revealed by work to improve an urban landscape would have been familiar to Hardy’s readers who witnessed the same in England, so there is an implicit connection here between Rome and London, much like the explicit connection in “In the Old Theatre.” In the first stanza of “Rome: Building a New Street in the Ancient Quarter,” Hardy offers a confusion of old and new, a mixed metaphor at once architectural and corporal, with Time at the heart of it all:

These numbered cliffs and gnarls of masonry
Outskeleton Time's central city, Rome;
Whereof each arch, entablature, and dome
Lies bare in all its gaunt anatomy. (1-4)

It is worth lingering over the word “outskeleton.” Does Hardy mean that the apparatus of construction brings out the skeleton that lies underneath the city? This is a distinct possibility, and it is reinforced in the last two lines of this stanza. Or does he mean that the construction forms a new, outer skeleton that frames the “gaunt anatomy” within? Both possibilities—surely both in play given Hardy’s penchant for meaningful ambiguity – foreground the architectural signs of time, both past and present, and conjoin them within the single body of Rome. When Hardy writes that Rome is “Time’s central city,” he means, among other things, that Rome is where past, present and also future (implied by the construction work) come together. Returning to his image of the closed fan, the city itself is the point where time closes up.

The sonnet’s sestet brings in the image of shadow that not only Hardy but many poets use to symbolise the coming together of past and present:

And yet within these ruins' very shade
The singing workmen shape and set and join
Their frail new mansion's stuccoed cove and quoin
With no apparent sense that years abrade,
Though each rent wall their feeble works invade
Once shamed all such in power of pier and groin. (9-14)

The singing workmen labour in the shade of the ruins, indifferent to the former greatness that looms over them. The shadow is an important image as it implies
measuring time, as in a sun dial in which a shadow marks time. The shade is cast most literally by the ruins that still exist in the present, but Hardy suggests that they have similarly cast their shadow since they were first built in the past. Thus, the workmen, though they do not realise it, “shape and set and join” in a shade cast at once by a ruin in the present and by what that ruin was in the past. Again, past and present co-exist, and the ruin itself is a sort of time-keeping device for non-linear time.

Tandon argues that this poem also performs the temporal layers that are its subject with Hardy’s use of archaic language: “As the workmen in the poem expose physical ruins in the strata of past Rome, so Hardy's lines hold buried shards of archaism at different vertical and etymological depths (‘rotten metope’ ‘monitory gnome’)” (482). That is, the poem mimics the gaunt anatomy of Rome with linguistic ruins brought to light on the page. It may not be an extrapolation Hardy intended, but if Rome is Time’s central city, and the poem takes the shape of Rome, then we might consider that the poem, like Rome, is a place where time closes up. Indeed, the language Hardy uses to describe the workmen’s labour could as easily describe a poet’s craft: the workmen “sing;” they “shape, set and join.” Similarly, a poem can be said to sing, and a poet shapes a stanza, he sets a rhyme, he joins two images. Hardy makes this comparison most explicit in the second stanza: “cracking frieze and rotten metope / Express, as though they were an open tome” (6-7). The simile likens ruins to an open book, and in the book, the reader reads, “‘Dunces, Learn here to spell Humanity!’” (9). Just as Hardy reads this line in the crumbling architecture of Rome, so does his reader read the line in his poem. Thus, the poem represents not only Rome, but ancient Rome asserting itself despite its ruin into modern Rome, asserting itself in shadow and poem.

Hardy wrote one other sonnet about his visit to Rome, “Rome: On the Palatine.” This poem is most interesting because it so precisely recounts the actual excursion Hardy and his wife took. While Florence Hardy’s Early Life does not describe the visit to the Palatine in any detail, Hardy’s personal Baedeker, in the British Library, includes many annotations and was clearly an important guide to the city for him. The path suggested in the Baedeker is precisely the one traced in the poem. Of course, it is possible that Hardy based the poem on the travel guide rather than on his actual experience, but it seems more likely that he and his wife followed the suggested route, and he subsequently wrote a poem that recalled his excursion. For instance, it is clear from the poem which of the two suggested routes from Livia’s house to Caligula’s Hardy followed. The Baedeker offers:

Another way from the house of Livia to this point leads to the right of the door, passing some steps ascending to a large water basin, and traverses a covered passage (Cryptoporticus), with remains of ancient stucco ornamentation. This is supposed to have been the scene of the murder of Caligula. Various architectural and sculptural fragments are exposed to view here. (240-41)

In the poem, Hardy writes, “Whence, thridding cave and Criptoportico, / We gained Caligula's dissolving pile” (3-4). The comparison with Hardy’s Baedeker is useful because the guidebook offers a sort of textual archaeology of Hardy’s visit. The text suggests a path to take, and Hardy (and probably also his wife) added notes to the book, indicating dates they visited certain sites or making comments. The text thus becomes palimpsestic, and layering the poem atop the guidebook provides multiple layers of text giving insight into Hardy’s experience of Rome. Catherine Crawford’s
comments on artefacts that are altered at a later date come to mind: the Baedeker is itself an artefact, but it was altered by its owner to record that individual’s experience. Thus, Hardy’s Baedeker becomes a central artefact for those who hope to glean insight into Hardy’s experience of Rome. It ceases to serve its original purpose – a guide to Rome – and becomes instead a guide to Hardy’s Rome. He perhaps used that guide himself when he wrote his poems, which become the surface layer of this particular archaeological site.

The poem itself is written in layers. Most of Hardy’s sonnets are Spenserian with an octave and a sestet, but this one is Shakespearean with three quatrains and a couplet to conclude. The first stanza describes the path taken through the ruins, echoing the Baedeker. In the second stanza, Hardy describes how the ruins seem to come to life: “each ranked ruin tended to beguile / The outer sense, and shape itself as though / It wore its marble hues” (5-7). In the third stanza, Hardy sets aside the language of simile for metaphor. Ruins that beguile the imagination are transformed by music into the past reborn. The poet-speaker describes how, standing in Caesar’s house, he heard a violin playing:

When lo, swift hands, on strings nigh over-head,  
Began to melodise a waltz by Strauss:  
It stirred me as I stood, in Caesar's house,  
Raised the old routs Imperial lyres had led, (9-12)

As he stands amidst ruins, the live music recalls the music that must have played in that place thousands of years before. Hardy’s use of the word “raised” (used also in “In the Old Theatre”) invokes a notion of raising the dead, raising dead sound from a long gone time. This is a topic that interests Hardy generally, and he wrote similarly about the endurance of sound in his poem “In a Museum.” In this poem, Hardy conflates the sound of a fossilised bird with “a contralto voice [he] heard last night” (3). Again, a sound from the present raises a sound from the past. Hardy explains in the poem’s second and final stanza:

Such a dream is Time that the coo of this ancient bird  
Has perished not, but is blent, or will be blending  
Mid visionless wilds of space with the voice that I heard,  
In the full-fuged song of the universe unending. (5-8)

Writing of this poem, Gillian Beer explains, “The ‘full-fuged song’ of the final version recognises the play of different voices – different forms of being – driving on, over and under each other, in a flow of energy that keeps alive both the most distant and most immediate past” (26-27). She writes earlier in the same essay, “How to reach into that shared past, as well as those many and separate individual pasts, becomes the most intense question of Hardy's creativity. How to make the past again present, as future, is the matter and the technical enquiry of his fiction and poetry” (18). Collapsing time – bringing together past, present and future – is not only Hardy’s preoccupation in the three poems discussed here about his visit to Italy but is a central concern of all his writing.

Indeed, if we return to the final couplet of “Rome: On the Palatine,” Hardy makes this interest plain: the sound of the strings, “blended pulsing life with lives long done, / Till Time seemed fiction, Past and Present one” (13-14). The notion of time as a fiction is complex. What Hardy means here is a traditional notion of linear time: the
fiction is that the past has finished. Instead, Hardy breaks down the distinction between past and present. A sound from the past may endure in the present. Yet, it should come as no surprise that there is an ambiguity here. “Past and Present one” means that past and present are blended together, undivided by whatever markers might indicate the past has terminated, but “one” may also refer back to “fiction.” In this reading, the line says simply that past and present are a fiction. With this second possibility, it seems that, for Hardy, the fiction lies in the conjunction: past and present, with “and” holding the two times apart, rather than allowing them to merge into some nameless temporal state that is non-linear and undivided. Bert Hornback writes of Hardy’s Italy sonnets, that “he engages the past through its mythical immediacy in the present. The doubling – and the conjunction of past and present is both effective and affective – is what gives these poems their theme and their experience” (153). But Hardy eschews doubling and conjunction in favor of blending and merging. Whether past and present are one and the same, or whether the conjunction of past and present is a fiction, Hardy demands some new way of thinking about time, a way that is not linear and that allows for endurance and simultaneity. Past and present co-exist at the site of a coin or a quoin or a couplet. Indeed, these artefacts offer encounters that reveal all time collapsed together.

Rossetti’s poem about an archaeological encounter, “The Burden of Nineveh,” extends the logic of the encounter into the future more explicitly than Hardy. Like Hardy’s sonnets, “The Burden of Nineveh” can be seen as itself an archaeological artefact. While Hardy’s use of ancient language and stanzaic structure invite this claim, in Rossetti’s case, it is the different versions of the poem that offer strata of meaning. The poem was first composed in 1850, perhaps only in a fragmentary form; it was then revised and published in the *Oxford and Cambridge Magazine* in 1856; in 1858, it was reprinted in the American magazine *The Crayon* with some small changes; a final version, significantly revised, was published in 1870 in Rossetti’s *Poems.* The nature of the revisions are not as important here (and is ground that has been well covered by Andrew Stauffer), but suffice it to say that multiple versions of the poem are extant, and thus even as it is in some ways about excavation, the layers of the poem itself must be excavated. Indeed, the poem is associated with the excavation of Rossetti’s notebook, which had been buried in his wife’s grave: Stauffer points out that the poem was chosen to appear first in “his own monument, the 1870 *Poems* – a monument that would come to depend on [...] the notebook exhumed from Siddal’s grave” (55).

The poem describes the arrival of the great winged bull from Austen Henry Layard’s excavation in Nineveh, and uses this archaeological artefact as an occasion to reflect on the British Empire alongside a lost empire. Florence Boos asserts, “Rosetti’s bull seems a form of compromise between Shelley’s ‘Ozymandias’ image and Keats’ urn, simultaneously a sign of the transience of corrupt glory and an artefact inspiring meditation on past life” (213). Boos does not adequately theorise Rossetti’s engagement with time, and while her claim seems right, it is important to add that Rossetti also uses the bull to reflect on the future and to call into question a linear notion of time. Stauffer writes, “The winged bull became an imperial *momento mori,* the centrepiece of various fascinating spectacles that fused Eastern otherness and Victorian anxieties about England’s future past” (372). This “future past” is what I will primarily focus on here.

Rossetti did not encounter the artefact in its original location, as Hardy encountered the coin in Rome. Instead, he came upon workers unloading the statue as he departed the British Museum (or so the poem reports):
Sighing I turned at last to win  
Once more the London dirt and din;  
And as I made the swing-door spin  
And issued, they were hoisting in  
A wingèd beast from Nineveh. (6-10)

Rossetti’s encounter occurs in London, as he makes plain in the poem’s first stanza, and this site, the new home of a relic of another time and place, is central to the poem’s engagement with time. The “swing-door” of line eight underscores the image of the poet, the statue, London and Assyria all spinning together in the achronic space of the British Museum. The museum is emphatically of its present moment, celebrating the accomplishments and acquisitions of the nation, but it is the repository of so many objects from the past that it becomes a space confused in time.

In the midst of that space, Rossetti sets, as Hardy did, shadow as a marker of time. He uses the image of shadow to reflect on the artefact’s dislocation and its past and present lives. After musing over the statue’s creation and its subsequent burial for thousands of years, Rossetti writes:

On London stones our sun anew  
The beast's recovered shadow threw.  
(No shade that plague of darkness knew,  
No light, no shade, while older grew  
By ages the old earth and sea.) (41-45)

The shadow was lost when the statue was buried, described in the parenthetical. These three lines acknowledge the period during which the artefact endured but was not subject to any interpretation: while Rossetti describes this period, his real interest lies in the rediscovery of the bull and its shadow. The recovered shadow recalls Hardy’s coin, which rises from the soil after years buried and forgotten. Having no shadow suggests having no significance and also no location in time. When the statue is buried it ceases to exist for any interpreter: it has no past or present. Yet it was dormant. Layard woke the artefact up and brought it from oblivion into the light of the present where it casts a shadow, first in Assyria where it was excavated and then in London where it will be displayed. With the shadow shining anew on this object, it regains a relationship to time.

The statue survives from the past – “from their dead past thou liv’st alone” (48), but it means differently than it did – “and still thy shadow is thine own” (49). The shadow is made from the sun shining on the artefact in the present; however, Rossetti imagines that the shadow is identical to what it was long ago: “this shadow has been shed the same” (56). Thus there is an achronic quality to the interplay between sun and artefact: the shadow is constant even as it is produced only in the moment and determined by the precise position of the sun in the here and now. Rossetti imagines Sennacherib kneeling to pray in the shadow of the bull, and he observes that only last year, Christians knelt to pray in the same shadow. That shadow will now fall on “school-foundations in the act / of holiday” (76-77) as they visit the statue in the museum. The shadow is for Rossetti what music was for Hardy in “Rome: On the Palatine.” It collapses time.
Rossetti highlights the collapse of temporal order and linear time when he writes of “all relics here together” in the museum, a jumble of archaeological debris, all taken out of time:

Why, of those mummies in the room
Above, there might indeed have come
One out of Egypt to thy home,
An alien. Nay, but were not some
Of these thine own ‘antiquity’?
And now, – they and their gods and thou
All relics here together (101-107)

The museum brings together archaeological remains from assorted times and places, and the museum itself becomes a place of anachronic encounters. The artefacts bump into one another across the boundaries of period and place, and visitors experience time jumbled together, displayed by artefacts who resist linearity.

Rossetti extends this temporal jumble into the future when he asks the central question of the poem: “some may question which was first, / Of London or of Nineveh” (169-70). That is, just as present visitors to the museum confuse the timeline, not knowing whether Egypt or Assyria came first, future visitors to the British Museum may not know whether the British Empire predated the Assyrian Empire; they may not know of which culture the bull god is a relic. Indeed, Rossetti imagines that it could even be taken at some future time by the imperial forces of a latter day empire to another place altogether:

So may he stand again; till now,
In ships of unknown sail and prow,
Some tribe of the Australian plough
Bear him afar, – a relic now
Of London, not of Nineveh! (176-80)

Of course, Rossetti is not indulging in some futuristic aimless musing. The statue is now a thing of London; it casts its shadow there. When archaeologists come from the future, they will have to contend with the hodgepodge of artefacts in museums. Like Catherine Crawford, they will interpret objects as palimpsests with several cultures carving (literally or figuratively) significance into their surfaces. The bull god, then, is not an object from the past, signifying the past, and standing apart from the present or the future. It is a thing onto which time collapses: it is from the past but it is also of the present and will be of the future. It lives in all time as its unchanging shadow shows, whether it is cast in Assyria or London or Australia.

The final poet to be considered here is Emmeline Fisher. Fisher wrote a handful of poems under her maiden name and then published a volume, Poems, in 1856 under her married name of Hinxman. She was not well known during her lifetime nor afterwards. Her greatest poetic claim was that her mother was Wordsworth’s cousin, and he wrote several letters attesting to her poetic abilities. On the strength of that connection, she was invited to write a new version of the national anthem for Queen Victoria’s coronation. Her anthem was not chosen or published at that time, but the twelve-year-old Fisher did receive a gift of a writing set from the young queen, and the story of the girl who wrote a new national anthem appeared in the Fortnightly Review in 1910. In short, Fisher has achieved little fame or notice.
However, she played an interesting part in the excavation of Silbury Hill, a prehistoric mound in Wiltshire, not far from Stonehenge and Avebury.

Archaeologists and local dignitaries believed that treasure would be found within Silbury Hill, and so John Merewhether, the Dean of Hereford, organised an excavation to tunnel into the hill in 1849. This effort achieved a fair amount of recognition in the press, and a crowd was assembled for the opening of the hill on August 3. It is presumed that Emmeline Fisher was in the group. In any event, she wrote a poem commemorating the occasion. The opening of the hill was most notable for the disappointing fact that it revealed absolutely nothing within. The hill was devoid of any archaeological artefacts whatsoever. Thus, the opening of Silbury Hill was a planned encounter – the excavation was elaborate, lengthy in duration, and much publicised – that failed. No artefact rose from the past to challenge assumptions about time.

Fisher’s poem, “Lines, Suggested by the Opening Made in Silbury Hill, August 3rd, 1849,” was published in 1854 in the Wiltshire Archaeological and Natural History Magazine. Fisher’s “Lines” acknowledge the absence of an archaeological encounter and then imagine what might have been. Fisher begins by asking that their forefathers forgive them for intruding in the site, and then she describes a vision of one of these men leading them into the tunnel: “Hark, as we move, / Runs no stern whisper through the narrow vault? / Flickers no shape across our torch-light pale, / With backward beckoning arm?” (4-7). Fisher’s use of rhetorical questions raises the possibility of a “shape” flickering across their path but at once negates the possibility. She asserts absolutely that there is no one there: “No, all is still” (7). In the next line, she laments, “O that it were not!” (9), and later she wishes that, “science, could call back thy history lost, / Green Pyramid of the plains, from far-ebbed Time!” (10-11). She goes on to imagine an encounter, so while the archaeological excavation of Silbury Hill revealed nothing, within the fictive space of the poem, Fisher uses the site to stage an encounter with a yellow-haired “zealous” Savage engaged in funereal rites (14-22). Because there are no artefacts, the poet has license to invent a character and to craft an encounter not with an object but with a man from another time. For Fisher, the absence of archaeological remains creates an opportunity to set aside the mundane reality of potsherds in favour of fantastical visions of noble forefathers.

But Fisher’s imaginary savage is not the only archaeological encounter in relation to Silbury Hill. When the excavation failed to uncover any evidence to warrant further activity, the hill was closed up, but before the tunnels were sealed, Richard Falkner, a historian and archaeology enthusiast who had been involved with the excavation, arranged to bury within the hill a stoneware pot filled with clippings about the site, including some that recounted debates about the hill’s purpose and others that documented the excavation of the site. This time capsule also contained The Devises and Wiltshire Gazette for September 20, 1849, three coins, a Bible Society poster, and Emmeline Fisher’s poem. The jar was buried in the hill on September 25th, 1849, and it remained there until it was uncovered by archaeologists again attempting an excavation of the site in 1969. Thus, the most compelling archaeological encounter associated with Silbury Hill is the encounter with Fisher’s poem, which could not describe an artefact as there was none, but which itself became an archaeological artefact.

Much more literally than Hardy’s poems which use diction and structure to echo strata or “The Burden of Nineveh” which arguably has a literary kinship with Rossetti’s exhumed notebook, Fisher’s poem is emphatically an archaeological object. The encounter with this poem brings to life the hopes of a young woman who might...
have found her forefathers in Silbury Hill and the disappointment that nothing remained to raise the past in that place. Yet, it acts as a reminder that even without material objects, archaeology inspired poets like Fisher to construct a vision of the past based on fragments of imagination. Fisher hoped to meet her zealous savage in the tunnels of Silbury Hill, and she did, because she wrote the poem and set down on paper the possibility of that meeting. The savage’s beckoning arm, even if it is only a figment of her imagination, is another image for the coming together of past and present. And, in effect, Fisher joins him in the past because her poem becomes the artefact that was not found and is sealed within the hill like the funereal remains she imagines. She responds to his beck and lies down in the hill to await archaeologists of the future. She breaks down any division between poetry and archaeology as her “Lines” are an archaeological artefact. Fisher offers a final model of time collapsing: instead of bringing the past into the present, the present goes quietly into the past to become the archaeological remains of the future.

When Hardy offers the bold claim that “Time seemed fiction,” he articulates a changed philosophy of time. Past, present and future might co-exist, and archaeology, more than any other discipline, offers evidence of this anachronism. When Hardy encounters a coin, Rossetti faces a bull, and Fisher crafts an encounter for the archaeologist or poet of the future, they all interpret the artefact less as a signifier of a particular time and more as a signifier of the collapse of time. The archaeological object endures from its origin in the past into a life of new meaning in the present, and, as a palimpsest, the object folds time back on itself. Poets who depict archaeological encounters seize those moments to craft monuments to a vision of time that celebrates the power of the poet to see all time at once.
Notes

1. Several scholars have done interesting work on Hardy’s use of archaeology in England (See Andrew Radford and Bharat Tandon), but very little attention has been directed at the poems that rose out of his brief experience in Italy. Indeed, archaeology in Hardy’s poetry has been virtually ignored by Hardy scholars. Exceptions include Ian Ousby and Bert Hornback.

2. Even though the coin reveals Europe’s history, the coin’s history is not of particular interest to Hardy. It is worth noting that some writers were interested in narratives of objects’ lives. In Portable Property, John Plotz mentions one such narrative that offers the autobiography of a coin, Aureus: Or, the Life and Opinions of a Sovereign (1824).

3. For more on how digging for the future led to the past in Victorian London, see Zimmerman, Excavating Victorians.

4. I am grateful to the staff at the British Library for making Hardy’s copy of this book available to me.

5. Unless otherwise indicated, I will refer here to the 1870 version of the poem.

6. Jeffrey Cane Robinson has argued that Wordsworth’s poem "Lyre! Though Such Power do in thy Magic Live” (1842) was likely written about Emmeline Fisher, not his sister Dorothy as generally presumed (141). Fisher was visiting Rydall Mount at the time of the poem’s composition, and Wordsworth’s letters show that he attended with some care to Fisher’s poetic abilities, though he eventually suggested she should not write as doing so would distract her from proper female concerns (Masson 882).

7. I am quoting from the manuscript of the poem held at the Alexander Keiller Museum rather than from the published version which has some slight variations.

8. The extant contents of the jar are held in the archives of the Alexander Keiller Museum at Avebury. I am grateful to the museum staff for providing access to these materials, especially Fisher’s manuscript. I would also like to thank Bucknell University for the funding to visit this archive. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Brian Edwards whose kindness and thorough research made Fisher and all those associated with the Silbury excavation come alive for me.
Works Cited


The Dreams of Archaeology

Alexandra Warwick

One of the most interesting recurrent tropes in the writings of archaeologists, as well as in the fictions of archaeology is the dream. Baron Denon\(^1\) writes of Karnac in 1802:

> The imagination is fatigued with the mere thought of describing [these ruins] [. . .] to form a competent idea of so much magnificence it is necessary that the reader should fancy what is before him to be a dream, for even the spectator cannot believe his eyes. (qtd. in Ceram 122)

In A.H. Layard’s 1854 account of his excavations at Nineveh he writes:

> We look around in vain for any traces of the wonderful remains we have just seen, and are half inclined to believe we have dreamed a dream, or have been listening to some tale of Eastern romance. Some, who may hereafter tread on the spot when grass grows again over the ruins of the Assyrian palaces, may indeed suspect I have been relating a vision. (Popular 311)

Some seventy years later Howard Carter describes covering up the sealed doorway that has been found in the Valley of the Kings:

> The tomb had vanished. So far as the appearance of the ground was concerned there never had been any tomb, and I found it hard to persuade myself at times that the whole episode had not been a dream. (91)

And in one of the fragments that make up Walter Benjamin’s *Arcades Project*:

> The dream – it is the earth in which the find is made that testifies to the primal history of the nineteenth century. (88)

Denon’s comment makes explicit what is registered in the others: the inadequacy of empirical observation in the comprehension of archaeological sites, and the inevitability, even the necessity, of recourse to the dream rather than to the deliberately observed reality. The pull of the poetic away from the empirical is apparent: in Denon, Layard, Carter and many others the moments of doubt about reality are breaks in what are often long, dense and prosaic catalogues of distances travelled, buckets of earth removed, dimensions of objects measured and difficulties in obtaining labour and transport.

Benjamin’s fragment gestures at the complexity of the archaeological imagination in the nineteenth century. Yet the referent isn’t clear: is the dream the ground in which the find is made, or is it a dream that there could be such earth that would yield such finds? The earth itself is the witness that would seem to ‘testify’ rather than, as is more usually the case, the speaking object, the find. At the same time, there is tension too in Benjamin’s juxtaposition of the very specific ‘nineteenth century’ and the vague, mythical ‘primal history’, the latter phrase appearing decidedly unscientific against the new terminology of the emerging discipline of...
archaeology. No doubt the use of the term ‘primal’ here has much to do with that other collector and contemporary of Benjamin, Sigmund Freud, for whom it signified both an individual and collective originary. Significantly, the archaeological collection that Freud himself started in 1896 was a continuation of his earlier interests; as a young man he had been fascinated by Heinrich Schliemann’s excavations of Troy. He said that Schliemann’s life was the one that he most envied (Gay 172) and remarked in a letter of 1931: “I have sacrificed a great deal for my collection of Greek, Roman and Egyptian antiquities, [and] have actually read more archaeology than psychology” (Letters 403). This analogy between psychoanalysis and archaeology is one that has been much discussed by Freudian scholars. Donald Kuspit, for example, makes a substantial claim for its importance, stating: “It is not simply a dramatic device to enliven and adorn the discourse of psychoanalysis [. . .] but the major instrument of its self-understanding’ (133). This is certainly not a position shared by all Freud scholars and the significance of the metaphor remains something of a contested point among them, but the entanglement of psychoanalysis and archaeology has persisted in both popular and critical thought.

Rosalind Williams indicates the difficulty of reading past the gravitational pulls of particular ideas such as these. Of Freud (and Marx), she observes that they “depend so much upon subterranean imagery that it is now virtually impossible to read a text about the underworld without [. . .] reading the buried world as the subconscious, or the working class, or both” (42). The difficulty that Williams alludes to is that the persuasiveness of Freud’s analogy has tended to encourage the development of only one form of mediation between its terms, in which psychoanalysis is persistently used to read archaeology, but archaeology less frequently used to read psychoanalysis. As such it elides something of the possibility of recovering the historical conditions out of which psychoanalytical forms of thought themselves emerged. In particular, if psychoanalysis is in part produced through the elaboration of a particular conception of time and space, it is already possible to see that conception as present within (and in some sense conditioned by) the archaeological imagination. While, then, Freudian ideas continue to inform our own contemporary re-presentations of nineteenth-century phenomena, the historical dynamics of this dialectic are rendered more complex once we begin to recognise the extent to which such ideas are themselves structured through distinctively nineteenth-century tropes and cultural forms. In saying this, I am suggesting that it isn’t necessary to try to read ‘past’ the ideas of Marx and Freud, but that the investigation of their development coincident with that of archaeology may be revealing of their relations with each other, and of the appearances of the archaeological in nineteenth-century fiction.

Writing in 1985, Robert Young observed that “at the heart of its science we find a culture’s values,” (125) and since the 1980s the study of the history of science, literature and culture has been enriched by the consideration of the complex interrelations that exist between them. Archaeology, like many other sciences, ‘emerges’ during the nineteenth century, through its separation from antiquarianism, tracking a familiar path to a place as a professionalised and bounded discipline. As with other Victorian sciences, what is often interesting in archaeology is thus the “remnant of the mythical” (Beer 2). that persists within the movement towards apparently objective study. This article endeavours to suggest that while the dream would seem to be just such a mythic remnant in archaeological writings, what it actually indicates is a troubled engagement with the historical present as Victorian culture attempts to comprehend the conditions of capitalist modernity. Specifically, the appearance of the

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The past is automatically connected with stratigraphic depth, and needs to be drawn back from darkness and obscurity if it is to be a source of significant knowledge [. ..] this disciplinary orientation towards depth, concealment, mystery and revelation is quite obstructive, for it enhances the belief that the past is entirely separate from the present: it is ‘somewhere else’ that has to be accessed in a particular way [. ..] a substance that is secreted in dark places awaiting its recovery. (170)

This, of course, is suggestive of the emblematic ‘somewhere else’ of the late nineteenth century: the unconscious as described by Freud. Indeed, Freud’s use of archaeology as an analogy for psychoanalysis is present from his earliest work onwards. The long passage from “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896) that begins “Imagine that an explorer arrives in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an expanse of ruins” (“Hysteria” 192) is probably the best known of the many examples from his writing. Here Freud states directly that “the fact that the scenes [incidents] are uncovered in a reversed chronological order” is “a fact which justifies our comparison of the work with the excavation of a stratified ruined site” (“Hysteria” 198). Thirty years later in “Civilization and its Discontents” (1930) Freud is still drawing upon the analogy, in this case through an extended comparison of Rome, with its evidence of successive layers of occupation, to the structure of the psyche.

The form of the ‘mighty metaphor’, as Kuspit and others understand it, is a fairly specific one. In spite of his collection of antiquities, for Freud it is not so much about the artefacts as about the process, which at its simplest level is digging. In the “Imagine that an explorer” passage he contrasts two approaches. The explorer “may content himself with inspecting what lies exposed to view, with questioning the inhabitants” or:

He may have brought picks, shovels and spades with him, and he may set the inhabitants to work [. ..] together with them he may start upon the ruins, clear away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried. (“Hysteria” 192)

This shows that the psychoanalytic version of archaeology is one principally governed by an idea of layering, of strata and sedimentation, and of the heroic work of digging. In the unquestioned right to “set the inhabitants to work” it also registers the colonial assumptions of many of the archaeological enterprises of the nineteenth century.
These particular emphases are perhaps derived from his long fascination with Schliemann. Schliemann’s excavation of Troy in the 1870s depended on a very specific idea of what he was doing: digging down to find the truth of the existence of the Homeric city. In his own words: “As it was my object to excavate Troy, which I expected to find in one of the lower cities, I was forced to demolish many interesting ruins in the upper strata” (Schliemann 28). As Schliemann bases his digging on Homer, so Freud’s image of the work of psychoanalysis is similarly inflected and guided by a trust in the evidential value of classical literature, as we see in his use of the drama of Oedipus. Freud’s use of the term ‘stratified’ is similarly significant, in so far as it signals the scientific claims of his fledgling discipline, but also draws on what was by then an important interpretative device.

Originating in geology, the dominant science of the early nineteenth century, the idea of the stratigraphic column was firmly established by 1800. As Rosalind Williams notes: “the image of the column – vertical sections in the earth, corresponding to enormously long periods of time – became the central representation of deep time.” Equally, she suggests that despite the image appearing to represent a triumph of empirical observation, “in other respects it opened the way to the mythological” (29). In Freud’s case, it also opens the way to the metaphorical, and the conflation of depth, profundity, truth and the past; emphasising an idea that anything already visible cannot be a source of significant knowledge (Thomas 169-70). Thomas notes, too, that the stratigraphical approach is most closely associated with “culture history,” with the desire to recover a whole past (160). This desire is one often translated into the dream.

Thinking in this way, we might begin to draw some categories in the broad field of what could be called archaeological fictions. In ‘stratigraphic’ fiction we can see a version of the historical novel in which the entire action is set in an identifiable period of the more distant past. In the nineteenth century these are works like Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s *The Last Days of Pompeii* (1834), Charles Kingsley’s *Hypatia* (1853), John Henry Newman’s *Callista* (1855) or Walter Pater’s *Marius the Epicurean* (1885). The motivations for these are not dissimilar from those governing the historical novel: they depict periods perceived to embody significant moments in particular trajectories of history. So, Kingsley sets his novel in fifth-century Alexandria to show the evil roots of Catholicism; Newman’s *Callista* is a rejoinder on the Church’s fight against paganism (Bowler 40). These novels are nonetheless interesting for the reconstructive impulse that is visible in them. The architect and designer William Burges wrote that “of all the dreams of archaeologists there is none more frequent than that of endeavouring to transport oneself into the domestic life of any given period” (243). Similarly, novels like *Hypatia* and *Marius the Epicurean* are marked by details that apparently confirm their historical accuracy and are full of descriptions of such things as mosaic floorings, jewellery, clothing, cooking pots, drinking vessels and household statuary. This, from *The Last Days of Pompeii*, is typical:

> his tunic glowed in the richest hues of the Tyrian dye, and the fibulae, or buckles, by which it was fastened sparkled with emeralds. Around his neck was a chain of gold, which in the middle of his breast twisted itself into the form of a serpent’s head. (27)

Lytton himself frequently steps forward in the narration: “Previous to our description of this house, it may be as well to convey to the reader a general notion of the houses
of Pompeii [. . .] we shall endeavour to make this description as clear and unpedantic as possible” (39). This correlates to what, for example, the French classical scholar Gaston Boissier, writing about Pompeii, said of it in 1863: “efforts were directed, above all, to reviving a Roman city that would depict for us the life of bygone ages; it was necessary to see the city in its entirety and in its minutest details in order that the lesson might be complete” (qtd. in Daniel 165). Such stratigraphic culture-history novels, like Boissier’s Pompeii, produce archaeological detail in the service of didactics, and the objects signify authenticity – the material guarantees the subjective.

By the early twentieth century we can see a revealing perception of this ‘authenticity’ in Roger Fry’s attack on Lawrence Alma-Tadema, whose work, Fry says, “finds its chief support among the half-educated members of the lower middle class”. Specifically he says that in his paintings of classical subject matter Alma-Tadema “proceeded to satisfy all the futile inquiries that indolent curiosity might make about the domestic belongings and daily trifles of those people” (666-7). Fry’s is a criticism of low-brow taste, and of the Victorians disdained by the Bloomsbury Group, but it also indicates the fascination with ‘stuff’ rather than ideas, a dismissal of the value of affective continuity and an identification of a whole class of society with the rubbish of mass-produced commodity culture. The ‘education’ offered by writers like Bulwer-Lytton or painters like Alma-Tadema is not a real education in art or history, as it appeals only to a prurient curiosity that is akin to the wish to see inside their neighbours’ houses. In this way, Fry’s attack re-states the class anxiety of Victorian museum boards that the lower classes would simply ‘gawp’ at the exhibits and fail, unless clearly directed, to derive any useful lesson from them. Early museum displays hence did not offer any kind of re-creation of context for their objects, such exhibitions being left entirely to the spectacles of popular culture and to the pages of novels like The Last Days of Pompeii.

Unlike the stratigraphic novel, there is however another category of fiction that registers something of the less controlled effects of the archaeological and in which objects signify very differently. These are the gothic and fantastic fictions of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century, which include texts such as Bulwer Lytton’s The Ring of Amasis (1863), Arthur Conan Doyle’s “The Ring of Thoth” (1890) and “Lot No. 249” (1894), Bram Stoker’s The Jewel of Seven Stars (1903), a number of H. Rider Haggard’s short stories and sections of his novels, and Arthur Machen’s The Hill of Dreams (1907) as well as others of his stories. Ruth Hoberman has written of what she calls a kind of “museum gothic” (469) in this regard, though I would suggest that such a category is impelled more powerfully by the objects than the museal setting and that the term artefactual fictions would thus seem more applicable. This use of ‘artefactual’ is one I borrow from Elliott Colla’s excellent book on Egyptology where he points to the origin of the word ‘artefact’ in the distinction between natural and human-made objects, and the emphasis on the status of the object as a product of a process of making. “Most especially” he says “its concept seeks to separate factual questions of what it means to have been made by humans from questions of value” (9).

Artefaction, for Colla, is thus the process, or processes, through which the finds of archaeology are constructed through discourse. The museum plays a part in the artefaction, but the objects themselves are not merely passive, rather they are an element within “a sprawling network of agents and actants.” As Colla notes, “one indicator of this fact is that even though the processes of artefaction and figuration attempted to construct antiquities as inert matter, the stuff itself often did not obey this command.” (19)
This, then, is the stuff of artefactual fictions, and they contain very different dreams from those of the stratigraphic: disruptive, destructive and even fatal. In these works, the object is not part of a stratum, at home with others in its period, but out of the context of its first existence. They are the mummy in the rooms of the Oxford undergraduate, the ring that once belonged to a priestess now in a museum cabinet, the strangely inscribed shard of pottery in a junk shop: the type is now familiar. The difference from the object in the stratigraphic is that these are conspicuously objects in the present rather than in the past. It is in this that the surface/depth analogy begins to be undone.

Returning to Freud, there is the evident possibility of thinking his work, too, from something like this perspective. Kenneth Reinhard suggests that the appropriation of the archaeological metaphor in Freud, where “the work of psychoanalysis is understood as a therapeutic hermeneutics, process of discovery in which the obscured past is revealed and integrated into the self-present ego,” is actually undermined by Freud’s own rhetorical deployment of the metaphor (57). In a nice phrase he contrasts what he calls “the Trojan historicism of Anglo-American ego psychology” with the “Orphic archaeology of Lacan”; the latter analyst being not a Schliemann triumphantly uncovering the true meaning of the past, but an Orpheus descending to Hell rather than Troy and always returning empty-handed. As Reinhard puts it, psychoanalysis is then seen “less as the discovery of lost secrets of the unconscious than as the endless re-discovery of the unconscious as lost” (74). The past is always irretrievable.

Discussing how ruins might signify, Reinhard suggests that they are “not so much of the past as to the past”: the sāxa loquuntur of Freud’s essay “speak of something other than the moment which they were intended to represent and always in the foreign and stony tongue of untimely epitaphs” (61). This is very different from the dream of the past of the stratigraphic, where objects are firmly of the past – indeed they are what guarantee the reality in those novels. The objects to the past, rather than of it, are the ‘new’ ones of nineteenth-century culture, the ones that could be described as engaging with the as-yet-unconstituted present. Benjamin echoes the same thought in his assertion that “the true method of making things present is to represent them in our space, not to represent ourselves in their space [. . .] we don’t displace our being into theirs, they step into our life” (206).

Objects and Commodities
This distinction is an important one, and it is in this context that it is possible to turn to a consideration of the archaeological object and to the work of Marx. Marx’s would certainly appear to be a much less explicitly archaeological imagination. His own writings do not employ anything like Freud’s archaeological metaphors, or indicate that he took any interest at all in the contents of the British Museum, despite working in the Reading Room frequently between his arrival in London 1849 and his death in 1883. This was one of the most intense periods of the Museum’s acquisition and expansion during which time many dramatic objects arrived amidst great publicity. Francis Wheen’s biography suggests that “the marvels and monstrosities of Victorian London which so astonished many foreign visitors were invisible to Marx.” In contrast to his excitement at seeing an electric model train in a shop window, “had he encountered Dickens’ megalosaurus in the mud of Holborn Hill he would,” Wheen speculates, “scarcely have given it a second glance” (150-1). Marx’s writing is, however, frequently marked by recourse to language that reaches beyond the vocabulary of economics. As Peter Osborne comments:
Marx draws upon a gothic literary imaginary, in presenting capitalism as secretly possessed by a series of pre-modern forms. But unlike in the gothic, these forms are not residues or remnants of earlier feudal forms, persisting, lurking repressed beneath the surface of modernity. They are the effects of the most advanced economic form itself: capitalism. (16-17)

Again, this is not the past as chronological, but the past as pre-history of the present. That is to say, it is an engagement with the contemporary; specifically here the modernity of capitalism as it transfigures the nineteenth-century world.

Marx elaborates on the process in an appropriately archaeological analogy: “Value [. . .] transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyph. Later on men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social product” (167). The analogy is appropriate because, like the hieroglyphics of Ancient Egypt (only recently deciphered), this is a secret that, in a sense, everybody knows and has participated in creating, only to forget. It is a secret hidden in plain sight, just as the monuments of Egypt stood for centuries, human-made and visible, yet unreadable. There is nothing ‘behind’ it, it is present, immanent.

At the same time, Marx famously also uses another analogy from contemporary anthropology: the fetish. In religion, he says “the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities” (165). There is, in this sense, an important distinction between Marx’s use of the term and our more common (Freudian) understanding of it. Marx’s account is not of fetishism as a psychological condition of the subject, whose desire transforms objects. Rather, it is about the fetish character of the commodity itself, and thus not about the fetishization of particular commodities by certain consumers. Or as Osborne explains: “When he wrote of commodity fetishism Marx wrote not of a desire for commodities, but of a displacement of the desire to know” (21).

In thinking about the objects of archaeology the difficult question concerns their distinctive status as commodities. It is clear that Victorian observers were easily able to see found objects within a framework of commodity culture. They were fascinated by the ‘things’ of places like Pompeii, often listing them exhaustively as Dickens does: “Lamps, tables, couches, vessels for eating, drinking, and cooking; workmen’s tools, surgical instruments, tickets for the theatre, pieces of money, personal ornaments” (446). The tumbled list of objects resembles exactly Dickens’ descriptions in his novels of the overflowing materiality of contemporary London. Others make even more explicit comparisons. Frances Trollope, writing in 1842, says: “I shall never feel sent back to ages past by the columns and pediments of ancient Rome as I did by the shop-counters, the oil-jars and the ovens of Pompeii,” (261) and forty years later a writer in All the Year Round remarks that “there are traces at Pompeii of all sorts of London shop-things” (44). In both there is an odd reversal of temporality: the present has left its traces in the past.

Virginia Zimmerman has traced the continuity of individual and social relations that the Victorian public imagined with the inhabitants of Pompeii, but it can also be suggested that the striking element in these accounts is not the timeless similarity of human nature, but instead their registering of the extraordinary conditions of capitalist modernity. In these passages the commodity is the means by which the present and the past are negotiated. The unreadable, unknowable past is made knowable by imagining it as identical to contemporary commodity capitalism. The
objects that figure in nineteenth-century artefactual fictions are apparently from outside a recognisable structure – that is, their mode of production is radically other than that which obtains in the present – but they are nevertheless *produced*. In this way, these kinds of fictions negotiate objects into their own commodity culture by the initial recognition and then the denial or forgetting of such objects as having been the product of labour.

Nineteenth-century writers also recognised the ways in which artefaction happens in the movement from use value to exchange value. This is from an 1852 article on a display of objects from Pompeii in *Household Words*:

In the next cupboard are various articles of a domestic nature: soap, cotton, sponges, wax…*the vanity of human toil sowing where it is never to reap; the cunning of mankind intent upon a morrow which will never arrive; the value of small things; the worthlessness of great ones* – how many lessons are taught by these relics, the whole of which would not probably have purchased for their possessor a night’s rest, or a meal, but for the possession of which the connoisseur would now-a-days mortgage his broad lands and entail poverty on his descendants? (Lewis 283)

As well as the more familiar meditation on the vanity of human ambition, this observation illustrates the transition in the status of objects. The use value of the trivial objects is translated into exchange value and the connoisseur is thereby prepared to abandon the traditional feudal system of leaving his broad lands to his descendants by entering into the illusory economy of commodity culture, trading solid land for evanescent ‘value’. The Romanticism of the antiquarian reverie is replaced by a heartless plunge into capitalist economics.

Despite their antiquity, the soap and wax of Pompeii or the cups and beads of Troy are ordinary and recognisable items, but there are other kinds of objects that are more difficult to recognise in such straightforward ways, such as those of religious or ritual usage, or without any apparent function at all. Marx is clear that these too are commodities:

*Circulation becomes the great social retort into which everything is thrown, to come out again as the money crystal. Nothing is immune from this alchemy, the bones of the saints cannot withstand it, let alone more delicate res sacrosanctae, extra commercium hominum* (consecrated objects, beyond human commerce). Just as in money every qualitative difference between commodities is extinguished, so too for its part, as a radical leveller, it extinguishes all distinctions. (229)

For Marx, as is apparent in this passage and re-stated frequently in his work, there is no differentiation between commodities. In this, however, he perhaps over-states the totalising and destructive power of capital, for it would seem obvious that there is in fact a significant difference between a bar of soap and an Assyrian winged bull. Nonetheless, there is a possible indication of another way to read the difference of the characteristic objects of artefactual fictions to be found in *Capital*: the magical rings, the strange statues, the mysterious boxes of Victorian gothic. In Chapter 2 Marx asserts that “commodities are things, and therefore lack the power to resist man. If they are unwilling, he can use force; in other words he can take possession of them” (178). There is an odd contradiction in Marx’s words here: commodities both lack
power but can be ‘unwilling’. Here I think, is what makes archaeological objects different kinds of commodities from tables or coats: it is their greater ‘unwillingness’: a stronger resistance to the process of commodification that necessitates the greater ‘use of force’.

This push-and-pull of unwillingness and taking possession correlates with the struggle apparent in processes of artefaction. Neither commodification nor artefaction are ever ‘completed’ in the sense that a permanent stasis of condition is never achieved. The dream is one of the markers that this struggle is taking place, as the figure of the dream frequently indicates, or attempts not to indicate, the presence of labour or money. Nineteenth-century archaeological texts are, in this way, marked by a doubleness of discourse in which both labour and money are emphasised alongside a vanishing of both in the language of wonder, miracle, luck, fate and magic and dreams. To take Austen Layard’s best-seller *Nineveh and Its Remains*: every discovery is framed by comments on the presence of the workmen, the carrying of baskets of earth and the shifting of quantities of rubble. The accompanying illustrations emphasise the mechanical difficulties and the heavy work of extracting and moving the larger finds. This labour, however, is erased even as it is being performed. In Layard’s account of his excavations at Nineveh he writes of being unable to sleep on the night before the digging began:

> Visions of palaces under-ground, of gigantic monsters, of sculptured figures, and endless inscriptions, floated before me. After forming plan after plan for removing the earth, and extricating these treasures, I fancied myself wandering into a maze of chambers from which I could find no outlet. Then again, all was reburied and I was standing on the grass-covered mound. (Remains 25)

In the dream too, objects simply appear or, indeed, seem to excavate themselves. Layard describes, “this gigantic head, blanched with age, thus rising from the bowels of the earth…slowly ascending from the regions below” (Remains 98). The dream takes the place of the work that is to be performed in a fantasy of doing without the difficult reality of local labour.

Nick Shepherd calls this a disciplinary “habit of elision” in the context of twentieth-century African archaeology, where he suggests that “a concern with native labour, its tractability, its cost, its continued supply, runs as a thread through colonial and apartheid histories” and argues that this is precisely mirrored in archaeological site reports (346-7). Although there are clearly further racial dimensions to this habit of elision in a colonial situation, the language is identical to that deployed about the British working class in the nineteenth century. In the 1840s and 1850s, when Layard and others are making their expeditions abroad, the tractability of workers at home had become a crucial issue in the context of the booms and busts of early industrialisation. Arguably, the archaeological habit of elision was one already acquired long before any digging took place. Shepherd explores Ian Hodder’s observation of a shift in the style and rhetoric of the archaeological site report, noting the latter’s claims that early examples of the genre give actor-oriented accounts and make use of personal pronouns, whereas in the late nineteenth century a “transformation occurs towards more distant, abstract, decontextualized accounts” and the use of the passive voice (Hodder 271). My argument is that such ‘scientising’ of archaeological language is to some extent only formalising, however, what is already present in the earlier and
apparently more romantic accounts. The earlier versions of the habit of elision is established in the language of the dream, the vision and magic.

The archaeologist dreaming the objects into existence is slid together with an idea of the objects themselves having been asleep: “All these figures, the idols of a religion long since dead and buried like themselves, seemed actually in the twilight to be raising their desecrated heads from the sleep of centuries” (Remains 369). In their sleep they too have something like the capacity to dream themselves into existence. In his Arcades Project Benjamin writes of an aspect of the life of the commodity, which is the boredom it experiences in its wait to be sold (861). What wakes it is its entrance into an economy of exchange, just as what animates the archaeological object is its coming into being as a commodity. In Victorian artefactual fictions, this awakening, though, marks the moment of the disturbance of the present, in which the object resists its commodification and asserts itself as a product of human labour.

It is not only the effacement of labour that takes place in these accounts, but also a curious disappearance of the ‘taking possession’ that Marx refers to. No-one seems to wish to assert ownership of the objects found, that is, no-one wishes to articulate the object as commodity, to display the ‘force’ of taking possession. Belzoni, for example, presents a very confusing account of the financing and purpose of his travels in Egypt. He claims to have been solely “making researches for antiquities, which were to be placed in the British Museum,” (37) yet some objects are given personally as presents to him, while some he purchases directly or indirectly with money that comes from Henry Salt, the consul-general who, in turn, may or may not be acting for the British government or the Museum. In Layard’s autobiography, there is a strikingly similar passage. Belzoni begins his version of events: “It has been erroneously stated that I was regularly employed by Mr Salt [...] I positively deny that I was ever engaged by him” (37); and Layard “It was generally believed In England that the expenses of my first journey to Mosul, and of the excavations previous to the grant made by the British Museum for continuing my researches – of which I did not avail myself until the month of October 1846 – were entirely borne by Sir Stratford Canning. Such was not the case” (1:155). There then follows a series of confusing acknowledgments of debts to Canning, Layard’s mother and the Museum. He concludes: “I might have claimed all that I found in the ruins as my own property” (156), but he emphatically does not make such a claim. Much as this may reflect the precarious pecuniary reality of those early expeditions, the effect is a dispersal of agency in which no one person is responsible for the possession of the finds. Hence, after its self-excavation, the object then seems to take itself to the market, as the commodity does.

In a poem published in Household Words, a bull at Smithfield Market addresses his “cousin of Nineveh”:

    whether you be there, or here,
    Or on your travels

and continues:

    your high mission
    To Fifty One’s Great Exhibition,
    Is not to show your ancient learning,
    But into practice knowledge turning (589-90)
It is not a good poem, but in its clumsiness it exposes the tangled idea of the self-marketing commodity. The Nineveh bull is travelling to England independently on its mission and is cousin to one already in the marketplace. Moreover, the bull is not actually coming to Smithfield but, both topically and inaccurately, to the Great Exhibition of 1851 (the poem was published just before its opening). Its destination is telling; rather than presenting itself at the very old marketplace of the pre-capitalist economy, the bull is going to the Great Exhibition, the absolutely new spectacular space that established the commodity as “the centrepiece of everyday life, the focal point of all representation, the dead centre of the modern world” (Richards 1).

In their reluctance to assert possession, the archaeologists underscore again the denial of production and commodification: objects are ‘finds’ or ‘discoveries’, that eventually become ‘gifts’ or ‘bequests’ or ‘acquisitions’. As Susan Stewart notes, this is characteristic: the collection, she says:

represents a metaphor of ‘production’ not as ‘the earned’ but as ‘the captured’ [. . .] the collection says that the world is given; we are the inheritors, not the producers of value here [. . .] The collector constructs a narrative of luck which replaces the narrative of production. (164-5)

Again, Layard provides an illustration:

It had often occurred to me during my labours, that the time of the discovery of these remains was so opportune, that it might be looked upon as something more than accidental [. . .] It was consequently just at the right moment that they were disinterred; and we have been fortunate enough to acquire the most convincing and lasting evidence of that magnificence, and power, which made Nineveh the wonder of the ancient world. (Popular 351)

Even as he mentions his “labours” he invokes good fortune as that which has really brought the things into the world and by referring to them as “evidence” he rhetorically places them in the system of knowledge. They are to be made safe, inert artefacts by their position within a system of relations constructed by the new ‘knowledge’ of archaeology, the mirror of the abstract system of relations that the commodity inhabits.

**Residues of a Dream World**

It is important to return finally to Freud and to Benjamin. Writing in the 1930s, the dream became an important idea for Benjamin in his effort to understand the pre-history of the present. In particular, he endeavours to connect Marx and Freud through this figure, suggesting that:

Didn’t Marx teach that the bourgeoisie, as a class, can never arrive at a perfectly clear awareness of itself. And if this is the case, isn’t one justified in annexing to Marx’s thesis the idea of the dream collective (that is, the bourgeois collective)? (863)

Similarly, the *Arcades Project* suggests that the spectacular spaces of the nineteenth century are both profoundly connected to and manifestations of this dream collective:

Museums unquestionably belong to the dream houses of the collective [. . .]
the inside of the museum appears as an interior magnified on a giant scale. In the years 1850-1890, exhibitions take the place of museums. (406-7)

Museums and exhibitions are the “residues of a dream world” (898), and as Richards reminds us, “in the spectacle, production and consumption are paired moments in a single process of commodity representation” (16).

The dreaming collective knows no history. Events pass before it as always identical and always new. The sensation of the newest and most modern is, in fact, as much a dream formation of events as the ‘eternal return of the same’. The perception of space that corresponds to this perception of time is superimposition. (854-55)

There is a strong echo of this conception in Freud too, where late in his life he still persisted with the analogy of archaeology, despite more or less rejecting it each time he uses it. In “Civilization and Its Discontents” (1930), for example, he asks the reader to imagine that:

Rome is not a place where people live, but a psychical entity with a similarly long, rich past, in which nothing that ever took shape has passed away, and in which all previous phases of development exist beside the most recent [... ] and the observer would perhaps need only to shift his gaze or his position in order to see the one or the other. (8-9)

In the next line he dismisses this fantasy as “pointless,” unimaginable and absurd. Yet, despite this dismissal he returns immediately to the analogy, only to “readily” dismiss it once again (“Civilization”10). His persistence indicates that there is nevertheless something about the metaphor that is true, and it is the dream that figures the possibility that, contrary to his assertion, the same space can accommodate two different things. That space is the archaeological, in fiction, culture and documentary accounts.

The archaeological theorist Gavin Lucas proposes that “archaeology is a materialising activity - it does not simply work with material things, it materialises. It brings new things into the world; it reconfigures the world” (117). This, of course, runs counter to the more usual sense of what archaeology does, which is recovering old things, recognising those things for what they ‘really are’ and placing them in a context. But these ‘new’ things are not new in that they already exist, or have existed before; their newness comes about during and after having been brought into the present. Lucas suggests a definition of archaeology as “an engagement with the unconstituted present.” (117). In this sense, archaeology is not the simple recovery and understanding of the past, but the negotiation of objects into the present and the simultaneous negotiation of that present itself. This is the doubled space, and these, then, constitute the dreams of nineteenth-century archaeology. The disturbance produced by archaeological objects is not the horror of the past, but of the recognition of the conditions of the present. The dreams of the archaeological imagination are not the dreams of Freud, but the dreams of capitalist modernity.
Notes

1. Baron Vivant Denon was invited by Napoleon as an artist to accompany other scholars alongside the army in Egypt. He later became Director General of Museums in France.
2. There is an exhaustive list of texts discussing the topic in Ucko 271-2.
3. Glyn Daniel suggests that Nabonidus, the last King of Babylon (556-539 BCE), may have been the earliest deliberate ‘archaeologist’. (16)
4. In the 1850s alone, the British Museum received large and spectacular material from Layard’s second expedition to Mesopotamia, Charles Newton’s excavations at Halicarnassus, and Nathan Davis’s in Carthage.
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On January 22, 1984, in the break of the third quarter of the NFL’s seventeenth Super Bowl, Apple Computer Incorporated aired for the first time the now famous “1984” commercial for its new, Macintosh computer.1 Needing a commercial winner and increasingly feeling the pressure of IBM, Apple banked its future on the success of Macintosh and the commercial that introduced it to the public. This article argues that Apple’s choice to refer to Orwell’s dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) in order to sell computers was informed by more than a lucky coincidence of dates. Rather, the “1984” commercial was to a large extent prompted by the poetics of dystopian discourse. By engaging with Orwell’s classic fiction Apple’s advertisement was able to activate paradigms of spatial coherency and subversion that are associated with utopian and dystopian constructions, and so effectively managed the commercial space into which Macintosh could emerge.

Macintosh and Product Placement: The First iCommodity

In 1984, several computer manufacturers were converging from different backgrounds to compete in the relatively new market of what was variously referred to as the home-, personal- or microcomputer. For example, Apple had jumpstarted its business from an electronics and hobbyist background, and sought to expand on its first commercial success, the Apple II. By contrast, IBM had expanded its traditional big-iron, mainframe computer business by introducing the IBM PC for end-users. Meanwhile, Commodore and Sinclair had developed from established calculator manufacturers to produce inexpensive home computers. In this complex and crowded emerging market, IBM had so far been the most successful competitor. Although comparatively late to realise the potential of the microcomputer, by the mid-1980s IBM had ensured that its PC was the dominant computing paradigm for consumers. It was into this turbulent and IBM-dominated marketplace that Apple introduced Macintosh.

Apple’s decision to quote what is perhaps the most canonical example of dystopian discourse appears to have been inspired by the company’s sales strategy for its new Macintosh computer. Macintosh, like so many of Apple’s subsequent products, relied to a large extent on the idea that it offered a unique sales alternative to the computing mainstream (i.e. the IBM PC). And certainly this claim was to a degree justified in the case of the Macintosh. As with its upscale sister the Lisa, Apple’s Macintosh shipped with a mouse and the System 1.0 operating software, thus introducing pointing devices and graphical user interfaces to ordinary consumers and giving them an alternative to commandline-only microcomputers. However, alongside these innovations, Apple continued to use ‘off-the-shelf” parts for the Macintosh so that its ‘unique’ design shared a large technical base with competing devices. For example, Macintosh was built up around Motorola’s 68000 processor architecture, which gave the machine a powerful family connection with, for example, the Commodore Amiga and Atari ST.2 In fact, as Brian Bagnall argues, it was Commodore, not Apple, that mostly lead the technology race in the early days of the microcomputer (ix-x). And yet, Apple has been far more successful than Commodore...
– and IBM, Atari, and Sinclair – at projecting a sense of radical innovation and capitalising on this message. Certainly, the marketing strategy for the Macintosh relied on stressing the machine’s exclusivity and “unique” design to such a degree that these became principal sales arguments in themselves. In this way, Macintosh, and Apple’s products in general, are, from the consumer’s point of view, not necessarily characterised by technical distinctiveness or superiority. Instead, Apple’s computing devices are associated with the idea of technical distinctiveness and superiority because these help to express the sales message of exclusivity and individuality. As indicated by Apple’s recent line of iDevices, it is not so much the tangible characteristics of the technological commodity itself that Apple uses as a sales argument. Instead, the company suggests that its products offer customers the tools to give voice to their individuality. Expressing yourself, the i-prefix proposes, is a simply a matter of deciding which iPod you are.

Apple first explored this sales strategy with the Macintosh: buying a Mac was not only buying a computer, it was also purchasing a piece of technology that functioned as a token of individuality. In short, Macintosh and Apple’s later products are not so much computing commodities as they are the attempted commodification of the concept of ‘uniqueness.’ This commodification of uniqueness, which deserves in this context to be named ‘iCommodification,’ entails the creation of a commercial space where the social relationship between individual and perceived collective is established through the consumption of electronic goods and services.

From a Marxist perspective, then, iCommodification reveals itself as a form of commodity fetishism. As Marx explains in *Capital*, commodities can attract functions beyond simply the representation of use, labour and exchange value. In this way, commodities express something other than the sum of their raw materials or the labour required to make them. Rather, commodities contain value beyond the mere physical and represent social relations, as Marx explains:

> There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. (Marx 43)

Macintosh, then, as a physical object, is transformed by its role as a commodity. It changes form from a collection of technological parts into a “fantastic form” where physical properties express social behaviour. In the case of Apple’s products, this commodity fetishism encodes a negative social relationship, or anti-social behaviour. That is, iCommodification entails the transformation of electronics devices into objects that bespeak an individual’s desire to reject the mainstream and instead express their non-conformity.

Apple’s effort to commodify uniqueness was first made tangible by Macintosh, and specifically by the ad that introduced it to potential consumers. “1984” represents a watershed event in Apple’s history as it forms a considerable break with the company’s previous advertising strategies. It replaced an emphasis on the pragmatic, concrete virtues of computing products and presented a new approach to selling computers. Previously, Apple had competed in the marketplace primarily on features and price (on use-value). Before Macintosh, Apple’s advertisements
generally showed products in the context of a use environment, and listed technical
details in support of the computer’s usefulness. For example, the Apple II was
introduced to the consumer by a full-page spread that focused on the practical
application of the computing device. (See Fig. 1 and 2) The left page featured a
realistic kitchen scene: wife in the background preparing food; husband in the
foreground working with an Apple II that displays a graph. While the specific
usefulness of the Apple II within this domestic context is not immediately apparent,
Apple’s literal product placement here does indicate their desire to present their
product favourably in terms of utility. Specifically, the ad’s use of diagrams and
confirmation of gender stereotyping underline the idea that the Apple II fits
conventional, gender-biased paradigms of usefulness, labour division and efficiency
with a degree of mathematical precision. Moreover, the right page of the
advertisement lists the machine’s technical details, as well as a number of suggestions
about how it may be employed in the household. In its entirety, then, the
advertisement which introduced the Apple II stressed utility above all else: it showed
a tool with specific capabilities that could be used to perform tasks that were imagined
to be compatible with a pre-existing social context. Apple II and its commercial
discourse, in short, were technologies of conformity, or at least attempting to be so.

By contrast, “1984” presented a less utility driven and more abstract sales
argument. The advertisement opens by showing gritty images of multitudes marching
through corridors while a narrative voice-over can be heard exalting the merits of the
“information purification age” (“1984”). The mise-en-scène is dominated by shades of
grey. Almost no colour is present in the picture. The marchers are men who share the
same outfit of loosely fitting overalls and have shaved heads, giving the impression of
a prison colony. The view then cuts to a scene revealing the destination of the
marching men as an auditorium. At the front of the auditorium is a massive screen
from which the source of the voice-over can be seen. An enormous, blurry and
bespectacled talking head continues to pontificate about information, ideology and
resolve over the captivated, attendant crowd. The uniformity of these scenes is
interrupted by brief shots of a single figure running instead of marching. An athletic
women, dressed in red shorts and white top runs powerfully and elegantly holding a
hammer, while being chased by what are intended to look like riot police. Her
movement, colour and sexual appeal all disrupt the uniform monotony of the
surrounding environment. The view of the running figure and that of the auditorium
begin to coincide as the athlete can be seen coming up to the screen. She stops, swings
around, and then throws the hammer. It flies through the auditorium and hits the
screen. As the screen explodes, its light illuminates the front row of onlookers to
reveal their shock at its destruction. The screen then fades to show the final text
message, which is also narrated: “On January 24th, Apple Computer will introduce
Macintosh. And you’ll see why 1984 won’t be like ‘1984’” (“1984”).
Fig. 1.
“1977 Apple II Introduction Ad.”
The home computer that’s ready to work, play and grow with you.

Clear the kitchen table. Bring in the color TV. Plug in your new Apple II and connect any standard cassette recorder/player. Now you’re ready for an evening of discovery in the new world of personal computers.

Only Apple II makes it that easy. It’s a complete, ready to use computer—not a kit. At $129.9, it includes features you won’t find on other personal computers costing twice as much.

Features such as video graphics in 15 colors. And a built-in memory capacity of 8K bytes ROM and 4K bytes RAM—with room for lots more. But you don’t even need to know a RAM from a ROM to use and enjoy Apple II. It’s the first personal computer with a fast version of BASIC—the English-like programming language—permanently built in. That means you can begin running your Apple II the first evening, entering your own instructions and watching them work, even if you’ve had no previous computer experience.

The familiar typewriter style keyboard makes communication easy. And your programs and data can be stored on tape cartridges, using the built-in cassette interface, so you can swap with other Apple II users. This and other peripherals—optional equipment on most personal computers, but hundreds of dollars extra just—a re-purpose Apple II. And it’s designed to keep up with changing technology, to expand easily whenever you need it.

As an educational tool, Apple II is a sound investment. You can program it to teach your children in most any subject, such as spelling, history or math. But the biggest benefit—no matter how you use Apple II—is that you and your family increase your familiarity with the computer itself. The more you experiment with it, the more you discover about its potential.

Start by playing PONG. Then invest your own games using the input keyboard, game paddles and built-in speakers. As you experiment you’ll acquire new programming skills which will open up new ways to use your Apple II. You’ll learn to “point” dazzling color displays using the unique color graphics commands in Apple BASIC, and write programs to create beautiful kaleidoscopic designs. As you master Apple BASIC, you’ll be able to originate, index and store data on household finances, income tax, recipes, and record collections. You can learn to chart your blood pressures, balance your checking account, even control your home environment. Apple II will go as far as your imagination can take it.

Best of all, Apple II is designed to grow with you. As your skill and experience with computing increase, you may want to add new Apple peripherals. For example, a refined, more sophisticated BASIC language is being developed for advanced scientific and mathematical applications. And in addition to the built-in audio, video and game interfaces, there’s room for eight plug-in options such as a prototyping board for experimenting with interfaces to other equipment; a serial board for connecting teleprinters or terminals; a parallel interface for communicating with a printer or another computer; an EPROM board for storing programs permanently; and a modem board for communications interfaces. A floppy disk interface with software and complete operating systems will be available at the end of 1977. And there are many more options to come, because Apple II was designed from the beginning to accommodate increased power and capability as your requirements change.

If you’d like to see for yourself how easy it is to use and enjoy Apple II, visit your local dealer for a demonstration and a copy of our 

Apple II is a complete self-contained computer system with BASIC, 8000 bytes of memory, advanced BASIC, efficient switching power supply and molded case. It is supplied with BASIC in ROM, up to 48K bytes of RAM, and with cassette tape, video and game I/O interfaces built-in. Also included are two game paddles and a demonstration cassette.

SPECIFICATIONS

- Microprocessor: 500 Hz 1 MHz.
- Video Display: Memory mapped, 5 modes—All Software-selectable:
  - Text—40 characters/line, 24 lines upper case.
  - Graphics—40 x 48, 16 colors
  - High-resolution graphics—280 x 192, black, white, violet, green (16K RAM minimum required)
- Both graphics modes can be selected to include 4 lines of text at the bottom of the display area.
- Completely transparent memory access. All color generation done digitally.
- Memory: Up to 48K bytes on-board RAM (4K supplied).
- Software:
  - Fast extended Integer BASIC in ROM with color graphics commands
  - Extensive monitor in ROM
  - I/O:
    - 1500 bps cassette interface
    - 8-bit RIU terminal
    - Apple game I/O connector
    - ASCII keyboard port
- Expandable: Composite video output

Apple II is also available in board-only form for do-it-yourself hobbyist. Has all the features of the Apple II system, but does not include case, keyboard, power supply or game paddles. $299.

PONG is a trademark of Atari Inc.

Apple II plugs into any standard TV using an innovative modular TV-to-computer device. For more information, write the detailed brochure. Or write Apple Computer Inc., 2083 Stevens Creek Blvd., Cupertino, California 95014.

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Apple’s “1984” commercial, then, works not by focusing on the Macintoshes’ technical merits and their ability to connect with convention, but instead draws parallels between Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and the personal computer marketplace to suggest the *resistance* to convention. The ad’s success in this respect depends upon a number of thematic connections between the novel’s major concerns and the early 1980s computing landscape. This thematic overlap consists of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*’s dominant power structures and computer market leaders on the one hand, and Apple and dystopian resistance on the other. By offering itself as an intertext to Orwell’s novel, “1984” suggests that social conformity involves the forceful compliance to imposed ideals and the restriction of free and creative thought. In this way, the ad paints Apple’s competitors – in particular market-leader IBM – as entities that inherently confine the individual consumer and inspire submission to generalised computing solutions. Alongside this analogy of market dominance and freedom restriction, “1984” places Macintosh in the position of the freedom fighter. Recalling *Nineteen Eighty-Four*’s protagonist, the ad associates Winston Smith’s heroic struggle for individual freedom and creativity with resistance to the existing state of affairs in the computer marketplace. In this way, Apple attempts to make its desire to commodify uniqueness concrete: by presenting its competitors in the shadow of the Ministry of Truth and “newspeak”, the company allows itself to assume the role of resistance fighter. As a result, an Apple computer becomes evocative of confronting conformity and questioning the status quo. In turn, this image suggests that buying an Apple involves an act of rebellion which, through its opposition to orthodoxy, is able to express individuality and uniqueness. As such, “1984” forms an early attempt on Apple’s part to commodify uniqueness rather than shift technological artefacts. Indeed, there is nothing in the ad to suggest that buying a Macintosh entails the acquisition of a technological commodity. (See Figs. 3 and 4) Instead, “1984” proposes that choosing to buy a Macintosh offers you a chance to stand out as unique and individual.

Not only was “1984” Apple’s first more abstract sales message, one that focused on the ability of computers to codify social relationships rather than on technical details, it also resolved a number of inconsistencies in the company’s previous sales strategies. In two ways “1984” introduced a consistent message where there formerly had been none. To begin with, “1984” introduced a solid logic behind Apple’s pricing schemes. From its inception, Apple had struggled with the exchange-value of its products, as well as the importance of advertising on price. As a result, pricing schemes were often contradictory and Apple’s narrative on price showed little consensus. Henry Whitfield, Apple’s manager at the advertising agency Chiat/Day, complained of the difficult bind that this ambivalent attitude towards pricing put him in:

“There are these guys at Apple,” Whitfield said, “who are saying ‘Let’s make a lot of hay out of price.’ Then the left hand says, ‘Don’t advertise price.’ And the right hand says, ‘Promote the hell out of price.’ We look like idiots if the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing. I don’t think price is an advantage for Apple. The price of the Apple Two isn’t all that low compared to other machines. People don’t know what price means.” (qtd. in Moritz, *The Little Kingdom* 57-8)
Macintosh and “1984” resolved this tension by clearly positioning Apple’s products as luxury items. Macintosh was launched with an introductory price of $2,495 which – while still considerably cheaper that the Apple Lisa which cost $9,995 at introduction – placed it well above, for example, the Commodore Amiga 1000 that used many of the same components and retailed at just $1,295. Macintosh, in other words, was not competing on price but on its social value as a commodity item. Accordingly, Apple made no mention of price in its commercial at all. As with the Macintosh’s technical details, then, Apple preferred to highlight the social aspects of its products over use-value or exchange-value. In this way, “1984” helped to structure Apple’s sales strategy around iCommodification and removed some of the inconsistencies of the company’s earlier advertisements in relation to price.

Secondly, Apple’s commercial effectively signposts the computer as a mainstream commodity for the first time. Whereas earlier advertisements attempted to appeal to specific and often disparate customer focus groups, “1984” made no overt claim as to the particular audience it was trying to reach. Before Macintosh, Apple – and IBM, Commodore, Philips as well as every other manufacturer of microcomputers – still sold their wares working from the basic premise that computers had as of yet no place in mainstream culture. Strongly rooted in amateur electronics traditions, companies such as Apple struggled to find their way from parents’ garages into mainstream markets. Their initial customer set of bespectacled young men with interests in ham radio and telephone exchange signals continued to fuel Apple’s need to appear worthy of ‘serious’ attention. So, while products progressed from the Apple I in the form of (quite literally) a wooden box with bits to rather mature looking consumer objects such as the Apple II, advertisement messages continued to work hard at convincing the non-tinkerer potential customer of the polished experience that Apple now had on offer. In their effort to appeal to customers outside of their traditional niche, computer companies tended to work hard at finding possible uses for their products and identify their associated marketing segments. As can be gauged by, for instance, the ad that introduced the Apple II, commercials offered a confusing cast of ‘typical’ housewives, dutiful family men and smiling secretaries to help potential customers identify with the product. This cast of focus group characters signifies the extent to which Apple perceived the need to make a case for its products outside of its traditional market of hobbyists. More importantly, it presented Apple’s potential customer base with a disparate message on who these computers were for.

Apple’s new commercial for the Macintosh changed this ambivalent message by forgoing the question of focus group altogether. Rather than put the Macintosh forward as a machine for students or housewives, it attempts to appeal to the individual in general, thus inserting itself into the mainstream. It is interesting to note that no focus group tests were conducted at any time during the commercial’s production. Apple’s advertisement company Chiat\Day scripted “1984” and after production the ad was approved by Steve Jobs and Apple’s new CEO John Sculley; no testing of target audience was done at any time. Apple’s decision not to perform quantitative testing prior to producing or airing the commercial appears to indicate its desire to appeal to the majority of potential customers rather than a narrow demographic subset.
“1984.”
[Unlike earlier advertisements, Apple no longer presented its customers with technical details or even showed its wares. In fact, there is nothing about “1984” that hints at the nature of the advertised product bar the final voice-over.]

The mainstream appeal of “1984” is further underlined by its Hollywood-sized production budget and its director, as well as by the context in which it appeared. Apple allocated a $900,000 budget for the commercial’s production, making “1984” the most expensive commercial ever made. And Chiat\Day hired film director Ridley Scott to direct it. Scott’s work on *Alien* (1979) and *Bladerunner* (1982) put Apple’s...
dystopian vision of the computer marketplace in the art style and visual language that audiences associated with the large-scale tech-noir Hollywood productions of the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, “1984” seems less like an advertisement with a target audience than it does a miniature film for popular, mainstream cinema: its production value, visual style and soundscape bespeak a heritage of Hollywood film production rather than that of an advertisement for a niche electronics device. To further root Macintosh in popular mainstream culture, Apple bought 60 seconds of advertisement time during the Super Bowl. As one of the most watched sporting events of the year in the USA, the Super Bowl ensured that “1984” would have a large and relatively generic audience. As such, “1984” constituted a dramatic move away from Apple’s previous advertisements and their anxious attempts to identify target audiences. Here, Apple unambiguously positioned Macintosh in the mainstream using a high-value, high-quality production, a premier Hollywood director and primetime advertising space. In this way, the company resolved some of the issues of its previous advertisement strategies and began to broadcast an unambiguous message in terms of price and target audience.

Of course, Apple’s brand of iCommodification and personal expression strongly conflicts with this idea of Macintosh as a product for popular, mainstream culture. Indeed, as with most luxury consumer goods, Macintosh’s function as a commodity fetish is based on a paradox. Macintosh’s codification of social relationships – its representation of the relationship between individual and collective – is entirely at odds with Apple’s sales strategy. It requires consumers of Apple’s products to transform their allegiance to specifically branded commodities into a tool used for personal identity formation and social demarcation. Yet, Apple did not wish to sell computers to a small number of unique consumers. While Apple’s marketing campaign stressed individuality and uniqueness, its production lines were geared towards market penetration and mass production. Apple never intended Macintosh to be a niche product but instead aimed the device squarely at its main competitor, the IBM-PC clone. Accordingly, and paradoxically, Apple’s success at marketing the Macintosh as the computer for individuals would ultimately result in its product turning into the status quo that it proposed to subvert. Macintosh’s success at commodifying uniqueness, then, would ultimately hurt its credibility in this respect. In becoming a popular object, Macintosh would no longer be a convincing token for individuality.

Apple solved this issue by invoking the paradigms which characterise dystopian fiction. These paradigms allowed for a careful renegotiation of Apple’s projected self-image of the individual freedom fighter towards a more lenient image where resistance to the existing state of affairs can occur in several different places at the same time and is organised by several people. These pockets of resistance, then, begin to establish a balance between Macintosh’s iCommodification and Apple’s desire to sell as many machines as possible. Apple’s use of dystopian poetics, in other words, creates the commercial space into which Macintosh can emerge. As such, Apple’s choice of Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is neither solely engendered by its thematic overlap with Apple’s plight in the computer marketplace, nor by a lucky coincidence of dates. Certainly, the relationship between “1984” and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* exists primarily in their portrayal of power structures and subversion. However, at the same time, “1984” activates certain dystopian spatial paradigms which ultimately allow Apple to position the Macintosh as a commodity fetish while simultaneously selling significant amounts of product.
Dystopian Poetics

The effectiveness of “1984” can only be understood by first becoming aware of the discursive patterns that the commercial activates. The ad’s textual engagement with Orwell’s dystopian novel places “1984” within a specific narrative tradition that sets in motion certain expectations. It is these expectations that ultimately help determine how the viewer will ‘decode’ Apple’s message concerning Macintosh.

While perhaps the most obvious anticipatory response in relation to dystopian narrative is the idea that dystopia is characterised by a ‘bad’ imaginary society, there are actually more powerful genre indicators at play. The standard body of canonical dystopian texts – “The Machine Stops” (1909), We (1921), Brave New World (1932), Animal Farm (1945), Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), The Matrix (1999) – suggests, at the surface, that dystopia and its dialectical opposite, utopia, are both narrative forms concerned with imagined societies, where one respectively deals with ‘bad’ and the other with ‘good’ communes, cities and nations. While this may seem plausible initially, adjectives like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are ultimately inadequate descriptors of these genres. That is not to say that “1984” does not represent Apple’s competition in a negative light. Clearly, IBM is meant to be understood as an authoritarian and oppressive Big Brother and Apple as the ‘good’ alternative. The ad’s lighting, sound and costumes all seem to work towards aligning “1984” with this typical conception of dystopian narrative. However, there are other, more powerful factors that serve to inform our notion of dystopia as well. And it is through these factors that “1984” successfully manages to position Macintosh as the commodification of uniqueness.

The idea that dystopia centres on ‘bad’ societies whereas utopia focuses on images of a ‘good’ or ‘perfect’ society, is problematized when looking at cross-genre analogies of seemingly prototypical cases. This point can be illustrated briefly by focusing on one of the seemingly most prominent dystopian indicators of Apple’s advertisement, namely its treatment of sexuality. In “1984”, dystopian reality is characterised by apparently sexless (if not gender-less) masses, whereas resistance to this society is represented as overtly sexual in nature. As such, “1984” appears to activate one of the staple characteristics of dystopian literature. Certainly, dystopia is strongly associated with rigid class systems in combination with state enforced, selective breeding programs that give way to the repression of sexuality. In Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, for instance, such interlinking of class with birth control emerges through Oceania’s government and its policies. Per Big Brother’s dictum, Oceania’s society is organised in a triangular fashion with four classes filling the space between base and top: proles, outer party, inner party, and Big Brother himself. What is more, this socioeconomic model is enforced through the restriction of sexual relations and of sexuality itself. The novel professes that all relations, including intercourse, between proles and party members are a taboo. What is more, as evidenced by the existence of the “Junior Anti-Sex League,” procreation for party members in general is strictly limited so as to ensure the continuation of the nation’s social fabric: too many party members would disrupt the carefully constructed triangular social model.

Other classic examples of dystopian literature, such as Zamyatin’s We and Huxley’s Brave New World, imagine similar connections between socioeconomic class and authoritarian breeding schemes. Zamyatin’s novel, for instance, uses “pink slips” to symbolise state enforced social status through control of sexual relations. And Brave New World is a well-known example of a society that outsources natural reproduction entirely to the state in order to ensure the proper numbers of Alphas, Betas and Gammas. Indeed, it is this same form of government-imposed restriction of
sexual relationships that emerges in Apple’s “1984”. The ad’s anonymous masses embody the asexual and androgynous qualities that bespeak dystopian repression of sexuality. The baggy, grey clothing of the drones disguises sexuality, while the scant clothing and obvious sexuality of the female runner contrasts with the state’s success in suppressing sex drive. Arguably, then, sexual repression and the enforcement of class difference seem strong indicators of dystopian societies. Surely, such incursion into the most private of experiences by government in order to limit the social mobility of individuals can only be understood as dystopian and ‘bad.’

But to what extent can this be said to be an exclusively dystopian trademark? Certainly, while social control through authoritarian management of sexuality may seem like a typically dystopian device, the same theme is prevalent in what we understand to be utopian fiction. Consider, for example, Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s 1915 novel Herland. Gilman’s narrative imagines a ‘perfect’ female society hidden away deep in the rainforests of South-America. Three male characters inadvertently come across this female enclave and serve to expose both the virtues of matriarchal society and the demerits of patriarchal England. Interestingly, Herland depends entirely upon similar notions of social and sexual control as do dystopian novels like Brave New World and Nineteen Eighty-Four. Gilman’s purely female society relies on asexual reproduction for its survival. Within the narrative, this parthenogenesis allows for full state control of reproduction. As procreation no longer depends on fertilisation, mothers-to-be simply ‘will’ their pregnancies into being. In turn, Herland suggests, this allows the state to exact a high level of control over who is allowed to give birth and who is denied such a privilege, thus linking social status and economy with government-enforced breeding programs. More importantly, the novel also echoes the sinister discourse of Brave New World and Nineteen Eighty-Four in this respect, as the matriarchs invoke the tone and logic of social Darwinism on several occasions: “We have, of course, made it our first business to train out, to breed out, when possible, the lowest types” (Perkins Gilman 83).

Even the utopian genre’s eponymous text, Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), is subject to the same social and biological manipulation at state level that seems to underlie the dystopian image that Apple puts forward in “1984”. As Hythloday’s visit to the island nation of Utopia illustrates, Utopian society depends to a great extent upon the state’s influence in such private matters as choice of partner and family size. What at first appears to be an emblematic characteristic of ‘bad’, dystopian societies is upon closer inspection revealed to be an essential part of ‘perfect’ utopian constructs as well.

This thematic overlap between utopian and dystopian literature, then, ultimately raises the question to what extent it is possible to claim that dystopias such as Apple’s “1984” portray ‘bad’ societies while utopias depict ‘perfection’? If, for example, authoritarian sexual selection and social Darwinism are the linchpins to both dystopian and utopian socioeconomic models, who is to say which is ‘good’ or ‘bad’? Whose opinion is at stake here exactly, and how do we weigh the moral consequences of the text’s propositions?

These questions already arise from utopia’s etymology. Its Greek lineage reveals its combination of ‘ou’ (not) and ‘eu’ (good) with ‘topos’ to denote the good place that does not exist. Conversely, its derivate, dystopia, merges ‘topos’ with ‘dys’ (bad or harsh) to signify the place that is bad. In other words, the etymologies of both utopia and dystopia reveal that these are not just ‘good’ or ‘bad’ constructions. Both constructs rely on the idea that they are ‘outopos’ or non-places as well. In this way, utopia and dystopia question from the beginning the extent to which it is possible to
ascertain the exact link between ‘real’ and ‘fictional’ spaces: as the author and construct do not inherit the same continuum, there is no reason to assume that the former intended the latter to be ‘perfect’ or ‘bad’, or for this connection to be accessible.10

More importantly, the reliance on the ‘topos’ morpheme by these utopian and dystopian constructs points towards the central significance of the notion of space. That is, besides notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ideas that revolve around an authorial intent that remains inaccessible, utopia and dystopia are engendered by their spatial properties. As such, it seems logical to assume that the reading of a text as utopian or dystopian is to a certain extent determined by the narrative’s invocation of specific spatial paradigms. Whether a text is utopian or dystopian, in other words, is not greatly determined by what the texts are about. Rather, it is their treatment of space that activates the patterns of expectation that we associate with these specific literary forms.

In the case of utopian literature, these expectations consist of a diegetic construct that is both spatially isolated and features a homogenous geography. Typical and prototypical utopias, such as the Garden of Eden, Plato’s Republic, More’s Utopia, Wells’ modern Utopia, Huxley’s Pala and LeGuin’s Anarres, are all comprised of communes, cities, islands, and planets that position themselves outside of ordinary space. By emphasising distance, cartography, inaccessibility and detachment, these narratives begin to activate the emblematic representation of utopian space. More’s Utopia, for instance, invests a significant amount of textual real-estate in conveying the isolation of its island setting. Rather than just have the island exist, More posits that Utopia was at first a peninsula, but that king Utopos, “[t]he moment he landed and got control over the country [. . .] immediately had a channel cut through the fifteen-mile isthmus connecting Utopia with the mainland, so that the sea could flow all round it” (More 50). In doing so, the text emphasises Utopia’s island status and makes it an imperative condition: Utopia is utopian precisely because it was disconnected from the ‘real’ world by its founders and its creator.

Moreover, the text explains at some length where Utopia is located in order to emphasise the island’s separateness. For Susan Bruce, such cartographic information actually signals More’s desire to increase the credibility of his text as “an unknown nation in the middle of the Indian Ocean or off the coast of the Americas is self-evidently more credible than it would be to situate such a community in a village in the Alps” (More, Bacon and Neville ix-x). However Utopia’s position off the coast of South America has little to do with raising its credibility. Utopia is steeped deeply in the lore of colonial exploration and, if anything, uses the travels of Amerigo Vespucci in order to grant itself the greatest artistic license possible. Freely mixing early modern travel narratives with classical Greek mythology, the text renders South America as the place where “nothing is more easy to be found than be barking Scyllas, ravening Celaenos, and Laestrygons, devourers of people, and suchlike great and incredible monsters” (More, Bacon and Neville 14).11 As a place where there are monsters, then, the Americas are precisely not a setting that allows Utopia to acquire ‘credibility’ but rather allow the island to obtain the isolation from the known world that its existence requires. So, while the discovery of the Indies may have been the economic, technological and political inspiration for many early modern utopias, their location in the new world is not an argument for the fictions’ credibility. Instead, their exotic locations underline the idea that utopias are isolated, impenetrable topoi.12
Besides their isolation, these utopian spaces are also defined by their internal consistency. Utopias present complete accord with their political systems. In turn, this social invariance can be seen reflected in the topography of utopian space. Standardised and homogeneous, the utopian topography is the featureless representation of ideological strictness. In More’s *Utopia*, for example, it is made clear that, while the city of Amaurote serves as an example to Hythloday’s lecture, Utopian cities are characterised principally by their similarities:

There are fifty-four splendid big towns on the island, all with the same language, laws, customs and institutions. They’re all built on the same plan, and, as so far as the sites will allow, they all look exactly alike. The minimum distance between towns is twenty-four miles, and the maximum, no more than a day’s walk. (More 50)

Utopia, in other words, through its strict regulation of social interaction, projects uniformity on its internal space. As modes of communication, social decorum and laws have all been standardised in Utopia, the precisely location of its cities has become irrelevant, rendering the island’s topography as a homogenised space of uncritical, ideological conformity.

Dystopias copy the spatial properties of utopias, as well as subvert them at the same time. That is, dystopian narrative is characterised by the stipulation of a utopian-like space that is subsequently subverted and disrupted. As such, the spatial attribute with which dystopia is principally associated is the disruption of spatial totality. In contrast to utopia, dystopia is concerned with rendering a space of totality that is unstable and forcefully threatened with collapse, as Jacobs indicates:

Whether dystopia is an Orwellian place of fear and deprivation or a Huxleyan one of vapid contentment and plenitude, the individual who would choose or act “otherwise”[. . .] will be reprogrammed, exiled, or killed, so that the social fabric may maintain its impenetrability. (Jacobs 92)

Dystopia, then, is concerned with the threat of destruction to totalitarian spaces. That is, protagonists Winston Smith and Bernard Marx help to define *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *Brave New World* respectively as dystopian novels by providing the penetrative force with which to threaten the texts’ otherwise totalitarian spatial dimensions. Airstrip One and The World State are required to protect their ideological space against rebellion, and it is this act of protection of the uniformity of ideological space that is so characteristic for dystopian texts.

This may suggest that the way in which dystopia treats space is hardly different from utopian spatial poetics. After all, is Utopia not also characterised by an effort to protect certain ideologies through spatial isolation? Are its walls not seeking to defend against influences that could disrupt the uniform topography within? While, on the surface, dystopia’s and utopia’s spatial poetics may bear similarities, they are in fact inspired by entirely different sets of concerns. In the case of utopia, an imaginative space is created in which a social experiment can be performed unhindered. Utopia is required to safeguard its own isolation in order that its experiment may remain uncontaminated by outside influences and so protect the ‘validity’ of its ‘results’. Even minor incursions such as Hythloday’s visit to the island of Utopia are never imagined in terms of insurgency or disruption of the utopian space. Rather, in More’s *Utopia* the outside visitor only serves to further underline the
island’s geographical distinctiveness and coherency. As Hythloday relates his travels to More and Peter Giles, his status as a foreigner in Utopia does nothing to interfere with the utopian space but only enhances its uniformity further. Here, the travel narrative format helps to affirm Utopia’s character as a distant, different, and homogenous space.

By contrast, dystopia is characterised by spatial properties that, while they initially project coherency and uniformity, are either disrupted or about to be disrupted. For example, Winston Smith and Bernard Marx interrupt the totalitarianism of Airstrip One and The World State by constructing sites of opposition. These spaces – the savage reservation in Brave New World, and the countryside, Smith’s personal apartment and the room above the antiques shop in Nineteen Eighty-Four – form the pockets of resistance that inform the texts’ dystopian spatial poetics. It is in these spaces that the tension between the uniformity of totalitarianism on the one hand and the disruption of this uniformity on the other begins to emerge. As a result, dystopia is typified by a homogenous space that is similar to that of utopian constructs, but that, crucially, seems unable to contain the social experiment within. In the case of Orwell’s novel, for example, Oceania initially constitutes a space that is as uniform as is, say, More’s Utopia. Of course, the socioeconomic landscape of Orwell’s nation is characterised by standardisation through birth control, the creation and maintenance of artificial social classes, as well as state controlled work, ‘leisure’ time and recreational activities. In this way, then, Oceania is no different from More’s island Utopia. However, what marks Nineteen Eighty-Four as a dystopian text is the failure of Airstrip One to maintain the uniformity of its “Ingsoc” ideology. In spatial terms, Airstrip One is denied the status of a utopian construct because it harbours within its borders certain sites of opposition that contaminate its social ‘reality’ and disrupt the uniformity of its topography.

These spaces of resistance in dystopian narratives are significant because they help to codify the relationship between the individual and society at large. It is in such places of opposition, for instance, that Winston Smith can be seen acting out his rebellion. In the alcove besides his television, Nineteen Eighty-Four’s protagonist can give voice to his individuality just outside of the panoptic gaze of the collective by writing in his diary. This space, then, helps to stage Smith’s relationship with the collective by changing the social aspects of the act of writing. On the one hand, writing outside of this space is Smith’s act of conformity. His job as a clerk at the Ministry of Truth who rewrites historical documents signals the character’s submission to the ideological norm. On the other hand, inside such spaces of resistance, record keeping turns into an act of exclusion, and marks the extent to which Smith is able to separate himself from the collective. Smith’s apartment, in other words, transposes the act of writing from an inclusive to an exclusive social operation, thus allowing dystopian resistance to dominant ideology to occur.

What is more, such subversive spaces in dystopian narratives generally give voice to the idea that the disruption of dominant ideology requires not a single individual but a collection of individuals. For example, in the case of Nineteen Eighty-Four, the room above Mr. Charrington’s antique shop allows for Winston’s romantic interest, Julia, to emerge as well. Conveniently furnished with a double bed, this seditious space already hints at a common theme in dystopian fiction, namely that the revolution is carried out by more than one dissenter. Both by providing the diegetic space for an additional subversive character and through its suggestion of revolutionary procreation – the bed plays host to Winston and Julia’s main act of rebellion: intercourse – Mr. Charrington’s room demonstrates how dystopian
narratives use social spaces for the disruption of totalitarianism. Indeed, it is this use of subversive spaces as a meeting place for society’s rebellious elements that typifies canonical dystopian literature: prefiguring *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *We*’s D-503 and I-330 have their illicit sexual encounters in an old abandoned house on the edge of the One State; Kuno and Vashti discuss escape from their subterranean world in the latter’s quarters in E.M. Forster’s “The Machine Stops”; Faber’s house in *Fahrenheit 451* allows Guy Montag to make good his escape from the book-burning dystopian city to the book people who live in the surrounding forests. In this way, sites of resistance in dystopian literature are not just representative of the individual’s struggle against conformity. Rather, such spaces help to suggest that resisting the status quo is a collaborative effort as well as a social practice.

All in all, then, dystopian poetics are characterised by the construction of new social spaces alongside the deconstruction of the main authoritarian space. The dystopian poetic involves the interjection of contentious spaces where disruptive elements can meet, plan and procreate.

**Dystopian Poetics in “1984”**

Apple’s “1984” commercial is heavily informed by dystopian narratives’ reliance on spaces that simultaneously subvert and establish new social relationships. The spatial poetics laid down by texts such as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* dictate that the dystopian landscape is characterised by an initial social isolation and uniformity that is subsequently disrupted by sites of opposition. It is in this establishment of new social spaces, especially, that “1984” finds most of its persuasive force as well as a solution to the paradox that informs iCommodification.

Apple’s “1984” resolves the inconsistencies behind its commodification of uniqueness by borrowing the spatial organisation of Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It starts by constructing a site of ideological conformity. The multitudes marching in unison, uniform clothing styles, riot police, as well as the pontificating head convey a strong sense of totalitarianism and forced submission to dominant belief. Moreover, this totalitarianism is signified spatially as well. As with prototypical dystopian texts, “1984” begins by constructing an isolated site of ideological uniformity and topography, and subsequently subverts and disrupts this space. In terms of isolation, the ad spends considerable screen time in rendering the limits of its diegesis in order to demonstrate its seclusion from normal space. The first shot, in fact, shows nothing but wall, indicating that the diegetic space should be seen as walled-off from normal space. This sense of isolation grows in later shots where the *mise-en-scène* is also dominated by barriers. Indeed, the commercial consistently and carefully frames the tight-spaced enclosures of the “garden of pure ideology” in order to give the impression of a site of incarceration. For instance, the low camera position, especially in the shots of the corridors, accentuates the narrowness of these inner spaces to further accentuate the impression of imprisonment. The main auditorium, as well, is not so much spacious as it feels confining with its high walls and pillars restricting the viewer’s gaze. Here especially, the legacy of director Ridley Scott’s filmic interpretation of dystopian spaces may be easily identified. Specifically, the low camera position and obstruction of line of sight are devices that are characteristic of Scott’s visual representation in *Alien* and *Bladerunner*. In this way, Scott’s experience in translating dystopia to the screen imbeds “1984” in typical dystopian filmic spaces of isolation. Dominated by thick, concrete walls, the frame of “1984” invokes the tradition of dystopian fiction to imagine isolated diegetic spaces in order to contain its dominant ideology.
“1984” also conforms to the dystopian tradition in its uniformity. Initially, the isolated diegetic space is shown to be homogenous and featureless. It consists of a bland palette of walls, drones and omnipresent technological bits to create a space that is of a more or less uniform topography. The mise-en-scène of “1984” further underlines this dystopian uniformity through use of colour. It consistently uses low-contrast, drab shades of grey and blue that work to make everything in the frame appear similar. The use of sound also sets up the diegetic space of “1984” as a typical dystopian construct. The sound of marching as well as the ubiquitous background bleeps of technology – again a direct descendant of Scott’s work on Alien and Bladerunner – make a constant white noise that echoes the uniformity seen on the screen.

This isolated and uniform space that “1984” initially sets up is subverted by the character that Apple’s customers are to identify with: the female runner. She subverts the dystopian space both in terms of uniformity and isolation. In the case of the former, the first four shots of the runner show how she disrupts the homogeneity of the corridors, hallways and auditorium. Her gender, bright clothing, blonde hair, athletic ability and sexual appeal all act to subvert the uniformity of both the screen space and of the diegetic space. The briefness of these shots, their apparent random distribution, and the lack of fade-in or overlay transitions ensure that the sequences showing the female runner have a maximum disruptive effect in the camera’s space.

As if to transmit a subliminal message, the mise-en-scène – suddenly, briefly – contains content that is oppositional to its otherwise uniformly asexual, rigid-limbed, grey and blue primary subject. Moreover, the runner disrupts the uniformity of the diegetic space as well. Leaving in her wake sprinting riot police, she manages to interrupt the orderly progression towards the auditorium and introduces chaos to a disciplined system.

The final three shots of the runner deal with disrupting the isolation of the ad’s dystopian space. Here we can see the runner come to a halt, rotate and swing her hammer. These actions lead to the primary subversive act in “1984”: the breaking of the screen in the auditorium and the destruction of the isolation of the diegesis. That is, not only does the runner’s hammer stop the transmission of the pontificating head, it also fractures dystopia’s barrier in order to subvert the ideological space. The ad signifies the screen’s function as dystopia’s barrier primarily through the use of colour. The breaking of the screen is accompanied by a bright explosion of light that not only bathes the awe-struck drones but drowns out the previously bleak and dark dystopian space as well. Air forcefully flows into the auditorium and moves down the ranks of attendants in order to expose them to what lies beyond the talking head and barriers of the system. What lies on the other side of the screen is then revealed by the voiceover and, perhaps more importantly, the final shot of the commercial. After dystopia’s barriers have been removed the screen fades to black and then displays the only substantial use of colour: a bright Apple logo, rainbow-coloured, sits at the center of the frame. This colour intrusion, then, marks the final destruction of the dystopian space as its most pervasive filmic representation can be seen subverted. The breaking of the auditorium’s screen, in short, breaks the quarantine of dystopia and allows the outside world to usurp its ideological space.

The sales proposition of “1984” derives primarily from the ad’s subversion of dystopian space. Obviously, the Super Bowl audience was meant to identify with the runner and see themselves as individualistic rebels in an IBM-dominated world. Indeed, at the surface, this is the sales message of Apple’s advertisement. However, “1984”’s use of spatial paradigms allows it to carefully negotiate the tension between
positioning Macintosh as a product for ‘rebels’ while at the same time popularising microcomputers in the mainstream market. Apple is able to solve this paradox which informs its iCommodification by relying on the ability of dystopian resistance to suggest the emergence of new social spaces. As may be seen in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, dystopian rebels seldom fight alone but find spaces where rebellion can be staged collectively. Concurrently, in “1984” the shock of the drones as the bright light and air hits their faces suggests their – and the consumer’s – possible conversion and emergence out of dystopia beyond the wall of the screen, together. So, while the runner in “1984” acts purely as an individual, dystopian poetics suggest that this action does not preclude a form of collective rebellion. In fact, the commercial suggests that the viewer can join this emblem of fitness, strength and sexuality in the space she just opened up, and not be any less of a rebel for it. In this way, Apple’s “1984” is able to sell Macintosh as a high-priced luxury piece of electronics intended for those who want to stand out of the pack, while at the same time building a large, mainstream base of like-minded and devoted Apple users.

It is interesting to note that, as with the resistance in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the suggestion of new social spaces in “1984” functions predominantly as a hegemonic device. Just as the antiques shop turns out to be part of Big Brother’s set of controls, so is the space of resistance offered by “1984” complicit to Apple’s intent to dominate the computer marketplace. In this sense, Apple’s customers are like Winston and Julia in that they are presented with the verisimilitude of resistance in order to ‘trick’ them into accepting dominant ideology. Nevertheless, there is a strong sense that the runner in “1984” opens up a new space of collective rebellion against IBM’s status quo, even if it is at a basic level understood to be motivated primarily by Apple’s commercial interests and its desire to dominate.

Apple’s advertisement, in other words, successfully turns dystopia into the topos from which Macintosh can be understood by consumers. As a ‘marketplace,’ dystopia pertains to precisely the right mix of social relationships that reflects Apple’s product placement with the Mac. On the one hand, dystopia stands for resistance and uniqueness, marking Macintosh as an emblematic form of iCommodification. On the other hand, dystopia is characterised by spatial poetics that suggest the emergence of new social collectives, and is steeped in mainstream, popular culture. This combination of individual appeal and mainstream conformity allows Apple to sell Macintosh as a commodity which expresses individuality while still building a substantial customer base in mainstream culture. Dystopia, in short, is the site where Apple is able to market Macintosh as well as make available microcomputers in popular culture.

Apple’s decision to try and make dystopia the site of the popularisation of the microcomputer is all the more remarkable because of the aura of fear that still surrounded the technology in 1984. Strongly associated with amateur enthusiast culture, computers appeared as arcane machinery to a mainstream audience. Computers’ interfaces and functions resembled no pre-existing paradigms and as such it was difficult for audiences to grasp why they needed these machines, what they were buying, and how computers could be made to support one’s activities. As mysterious and highly technical devices, computers therefore inspired fear of use in potential new users. Moreover, popular culture had done an effective job of reinforcing Luddite fears and had managed to demonise the technology. Most notably, Arthur C. Clarke’s and Stanley Kubrick’s *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) made concrete consumers’ distrust of computers with the specter of HAL. Aloof and malicious, HAL embodied the fear that computer technology could not be controlled.
and that the ‘magic’ of Integrated Circuits might give rise to unintended and entirely unwanted results. Certainly, the combination of HAL’s uncanny, unemotional voice and its murderous plots weighed so heavily on the popular imagination that, as Friedman points out, “the shadow of HAL hovered over early PC advertising” (106). But HAL was not the only fictional creation that was making computers monstrous. *Alien*’s Mother, for example, also reified consumers’ fears of computing devices. The main computer of the spaceship Nostromo, Mother, in spite of its name, showed anything but maternal compassion for the suffering of its crew. Coldly informing the human contingent that their chances of survival did not compute, Mother shaped the popular imagination with the image of computers as apathetic to and incompatible with the human condition.

As such, computer manufacturers faced similar issues as producers of electrical equipment and services did in the late nineteenth century. As Graeme Gooday and David Nye argue, electricity faced an uphill battle in the late Victorian era as consumers struggled to understand both what they were supposed to buy and what dangers it involved. As opposed to coal-gas, whose quantities could be measured and whose dangers were known, electricity’s matter was difficult to fathom and, therefore, perceived as dangerous by the general public. Of course, as Gooday points out, this was an image of electricity that suppliers of coal-gas were only too happy to sustain (“The Expert Consumer Relationship” 247-53). For manufacturers of electricity, the solution to improving electricity’s public image lay in finding sites where its virtues could be discussed with authority and enter the public mind. As the home was mostly dominated by gas, these sites were frequently construed as public spaces. The 1893 World Fair in Chicago, for example, served to extol electricity’s wonders and dispel the public’s fears. It provided manufacturers of electrical equipment with a space where they could establish a discourse of authority and back up their claims with extravagant displays of power.

As with electricity, computer manufacturers also had trouble making a case for themselves as their services were ethereal and highly suggestive of mystery and danger. As can be gauged by Apple’s “1984” commercial, the solution here also lay in finding the right space from which to begin to debunk the public’s fear. This space, as it turned out, was dystopia.

Apple’s success at using dystopia for this purpose stands in stark contrast to its earlier attempts. In trying to dispel fears about computers, Apple had resorted to kitchens, teenage-son’s bedrooms and office spaces, presumably under the assumption that these were typically considered to be safe havens and might therefore assuage the consumer’s doubts. However, as these sites were already pervaded with discourses of other forms of technology, the invasion of the microcomputer into these scenes seemed to, if anything, confirm the idea that it had no place there to begin with and might introduce new dangers or undesirable elements. Apple’s use of ‘conventional’ spaces, in short, seemed to be problematic for the same reason that early manufacturers of electrical equipment had such trouble finding their way into the home: the authoritative presence of other discourses resisted the newcomer and fuelled questions about usefulness and potential dangers.

Again, Apple’s successful appropriation of dystopia and its conversion into the locus of the popularisation and acceptance of microcomputers by mainstream culture comes down to dystopia’s ability to encode the correct social relationships. Apple’s earlier attempts to insert the microcomputer into mainstream culture were foiled by the stagnant discourses of the home with their powerfully established social relationships. So, while the kitchen may have appeared as an obvious site for
mainstream intervention, its pre-existing social significance resisted the inclusion of this new element. It immediately raised numerous important questions. Why would I want a computer in my kitchen, especially if this also involves moving my television there to use as a monitor? Does moving the television entail shifting the centre of family life from the living room to the kitchen? Who is to use the computer? If dad uses the computer, does this make the kitchen a primarily male-oriented space and what does that do to the distribution of gender throughout the house? Apple’s attempt to insert the computer in this domestic space, in short, was rife with contentious discourse on the social construction of space. Dystopia, however, was a space that came with an entirely different set of pre-existing social relationships that were far more suited for Apple’s purposes. Especially from the perspective of the high-priced, luxury commodity Macintosh, dystopia could speak authoritatively about the social relationships that Macintosh was attempting to encode. Both subversive and popular, dystopia proved the ideal site from which Macintosh could sell in large quantities while retaining its appeal as a rebel’s machine, wherever it might be placed in the house or office.

The Legacy of “1984”
The success of “1984” and its invocation of dystopian discursive strategies has continued to inspire most of Apple’s marketing strategies. Especially in the realm of desktop computing, Apple has persisted in making use of dystopian and utopian imagery for its brand of iCommodities and portrayed itself as the underdog and creative alternative. Following “1984”, Apple continued in a similar vein, for example, with its “Think Different” campaign (1997). Approximately coinciding with the introduction of the new iMac – the replacement of the Macintosh brand – the “Think Different” campaign consisted of a montage of film fragments featuring such individuals as Albert Einstein, Bob Dylan, Martin Luther King Jr. and John Lennon, and a voice over that detailed their rebellious nature:

Here’s to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently. They’re not fond of rules. And they have no respect for the status quo. You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify or vilify them. About the only thing you can’t do is ignore them. Because they change things. They push the human race forward. And while some see them as the crazy ones, we see genius. Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world, are the ones who do.

As indicated by its ungrammatical title, the “Think Different” advertisement was meant to inspire the viewer to identify with the defiant minority. Naturally, Apple ‘sided’ with this minority and presented its wares as a possibility to buy into creativity and uniqueness. As with “1984”, the advertisement balances precariously between this surface message of rebellion and its real intent of selling as many computers as possible. And while less overt than in “1984”, it is again the invocation of dystopian and utopian poetics that allows for this sleight of hand to occur.

Although “Think Different” does not overtly reference dystopian literature, it manages to activate the same paradigms of inclusion and exclusion that helped to sell Macintosh as an iCommodity. As with “1984”, it is the simultaneous suggestion of individual rebellion and the creation of new communities that turn this commercial into such an effective sales argument. Its sequence of portraits of famous, world-
changing individuals intimates a desire to stand out, and to “have no respect for the status quo” (“Think Different”). At the same time, this sequence of portraits, by its very nature, conveys a sense of inclusion as well. That is, as a series, it implies that while being a misfit, rebel or troublemaker will make your life more meaningful in the long run, it does not exclude the possibility of fitting into a community. Rather, it prefigures social recognition and even fame. The advertisement’s consistent use of black-and-white images, and its substitution of diegetic sound with a single, extradiegetic soundtrack, generate a uniform cinematic space that holds together all of the rebels. Outlined by the same visual and auditory cues, John Lennon, Maria Callas and Jim Henson are in this way turned into a community of individuals who can be adored and idolised. This discursive strategy, then, generates a sense of inclusion in the viewer and establishes a similar sense of rapport as did “1984”: buying an iMac entails standing out as an individual as well as belonging to a larger social context of rebels and world-changers. The commercial’s denouement is especially effective in conveying this message. It shows the face of an unknown child as the last in its series of portraits. The image suggests that the viewer too, like the anonymous child, will be able to belong to this ever-expanding series of successful world changers and rebels. In this way, “Think Different” proposes to the viewer that Apple’s products are the key to expressing individuality as well as offering membership to an exclusive community. It is this message, borrowed from the poetics of dystopian narrative that continues to inform Apple’s marketing strategies. It allows Apple to sell its electronics as commodities that serve to express individuality while at the same time maximising revenue and profit.

Of late, this delicate balancing act between exclusivity and inclusivity has become more difficult for Apple to maintain. Although the company’s marketing strategy has remained effective until now, its recent financial success begins to question the extent to which dystopian poetics will be able to continue to bridge the gap between Apple’s marketing message and its marketing goals. Certainly, while Apple’s desire to make as many consumers as possible part of its “minority” has always constituted a paradox, it has up to this point remained somewhat safeguarded by its minority market share. As Apple remained the underdog in comparison with Microsoft and IBM PC clones, its particular brand of commodity fetishism, while dependent on the subtle use of dystopian poetics, always had a ring of justification to it: even if Apple sold and made millions, Microsoft, HP and Dell sold more. So, while Apple was required to enlist narrative strategies in order to push its products, macroeconomics were at least not flatly contradicting its sales pitch.

By 2010, however, Apple had become the most valuable technology company on Wall Street, its $222.12 billion value exceeding Microsoft’s value of $219.18 billion for the first time. While largely based on speculation about its future value rather than its ‘real’ value, Apple’s place in the stock market’s limelight does reflect the company’s recent financial successes and its subsequent ascension to the forefront of the technology industry. Rather than mere hype, Apple’s high stock price is justified to a large extent by its strong earnings ($24.67 billion revenue and $5.99 billion profit, second fiscal quarter 2011) and very healthy profit margins (41.4 percent gross profit margin, second fiscal quarter 2011). And while Apple may see its strong financial performance as vindication of products and its dare-to-be-different message, it does present the company with a new challenge. In manoeuvring itself into a position of authority, Apple has effectively destroyed any possibility of appealing to consumers’ unconscious knowledge of dystopian poetics and their desire
to express their ‘individuality’ through brand loyalty. Buying an Apple, in short, is becoming mainstream.

It is interesting to see that Apple’s immediate reaction to this increase in financial success has resulted in conflicting messages. That is, while the company remains heavily invested in iCommodification through dystopian poetics, it simultaneously has begun to broadcast a utopian discourse that coincides with its new, dominant market position. In terms of spatial representation, certainly, Apple increasingly codifies its dominance through spaces that are isolated and uniform. For example, on the heels of its successful iMac line of products, Apple stopped selling its product through retailers, opting instead to open up Apple Stores. (See Fig. 5) These stores, and especially their internal decoration, represent an effort to present consumers with a universal outlet with a homogenous look and feel that matches Apple’s electronics. All such stores feature a mix of woods, white plastics and glass, and store employees wear the same black outfit. The uniformity thus created by Apple’s retail outlets creates a consumer space that mimics the characteristics of the islands, cities and republics from canonical utopian literature. Moreover, even Apple’s virtual storefronts now resemble such utopian spatial poetics. For example, the App Store for Apple’s line of iOS devices (i.e. iPhone, iPad and iPod Touch) is standardised through Apple guidelines and censorship in order to supply the consumer with a consistent shopping experience. So, while the store is accessible for any software developer, it remains exclusive to Apple products and looking standardised at all times. As with Apple’s brick-and-mortar stores, then, the App Store suggests that the company is moving towards presenting its products in utopian commercial spaces. These utopian poetics, however, contradict the dystopian spatial poetics that still inform most of Apple’s advertisements (as in for example the “Mac vs. PC” series).

Fig. 5.
“Apple Store Fifth Avenue.”
The question then remains how Apple will deal with this discursive conflict. On the one hand, we can expect Apple to continue to build on its dominant market position and increasingly employ utopian discourse. It seems logical to assume that Apple will attempt to expand its virtual stores to all of its devices and make the App Store available to its desktop lines of computers as well. In the process, it will continue to increase the uniformity and exclusivity of the Apple shopping experience, thus projecting utopian spatial properties, or at least for a long as the competition will not cry ‘monopoly’. On the other hand, Apple will at some point have to deal with its marketing campaigns and their reliance on dystopian discourse. If the company continues to grow its dystopian message will progressively come into conflict with Apple’s solidifying position in the technology market as well as its iCommodity brand. A possible solution to these discursive contradictions would be for Apple to embrace utopian discourse in its marketing. The play seems obvious: the apple, after all, is a symbol for proto-utopia. In fact, Apple used this reference in its advertisement once before. In 1980, the company issued an advertisement for the Apple II in the form of a contest. (See Fig. 6) The ad featured Adam in front of the Tree of Knowledge, hiding his nudity behind Apple’s computer and prompted the consumer to come up with an even more creative use for the machine. But Apple’s use of utopian poetics need not be so crude. If it could invoke utopian spatial discourse in marketing and advertising its computing commodities, Apple would be well underway in mobilising their customers’ narrative expectations in order to continue its growth in the electronics industry.
Fig. 6.
“Apple Computer’s Take on Adam and Eve.”
[An early example of utopian references in Apple’s marketing strategy.]
Notes

1. At present, Apple is registered simply as Apple, Inc. The company dropped “Computer” from its name in 2007 to reflect their increasing portfolio of non-computer, consumer electronics and services (i.e. iPod, iTunes, iPhone and iPad).

2. More recently, Apple made ‘the switch’ from the PowerPC architecture to X86 for all of its mini, desktop and portable computers. As such, since late 2005, there is no longer anything in terms of functional hardware that distinguishes an Apple from an IBM-PC clone.

3. See for example “Which iPod Are You?”.

4. This is not to say that there was no status quo in the computer marketplace itself. Indeed, in 1984 the computer market was dominated by enthusiasts and business users who were primarily using IBM-PC clones and MS-DOS. However, this computing ‘mainstream’ majority could not be said to be part of mainstream popular culture.

5. Before they made their first computer, founders of Apple Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak were busy making and selling the infamous ‘Blue Box’. Following on from the discovery that a free whistle inside Captain Crunch cereal boxes produced exactly the same tone that public payphones made when coins were inserted, this box of electronics could be used to fool telephone exchanges into accepting phone calls without payment. The Blue Box was a cult object among students and electrical engineers in 1970s California and was used especially to make long-distance phone calls. While Jobs and Wozniak did not invent the Blue Box, it was their first business adventure together. See: Moritz, The Little Kingdom 70-85.


7. See Friedman 109.

8. Consider for example the episode where Hythloday relates the social circumstances of the island at the beginning of book two. According to his narrative, Utopians are forced to live and work in a highly organised, patriarchal social structure where the state ultimately determines where one lives, works, and who is family. See More, Utopia 59-66.

9. The standard response in utopian and dystopian studies to this conundrum is to posit ever more narrative genres in an attempt to capture more precisely the exact relationship between the author’s intention and the text. Typically Lyman Tower Sargent’s extensive categorisation of utopian discourse is used for interpretation. See Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited.”

10. In the face of post-structuralist criticism this may seem a superfluous statement. However, utopian and dystopian discourses continue to inspire even contemporary scholarship to look for authorial intent. Presumably, this search is inspired by the strong allegorical and political content of such texts.

11. I quote here from the Oxford collection of Early Modern utopias rather than the Penguin Classics edition I referred to earlier as it is one of the few translations that retains the collection of monsters of the original Latin. While I, overall, prefer Paul Turner’s translation, his version of More’s Utopia exchanges the specific mythical creatures of the original for “horrible creatures who pray on human beings, snatch away their food, or devour whole populations” (19). This abridged translation seems unfortunate in light of Utopia’s setting: More’s engagement with Greek mythology is important in establishing the relationship between Utopia and the ‘real world’.
12. From this perspective, it seems no accident that utopian discourse frequently takes the form of a travel narrative. Travel, as Foucault argues in relation to heterotopias, is one of the main actions responsible for the formation of places outside of the ordinary socioeconomic space. From Foucault’s analysis of cultural ‘counter-sites’ it follows that travel, whether by sea-ship or spaceship, is often a prerequisite of utopian constructs. See “Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias.”

13. Before the Apple logo the colour red can also be seen in the runner’s shorts.

14. See Gooday, and Nye.

15. Other manufacturers used a combination of settings and characters to try and exorcise HAL. IBM, for example, had an extensive run of commercials featuring Charlie Chaplin in office spaces. See Friedman, 105-07.

16. Because computers displayed relatively low resolutions they often used televisions as their primary monitor. The Apple II ad indeed suggests that users move their televisions into the kitchen. See Fig. 2.

17. The only real disruption in this strategy coincides with Steve Jobs absence from Apple. In 1985, Jobs left Apple as a result of a falling out with then-CEO John Sculley. Subsequently, Apple’s marketing strategy returned largely to a focus on use and exchange value until Steve Jobs was reinstated as CEO in 1997.

18. See “Apple Passes Microsoft as No.1 in Tech.”

19. See “Apple Reports Second Quarter Results.”
Works Cited


Humphry Davy in Jan Golinski’s article is marked out as an intriguing figure in the first two decades of the nineteenth century; a fascinating lecturer to his audiences, yet a “mystery to his contemporaries” (24). According to Golinski, Davy is “charismatic and protean” (17) in his experiments, publications and lectures, where the chemist experiments with his body and deploys his charms and passion to reconfigure chemistry as a powerful discipline that can yield new knowledge and discoveries. Golinski proposes that Davy’s different identities are evident of the chemist’s personal exploration of the self. The article thus establishes that Davy can be a case-study from which to understand that with the wider transformation of practices, rhetoric and other techniques of structuring disciplines in this period there also came the exploration and shaping of the individual identity.

A subtle link between the concerns of historians of science and literary critics comes in the beginning of the article with the explanation that Foucault’s work can illuminate the period scholars call both the “second scientific revolution” (15) and the Romantic period since the changes in disciplinary institutions in modern society also transformed the sense of self and the individual. For Golinski the “implications” of Foucault’s work “have not been completely explored” (16) by scholarship on the early nineteenth century and the complex relationship between personal individuality and institutions can be analysed via Davy as an experimenter of both science and the self. To this end the paper follows Davy’s career as a chemical experimenter refashioning his own identity to foster resources and support for two newly established institutions, the Pneumatic Institution in Bristol and the Royal Institution in London. Golinski concludes that Davy underwent a serious and “profound inquiry” of his own identity throughout his life, shaped by “the difference structures of disciplinarity” and ultimately expressed in his final work *Consolations in Travel* (1830), where Davy “broke new ground” in synthesising his personal life and Enlightenment literature to suggest the adaptability of the self (25).

Davy’s publication of his nitrous oxide experiments in 1800 is the first case for Golinski’s argument since Davy needed to define the remit of the new Pneumatic Institute, to make the experiments “fit” (19) with already-established philosophies, while also including the narratives on the impact of the experiments on the self by those who experienced the gas, all in a single text. Golinski’s useful textual analysis brings to bear how those who experienced the gas, including Davy, employed the language of aesthetics, and articulated a loss of control over their body, questioning the relation between mind and body.

Davy’s lectures at the Royal Institution from 1801 is Golinski’s second case from which to explore how the chemist’s body, rhetoric and powerful experiments transformed the institution, the remit of chemistry and his own identity. Davy sought to distance himself from the reputation that his self-experimentalism at Bristol gave him by reconfiguring his body as the centre of attention during his theatrical lectures for his aristocratic patrons and the middle-class audiences. Here Golinski’s argument is not limited by an analysis of the lectures alone, but incorporates the writings of attendees of his lectures and his acquaintances. The journals of James Dinwiddie provide an interesting account of the way Davy involved and addressed his audiences beyond the lecture script (21-2).
Such an article on the way in which Davy experimented with his identity and the self suggests that Davy’s letters and manuscript poetry might be usefully considered. While Golinski does indeed point out that in these texts Davy reflects on his “genius” (17) and the “basis of life and thought” (21), further consideration of Davy’s personal correspondence and notebooks could bolster Golinski’s argument. It is clear that he is concerned with the public persona that Davy forged in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Following the methods of constructivism, in the paper Davy is frequently characterised as an active player in seeking to establish the authority of science through careful construction of the claims and the practices of chemistry. Davy, Golinski argues, attempted “to mobilise” (17) support for the Royal Institution, who “tried to fit” (19) his science into familiar frameworks, and “to fashion” (21) his identity. This perhaps overstates Davy’s purposefulness in his career and his consideration of his subjectivity. Golinski concludes that a lifetime of experimentation in science and with the self led to the writing of Consolations, a pinnacle of Davy’s experiment with the self, during his retirement. While this overlooks Davy’s earlier poetry where he addressed the same ideas while a working chemist, Golinski’s reading of the philosophical tract in his conclusion impressively encapsulates a much needed reading of Davy’s life-long personal exploration of his selfhood.

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In 2007, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison observed that “epistemic virtues do not annihilate one another like rival armies. Rather, they accumulate.” Moreover, “When epistemic virtues confront one another, so do scientific selves [. . .] Where one side sees a breach of scientific integrity, another may see loyalty to the discipline’s highest standards” (*Objectivity*. Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2007: 363, 367). This analysis succinctly summarises the main argument of Bruno Strasser’s article, which is a natural companion piece to the history of the scientific ‘atlas’ that Daston and Galison have so richly described. Strasser’s article about the construction in the 1980s of GenBank, an open-access digital repository of nucleic acid sequences, weaves a narrative around a clash between the experimental and natural-historical scientific traditions. That narrative is compelling, and the argument intriguing. The article connects the rise of the computer database with the natural-historical collecting traditions, from early modern *Wunderkammer* to Victorian museums and botanic gardens. It carefully and thoroughly documents the intellectual, inter-personal struggle that resulted in the creation of GenBank and the emergence of what Strasser describes as a “hybrid culture” in which the experimental method that produced individual sequences was combined with the natural-historical method of collation (61, 96). This “hybrid culture” of practices, he argues, signalled the end of the “predominantly experimental tradition” in the life sciences (96). Its coming into being involved the sometimes fractious encounters of individual scientists and their respective institutions. This scientific cultural antagonism centred on differences of received opinion about the ethics of scientific credit, attribution, and rights of ownership. If a hundred scientists create a hundred DNA sequences, can the collector of all one hundred make a proprietary claim on the collection? What rights do the individual producers of those sequences retain?

Strasser engagingly describes this antagonism as a clash of “moral economies,” (63) detailing the ultimate failure of the proprietary model and the emergence of a new model of scientific practice, wherein experimental and collecting methods are combined. If there is a major criticism, it concerns the depth of this analysis. Strasser overlooks Daston and Galison’s seminal work, and relies on a theoretically incomplete or unclear notion of what a ‘moral economy’ is. Strasser’s ‘moral economy’ has its provenance in E.P. Thompson’s *Making of the English Working Class* (1963), via Robert E. Kohler’s *Lords of the Fly* (1994). His definition of moral economy as “the system of values that underlies the exchange of scientific knowledge” (63n) never quite does justice to the extent to which value systems are affect-laden and manifested through practices. The distinction between an ethical culture and a moral one is rather ambiguous here. This results in a critical shortcoming in the conclusion, where Strasser misses an opportunity to unite the values of scientific disciplines with their respective practices, under the terms of *affect*. Instead, he sees two distinct and uncertainly related “major historical transformations,” in “moral economies” and in “research practices” (90). The first, he argues, was caused by the rise of an open-access culture within academia; the second was caused by the development of electronic databases.
If Strasser had engaged with Daston’s own development of the moral economy as a category of analysis it is doubtful that he could have maintained this separation of values and practices. Daston’s Osiris article entitled “The Moral Economy of Science” (2nd ser. 10 (1995): 2-24), which is really the intellectual blueprint for Objectivity, invigorated the concept of a moral economy by tying scientific practices to collective psychology. ‘Doing’ science according to entrenched cultural norms is an affective and reflexive process bound to the scientific self. There is no distinction between moral prescriptions that are framed by disciplinary boundaries and the methods of practicing science within those disciplines. It would therefore be fruitful to combine Strasser’s two historical transformations and recognise that “research practices” are an integral, affective, self-defining part of the moral economy of science. There are enough clues in Strasser’s article to demonstrate the possibility of the argument’s development. Throughout, Strasser refers to values (63n, 83), sentiments of injustice (63n), confidence (68), a “sense” of ownership (72), scientific satisfaction (83), and conceptions of legitimacy (96) without explicitly connecting these emotional cultures, through the word ‘moral,’ to the scientific activities that are both their cause and their effect. This missed opportunity aside, “The Experimenter’s Museum” makes a valuable contribution to a growing awareness of cultural interpretations of scientific practices.

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Generations of literature and science scholars have recognised Thomas Hardy as a crucial intersection between Darwinian evolution and Victorian fiction. Much of their attention has focused on the puzzling discrepancy between the bleak Darwinian pessimism of Hardy’s novels of the 1880s and 1890s and his self-identification as an ‘evolutionary meliorist,’ a tension in his corpus which has yet to be conclusively resolved. However, in an astute and intelligent article, Caroline Sumpter has proposed an answer to this question involving what might initially appear to be that most un-Hardylike of concepts: sympathy. Concentrating on his controversial 1896 novel, *Jude the Obscure*, Sumpter resuscitates Hardy as a key contributor to debates surrounding the evolutionary significance of sympathy and social feeling. Exploring the tension between pessimism, progressivism and determinism in *Jude*, Sumpter argues that Hardy “offered a stronger defence of morality based on biological determinism, but this determinism was linked to an unexpected evolutionary optimism” (665).

Identifying the presence of sympathy as a neglected locus of hope in *Jude*, Sumpter contends that Hardy’s oft-ignored evolutionary optimism, nurtured through his engagement with the ethical writings of his mentor, Leslie Stephens, grew increasingly vital in shaping his understanding of the author as an enlarger of “social sympathies,” (665) capable of championing ethical progress through aesthetic endeavour. Sumpter’s reading thus proposes *Jude* as a rebuttal to familiar knee-jerk assumptions of Hardy’s pessimism, instead asserting the novel’s sympathetic protagonists as harbingers of Hardy’s latterly professed evolutionary meliorism. The crux of Sumpter’s article, her most valuable contribution to the field of literature and science, is to reassert alongside the established evolutionary triad of Darwin, Spencer and Huxley the importance of Leslie Stephens’s biological conception of sympathy to Hardy’s ethical beliefs. Analysing *Jude*’s famous ‘pig slaughter’ scene, Sumpter juxtaposes Arabella’s indifference to animal suffering against Jude’s sympathetic bond with the condemned swine, illustrating how it reflects Hardy’s belief in the shared continuum between human and animal emotion proposed by Darwin in the *Descent of Man* (1871), yet also his endorsement of Stephens’s more provocative assertion in *Darwinism and Divinity* (1872) that “morality might be an evolutionary or adaptive trait, rather than the product of reason or evidence of divine justice” (667-668).

Consequently, for Sumpter, it was “Hardy rather than Darwin who provided the stauncher defense of a morality based on biological determinism rather than rule-making” (672). In *Jude*, “Individuals are endowed from birth with variable levels of sympathy; such responses seem not to be made by choice, nor are they often pleasurable” (675). Indeed, Jude and Sue’s sympathetic disposition renders them as vulnerable as Arabella’s pigs. In concordance with Stephen’s philosophy, Jude’s excessive sympathy renders him “too good to live” (676): he is crushed by his inability to adapt to an indifferent Huxleyan nature, itself devoid of sympathy. Far from an adaptive advantage, in *Jude*, sympathy is seemingly “blind and irrational,” (679) an evolutionary disadvantage for the individual.

So far, sympathy is characterised pessimistically. Yet, in the second half of her article, Sumpter challenges this mordant interpretation of the sympathetic ‘instinct’ in
Jude. Quoting the psychologist Henry Maudsely, whose work Hardy consulted on the origins of self sacrifice, Sumpter argues that “intellectual and moral progress depended on the aberrant: the ‘Benefactors and at the same time martyrs of humanity’” (677). Given time, the meek might yet inherit the Earth. Exploring Hardy’s engagement with the positivist philosophy of Comte and Cotter Morison, Sumpter argues that if Hardy does not unreservedly endorse Comte’s arguments for the progressive evolution of human sympathies, his late novels “do not deny the slow evolution of the human sympathies” towards universal altruism and understanding (681). Jude’s protagonists are therefore avatars of a better human future, ripe with sympathy.

Significantly, Sumpter attributes Hardy’s newfound evolutionary optimism to his devotion to Leslie Stephens’s Science and Ethics, rather than Comte or Darwin. Indeed, Sumpter persuasively argues that Hardy imbibed Stephen’s moral philosophy to such a degree that he considered literary achievement as synonymous with sympathetic instinct, the author, in Stephen’s words, able to “advance or retard the moral development of the race” (qtd. in Sumpter 684). Hardy’s evolutionary meliorism thus exists in continuum with his pessimism, rather than as a distinct break. Yet Jude’s hostile reception convinced Hardy that, just like his titular protagonist, his moral sympathies were ahead of his time, shattering his faith in “fiction’s progressive capabilities” (684).

This is not a fate this well researched and genuinely innovative article should suffer. For recovering the influence of sympathy in Hardy’s work, and for asserting the impact of Stephen’s biological thought on his aesthetic development, Hardy scholars owe Caroline Sumpter a great deal of sympathy indeed. Yet Sumpter’s article also adds valuably to existing analyses of the Darwinian influence on Victorian ethical debates, rendering it essential reading for those interested in the reception of evolutionary science in this period. Cutting a path for others to follow, Sumpter’s original handling of Hardy will surely encourage further study on the importance of sympathy in post-Darwinian evolutionary discourse.

Peter Eakin
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In “The Strange Case of Dr. White and Mr. De Quincey,” Peter Kitson persuasively examines the relationship between these two remarkable men, beginning on the occasion of the death of De Quincey’s nine-year-old sister, Elizabeth. The article describes the personal and creative influence on De Quincey of leading Manchester physician Dr. White’s work on anatomy and race and argues that this influence was instrumental to De Quincey’s writings about medicine, mummies, and Manchester. Beginning with his investigation of the traumatic occasion of Elizabeth’s death, Kitson writes with the conviction that this event and the subsequent attention paid to Elizabeth’s deformed skull as an example of aesthetic excellence were a catalyst for De Quincey’s obsession with White, and his work.

The article questions De Quincey’s fixation on White’s presence compared with that of Dr. Thomas Percival, a “major figure in Manchester’s cultural and scientific life,” and suggests that White’s appreciation of Elizabeth’s deformed and diseased skull is the reason for the commencement of his lifelong mania for White and craniology (278). Kitson examines the way in which De Quincey’s attention is selective, as the latter ignores White’s work as a respected obstetrician, and expresses only his interest in the doctor’s publications in the field of craniology. Thus Kitson introduces his discussion of the troublesome Romantic relationship between anatomy and theories of racial difference.

Kitson next describes the influence of the anatomical collection displayed at White’s premises on King Street in Manchester, locating the site of origin of De Quincey’s morbid obsession. White’s medical education is described by Kitson as entrenched in assumptions of racial gradation and the intellectual and aesthetic superiority of the European race. In this way, Kitson examines the problematic Romantic application of pseudo-scientific evaluation to questions of racial difference, locating Manchester as the “cradle of biological racism in Britain” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries due to the prevalence of this thinking among its leading medical practitioners (284). It is pseudo-scientific, Kitson argues, because proof of superiority, for White, was to some extent a matter of aesthetics. White, for example, describes the European anatomy as the most “beautiful of the human race” (285). Despite his ability as an intellectual sophisticate to reject extreme theories of gradation such as those advocated by London-based surgeon William Lawrence, De Quincey’s later “vehemently racist” writings are, Kitson argues, a clear product of this influence (286).

The article also argues persuasively that the obsession with the imagery of the broken and bandaged skull in turn informed De Quincey’s Orientalism, specifically the symbolism of the swaddled head as the source of the reoccurrence of the turban or ruined crown motif in De Quincey’s work, and the representation of White as an Eastern figure from the Arabian Night’s tales, a “lamp bearing Aladdin” (279) or a “Bluebeard” figure in his biographical writing (281).

Using specific examples of human remains prepared by White and known to have been seen by De Quincey, Kitson examines the role of bodily spectacle and exhibition in the latter’s work. Kitson examines the doctor as a show-man, revealing or concealing artefacts at his pleasure, and taking paying visitors at his Manchester...
home to gaze upon the embalmed body of former patient Hannah Beswick and the skeleton of the highwayman and convicted murderer Thoman Higgins. The potent effect of viewing these remains on De Quincey was to produce “the finest heights of his wonderfully baroque prose style” (281).

Kitson’s article adds to the established canon of scholarship on connections between Romantic literature and medicine, which includes such texts as Sharon Ruston’s *Shelley and Vitality* (2005), Nicholas Roe’s *Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Sciences of Life* (2001), and Hermione De Almeida’s *Romantic Medicine and John Keats* (1991) that provide studies of Romantic poets and their knowledge of, connections within, and influence by, the medical profession and scientific debates. Critical works such as these have successfully disputed the early twentieth-century view of Romantic writers as individuals isolated from their society who somehow transcend their historical moment. Instead, these works posit an alternative Romanticism that was very much connected with contemporary debates about human scientific progress. As with these works, Kitson persuasively uses a historicist approach in his research, and draws on De Quincey’s own accounts of the relationship and known biographical details as evidence of how his obsession with White and his work informed his writing.

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In this exceptional article examining how Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory replaced ideas of the special creation of species, Richard Bellon indulges briefly in abstract formulations characteristic of old questions about the relationship between Religion and Science. Shared among nineteenth century naturalists, he argues, were convictions that speculative flights of fancy had to be restrained by patient, detailed, inductive study. Thus science was able to strike “a grand bargain with theology. Science, being virtuous, was pious. Piety, being reasonable, imposed no theological litmus tests on scientific ideas” (397). Through the remainder of the article, Bellon moves discussion of Darwin’s work beyond the usual simplistic caricatures, delving into practical concerns and motivations.

Darwin’s work and writings may exude scholarly modesty, but this sort of judgment is made with the advantage of hindsight. It was not apparent to fellow naturalists, Bellon explains, that Darwin allowed the evidence to guide his thoughts to their proper conclusion. Finding inspiration in the exhaustive method of anatomical description modelled by George Cuvier, a good number held evolutionary theory to be incurably ungrounded. It had been tried, for example, by Robert Chambers and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, and found wanting by Cuvier and Adam Sedgwick, among a good number of others. Notably, the reactions of churchmen like William Wilberforce, far from being merely theological, were cast in terms of similar methodological and naturalistic – all of which is to say scientific – objections.

When *Origins* (1859) was published, Darwin was aware that he faced an uphill battle against the practical assumptions of fellow naturalists. But he seems to have been genuinely taken aback by the sort of the criticisms levelled against his work, and not without good reason. Bellon observes that “Darwin loved working with his ‘eyes and fingers,’ particularly after gruelling bouts of writing, which he rarely enjoyed” (407). Being accused of drawing hastily formed, speculative conclusions, the very thing he had worked so hard to avoid, was no doubt galling.

Nor would Darwin have been able to carry the day solely on the elegance or conceptual simplicity of his ideas. So while *Origins* raised a furore in the forum of public debate, Darwin completed a highly specialised study of the fertilisation of *Orchids* (1862). This little-read study included examples of how the supposed evolutionary mutability of species could illuminate botanical phenomena that hitherto had stubbornly resisted the best attempts at explanation. Bellon describes the radical reorientation affected by *Orchids* of the study of plant fertilisation towards evolutionary theory as a flanking movement. “Darwin simultaneously illustrated the conceptual and methodological power of his theory and its prodigious ability to bring order to the study of natural history” (409). Indeed, Darwin’s quiet retreat into the evidential minutiae changed the grounds of debate.

The few who read *Orchids*, whether holding species to be mutable or not, immediately recognised its erudition. Its small number of readers willingly followed Darwin as far as the concluding chapter, where he raised questions about whether homologous traits were better explained with reference to the wisdom of a divine plan or to descent with gradual modification fitted to the changing conditions of life. From
the ranks of special creationists, Bellon observes, came warm recognition of “the value of Darwin’s extension of empirical knowledge” (411). The scholarly pedigree of Orchids established, its reviewers were divided over whether the final chapter added anything of scientific significance. By this time, however, the tide of intellectual discourse was changing as George Bentham and Joseph Hooker pressed Orchids’ explanatory advantage and John Stuart Mill defended evolutionary theory against Wilberforce’s charges of illogicality. Bellon concludes: “Darwin and his allies thus outflanked their enemies – not by undermining the scientific establishment but by making evolution an indelible part of it” (415).

Though an older generation of naturalists continued to ponder Darwin’s solution to the problem of the origin of species, the younger generation eagerly embraced his research program. Accolades and awards rapidly followed the publication of Orchids. By 1866, Darwin’s work was ranked alongside that of Michael Faraday. The acclamation of Thomas Huxley as president at a meeting of the British Association in 1868 is an excellent indication of just how quickly evolutionary theory had won the field.

There is a notable, though understandable, absence of discussion of Darwin’s well-known preoccupations with interpretation of the fossil record and the geographical distribution of species in Bellon’s discussion. On the other hand, he makes a persuasive case for the triumph of evolutionary theory being a “pollen-grain” (419-20) revolution, rather than one of monkeys and men.

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Gainty’s historiographical article seeks to dispute and nuance the condemnation in earlier scholarship on the motion studies of industrial efficiency expert, Frank Gilbreth, which accused him of using his ‘scientific management’ to efface the individual agency of workers to the profit of corporate management. Gainty considers the case of Gilbreth’s offer to New York Hospital surgeons to conduct a motion study of their work free of charge on condition that he be given total autonomy in its execution. Why, Gainty’s argument runs, would surgeons, by no stretch of the imagination the least autocratic medical practitioners, agree to participate if they felt in danger of dehumanisation or subjugation?

Gilbreth sought to conduct a motion study of surgeons primarily as a publicity stunt: if he could render this most complex of medical practices efficient, this would suggest to potential clients that he could do so for any trade. Furthermore, he claimed a democratic intention behind “going after the High-Brows”: all workers could benefit from the insights of scientific management which broke skills down to a series of movements, all of which could be made more efficient. Gainty claims that “the dehumanising nature of Gilbreth’s motion study, which reduced identity to a series of ‘muscular coordinations,’ made motion-study science potentially the ultimate tool of American democracy” (13).

Gilbreth’s surgical subjects did more than acquiesce to his study, they participated with eagerness, in one case travelling from New York to Providence, Rhode Island to participate in an experiment in Gilbreth’s dining room. Gainty argues that Gilbreth’s study coincided with the dawn of medical standardisation, when all medical practitioners could carry out surgical procedures regardless of their level of skill or experience, but that surgeons were trying to distinguish themselves as expert, efficient and distinct from general medicine. The surgeons’ enthusiastic involvement in Gilbreth’s study is central to Gainty’s argument against the reading of scientific management as detrimental to the worker-subject’s agency and individuality. However, it is not quite convincing. Gainty’s precisely detailed description of Gilbreth’s experimental design emphasises that he insisted on surgeons wearing hoods and masks (which was not yet common practice) obscuring all facial features. They were identified instead by numbers and colour coded by rank.

The great unasked question of this article is whether Gilbreth’s work yielded any medically or scientifically valid results, or indeed influenced future surgical methods. The example used to highlight the participant surgeons’ enthusiasm for Gilbreth’s methods – their travelling two hundred miles to perform approximate surgical gestures to be captured by chronocyclegraph – is a case in point. The chronocyclegraph was a device where lights were attached to the subject’s fingers and a slow-exposure camera would record the line of light capturing the motion. The faith placed in the chronocyclegraph by the study’s surgeon participants is fascinatingly correlated to the contemporary advances in X-ray. X-ray permitted the visualisation of the inside of something without disruption to its exterior aspect. The chronocyclegraph allowed the user to see motion in a way that was impossible without mechanical aid. Both technologies gave access to a landscape which had
always been there but was previously unknowable. Gainty also considers the shortcomings of the chronocyclegraph: the images it produced were frequently unusable as fear of electric shocks prevented the lights from being tightly attached and subjects felt that their weight rendered movements inaccurate. There is no discussion, however, of whether there were any insights, or any improvements implemented, from this efficiency experiment which required surgeons to mime “what seemed not to be any procedure in particular, but rather the generic but fundamental motions that might be a part of any procedure in general” (16). It is perhaps beyond the remit of a historiographical article to consider this, but Gainty claims that previous scholarship’s focused criticism of the technocratic and de-individualising nature of scientific management “helps to account for the all but complete dismissal of Gilbreth’s study of surgical motion as a moment of significance in American medicine’s history” (2). The surgical motion study’s significance would thus seem to merit further exploration. Gainty’s article provides an insightful and interesting consideration of Gilbreth’s surgical motion study. It provides the background for his measurement of motion rather than time, it details his experimental design and argues for the serendipitous confluence of Gilbreth’s interests with those of the surgical profession. However, by not entering into colloquy with the scholarship it seeks to refute, it does not go far enough to convince as a reinterpretation of scientific management.

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