The Strange Case of the Appendix: Ian McEwan and the Pathology of Pseudoscience

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Abstract

*Enduring Love* ends with a pseudoscientific paper supplemented by a fictive clinical file. Such a narrative design is extraordinary since McEwan tries to publish the first appendix in a real medical journal—in what he calls “a shocking attempted fraud.” This article scrutinizes the appendices in the context of ethics violations engendered by the authorial intention to factualize the novel. The appendices are shown to evoke the vestige of a novelist’s attempt to engage himself with the real world of science. This article argues that the narrator divulges a pathology of narrativizing science—an obsession with the aesthetics of pseudoscience. It will show how the perusal of *Enduring Love* as a true-to-life fiction self-perpetuating the factual nature of its literary truth would lead to unresolved ethical complications in reading.

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Science seeks truth, although, as the Sokal hoax exposes, this is a truth not universally acknowledged in the humanities. In May 1996, a scandal erupted in United States’ academia: Physicist Alan Sokal revealed that his paper in *Social Text* was a parody on the abuse of science in the humanities invaded by “irrationalist tendencies” (“Revelation” 49; “Why I Wrote” 127). Sokal designs his pseudo paper as a postmodernist pastiche to show that truth is no more than a social construct—a belief that, for him, is detrimental to knowledge because it “denies the existence of objective realities” (“Revelation” 51). His hoax created such debates among scientists and the humanities scholars that the term “social construction” gradually went out of fashion (Guillory 484).

However disputable the claims from both sides were, Sokal’s supporters and critics seemed to agree upon one common reality: Sokal, in achieving his aims, broke the sacred ethical commitment of scientists—trust. The dissemination of scientific knowledge depends upon the confidence that scientists report their findings honestly and without distortion (Resnik 68; Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy 15). Even Sokal admitted to his ethical failings when he said: “I’m not oblivious to the ethical issues involved in my rather unorthodox experiment. Professional communities operate largely on trust; deception undercuts that trust” (“Revelation” 52).

In his study of authorial misconduct, Robert Hauptman shows the importance of maintaining professional ethics across disciplines. How an end is achieved is as crucial as the end itself. “Scientists are committed to the discovery of truth,” Hauptman observes, and “they are also obliged to consider the means for achieving this” (141). In pursuing their callings, scientists should not disregard conventional moral norms, and the ethical commitments of scientists also conform to the values of everyday life (Resnik 16-30; Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy 48). Not only should physicists abide by professional standards of conduct, similar ethical codes are also applicable to psychologists, journalists, and even novelists.
Therefore, the ethical responsibility of professional researchers and writers, Hauptman rightly points out, “entails nothing less than pledging fealty to truth, as opposed to falsity and deception, and this is even the case for creative artists, since truth in fiction is as meaningful as truth in a clinical study” (4). Moreover, since all professionals engage themselves with research, “[e]rror and especially unethical activity during the research process,” Hauptman remarks, are “always carried over into an authored text” (5). Authorial misconduct awaits detection by the reader. Reading, like writing, is thus an ethical act. The questions raised by J. Hillis Miller about the ethics of reading still resonate today: “Why must the poet tell the reader? What obligation, compulsion, or imperative compels him to speak? What law must he obey?” (181).

This article will discuss the ethical issues in a representative text contemporaneous to the Sokal hoax: Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love (1997), a modern classic known to convey the ethos of the emerging Third Culture in showing narrative as the “consilient” link between science and the humanities (Carbonell 4). It tells a story about a scientist who narrates his traumatic experiences of being a victim of stalking and, eventually, defends his claims about the perpetrator by presenting scientific explanations. When a scientist tells stories, or as this article will show, when a novelist tries to confirm scientific truth through fiction, the ethical problems involved in such a “consilient” narration are complex and delicate. This article will discuss the suspicious ethics violations engendered by the authorial compulsion to factualize the fiction in the real world of science. In so doing, this article adopts the critical stance of what Daniel R. Schwarz has called “an ethical reader” who attempts “to recreate the text as it was written for its original audience, as well as to define what that text means to us now” (217).

A Focal Puzzle

Enduring Love begins with a rescue attempt in a balloon accident that would implicate Joe Rose the scientist as narrator in more mishaps as he struggles to resist the homoerotic obsession of Jed Parry – one of the co-helpers. Joe’s failure to stay in the ranks of the helpers prompts him to recognize the “mammalian conflict” (15) between self-survival and altruistic sacrifice. Joe’s impulse towards self-preservation is to be intensified by the altruistic fervour of Parry, who is determined to save Joe from “his little cage of reason” (144). Parry’s “flame of altruism” (15) is kindled in a form of erotomania known as de Clerambault’s syndrome – an uncommon psychiatric disorder involving an individual who “has intense delusional belief” (249) that another person, “often of higher social standing” (249), is in love with himself or herself (Oliveira). Parry’s disorder, being “a dark, distorting mirror” (137), offers Joe an opportunity to explore the nature of love in his failed marriage with Clarissa Mellon. As Joe finds, “For there to be a pathology, there had to be a lurking concept of health . . . Sickness and health. In other words, what could I learn about Parry that would restore me to Clarissa?” (137). Joe’s efforts to save his marriage, his thwarted career as a science journalist, and eventually Clarissa’s life, generate the main action of Enduring Love that depicts the uneasy symbiosis between the healthy and pathological in the mind.

Such a reading is effectively endorsed by the two appendices of the novel. Appendix I is a fraudulent paper written by fictive psychiatrists for a fake journal. This pseudo paper discusses the case history of “P” who, “referred from the courts following charges arising out of an attempted murder” (252), exhibits “a pure (primary) form of de Clerambault’s syndrome” (249). Since the description of P’s
condition would remind the readers of what Joe has said about Parry in the main narrative, it would be apparent that Appendix I is a paper on Parry’s case. Moreover, the prognosis of Parry’s disorder suggested by Joe is further confirmed by Appendix II, a copy of an unsent letter written by Parry in a mental institution. The introductory note attests: “Letter collected from Mr. J. Parry, written toward end of third year after admittance. Originally filed with patient’s notes. Photocopy forwarded to Dr. R. Wenn at his request” (261; italics in original). This letter, also a work of fiction, manifests Parry’s delusory obsession on Joe. Accordingly, a combined reading of the two appendices would unravel the true identity of the anonymized subjects. One of the principal themes of Joe’s narrative, that love can “merge into psychopathology” (249), is authenticated by the academic discussion in Appendix I which, in turn, is corroborated by the letter in Appendix II as the conclusive evidence.

Consequently, the structure of the novel brings about a narrative loop of confirmation that celebrates the triumph of the primary narratorial voice. The cross-referencing among the main narrative and the appendices would turn the Case History in Appendix I into an ostensible spoiler that, summarizing the novel in eight succinct paragraphs, enhances the reader’s ease of processing the plot. Moreover, Appendix II can also be read as a spoiler that helps the reader comprehend the “enduring” danger of Parry’s illness. For the reader, the two spoiler-like appendices would therefore greatly improve “the fluency of reading” (Leavitt and Christenfeld). Joe would seem irrefutable in claiming that he was “so obviously, incontrovertibly right,” and Clarissa was “simply mistaken” (98), about the cause of Parry’s abnormal behaviour. However, like a beautiful theory, such a perfect reading hides a catch: the vindication of Joe by means of authentic documents betrays a suspicious ethics violation. In disclosing the identity of Parry and the recipient of his letter, Appendix II reveals a breach of patient confidentiality, a misconduct that real-world psychiatrists try to avoid.

In the UK, before the Data Protection Act 1998 formally established the legal framework to govern patient confidentiality (Department of Health 17, 37, 40), the 1990s saw increasing concern over the need to safeguard patient information (Caldicott 6). The chairman of the Standards Committee, General Medical Council, wrote in 1994: “Doctors who decide to disclose data about a patient, without consent, must always be prepared to justify their decision in individual cases” (Irvine 42). Disclosure of patient data can only be justified if the best interests of the patient could be served (Szmukler and Bloch).

In March 1996, a year prior to the publication of Enduring Love, the Department of Health, UK, issued a nation-wide guideline on maintaining patient confidentiality. It specified that, if disclosure of patient information was necessary, “only the minimum necessary information should be used and it should be anonymized” (Caldicott 1). In June 1996, in Jaffee v. Redmond 518 U.S. 1, the US Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege to rule against the disclosure of a psychotherapist’s notes. This high-profile case would later prompt the British Psychoanalytic Council to issue a statement on psychoanalytic confidentiality to proclaim that health professionals should “vigorously resist” identifiable disclosure of “all written records/notes about a patient” (2-3). In particular, those documents are “never intended to be used for communication about an identified patient to a third party” (British Psychoanalytic Council 3).

In Enduring Love, by contrast, while subjects in Appendix I are anonymized, Appendix II’s introductory note openly discloses the true identity of the subject
without acknowledging his consent. This article argues that the violation of patient confidentiality is not simply a novelist’s blunder, nor should it be read as an innocuous narrative design; instead, it suggests complex issues of questionable authorial intentions during the final stage of the novel’s publication. Moreover, this article will show that Appendix I involves other instances of potential ethics violations that will further affect the reader’s overall ethical response to the novel.

Dr. Wenn, requesting a copy of Parry’s letter, is apparently one of the principal psychiatrists responsible for the court’s “full psychiatric report” (254). Since the appendices are appended to Joe’s narrative rather than to the novel, it is presumably Joe the primary narrator that is responsible for appending these documents, instead of an omnipotent narrator who abruptly intervenes in the novel’s ending. The violation of patient confidentiality seems serious because Joe, as the narrator, obviously involves himself in disseminating the confidential information. Accordingly, a focal puzzle arises: How did the letter-file requested by a court psychiatrist, guarded under the strict code of patient confidentiality, end up at Joe’s disposal? This puzzle will generate more unanswered questions about the novel: how did Joe know that it was Dr. Wenn who had requested a copy of the letter “filed with patient’s notes”? Did the doctor consent to the use of the letter-file in Joe’s narrative? Was there any conflict of interest in the doctor’s breach of professional ethics? Does such a suspicious professional misconduct result in any harm to Parry as a patient? While Appendix I elucidates the strange case of a psychiatric syndrome, Appendix II shows that there is a stranger case of the appendix that equally deserves inquiry.

Such issues raised by the curious breach of ethics are further compounded by McEwan’s deliberate attempt to publish Appendix I in a real medical journal – in what he calls a “shocking attempted fraud” (“Shocking Attempted Fraud”). This article will show that McEwan’s unsuccessful hoax problematizes not only the reading of Enduring Love, but also the author’s use of appendix as narrative strategy. As John Farrell emphasizes in his recent study of authorial intention, “to think of a literary work as a mere text is to neglect its impact and value as a human gesture made in a concrete historical situation toward a potentially identifiable audience” (10). The strange case of the appendix involves more than a textual problem; rather, it involves the problem of literary production as “a human gesture” susceptible to possible ethical failings. As this article will demonstrate, the appendices intimate an untold story of authorial intentions that will affect the reader’s ethical judgement on the novel’s characters and their creator.

Emphasizing the significance of exploring authorial intention during critical reading, Farrell argues, “Grasping the intention does not confine or put an end to analysis. It is just the necessary beginning” (25). Since the placement of Appendix II makes it accessory to Appendix I, it is necessary to explore the unusual circumstances of Appendix I’s composition to better understand the strange case of the appendix.

“Shocking Attempted Fraud”

So far, Enduring Love is McEwan’s only novel furnished with appendices under the guise of genuine science. Shortly after the novel came out in September 1997, McEwan was overwhelmed by reader inquiries asking if the appendices were indeed genuine documents (Burkeman). Early critics tended to read the novel as a “mechanical” reproduction from an actual case (Lehmann-Haupt; Birkerts), as McEwan observed: “One critic castigated the novel for adhering too closely to the case study on which it was based” (“The Art of Fiction” 102). Another critic even
found that McEwan’s use of “the real-life case” was guilty of “literary dishonesty” that would blemish the novel as “a successful or authentic work of art” (Bewes 430).

Offering an “authentic” disclosure of Parry’s case, the appended documents reveal a narratorial urge to coerce readers into believing via reading. Psychiatrist Ronan McIvor, mistaking Appendix I for a genuine paper, believes that it enables McEwan to “expertly explor[e] the anatomy of obsession and the vagaries of romantic and deranged love” (61). Jago Morrison, regarding the appendices as “dissimulated continuation of the main fiction,” detects the “strangely overdetermined gesture of legitimisation” that “educate[s]” the reader “about a pathology of gender” (256). More recently, James Phelan shows that the fraudulent appendices generate “a highly immersive experience that engages its readers’ ethical judgments of its characters” (67). As Phelan rightly finds, the crucial question for the reader is how to evaluate the effect of the appendix on their response to the novel (67).

Early critics of the novel were unaware of the fictitiousness of the appendices because it was not until August 1999, nearly two years after the novel’s publication, that McEwan confirmed the appendices as fictional constructs (“Shocking Attempted Fraud”). In 1999, psychiatrist McIvor’s review of Enduring Love in the January issue of The Psychiatric Bulletin had drawn attention from sharp-eyed psychiatrists. Three months later, psychiatrist Kenneth Granville-Grossman wrote to the journal to uncover the fictitiousness of the Appendix I’s authorship and place of publication (243). In the same issue, clinical researcher Robin McCreadie acknowledged that the unsuspecting reader perhaps “ha[d] fallen nicely into Ian McEwan’s trap” (243). McEwan seemed to have felt strongly about the comments from medical professionals that he wrote to the Bulletin on May 14, 1999 (Armstrong) to clarify the query. In August 1999, the Bulletin published his letter to substantiate the doubt on the authenticity of Appendix I which, McEwan conceded, is “based on the novel that precedes it rather than the other way round.” His remarkable revelation deserves to be quoted in full:

At the end of a story about rationality, I wanted to produce an extreme example of a highly determined rational prose such as one might find in a psychiatric case study. As I am sure the editors will confirm, in 1997 I submitted the paper to the British Journal of Psychiatry in the name of one of the authors, Dr Wenn. If the monograph had been published, it would have seemed that my novel was based on a genuine case, my characters would have acquired an extra sheen of plausibility and the division between the real and the invented would have become seamless. The authority of the anagrammatic Drs Wenn and Camia would have been enhanced as their names dissolved among the authentic citations in the bibliography. I would have enjoyed thanking the editors for permission to reprint the paper, assuming they granted it.

I was both disappointed and relieved when my submission was respectfully turned down. Had it been otherwise, I am not entirely sure I would have had the courage, or callousness, to proceed.

I can also confirm that Ray Dolan the “friend and hiking companion” is the same as Dr R. Dolan, FRCPsych, Consultant Psychiatrist at the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery. He is, of course, in no manner implicated in this shocking attempted fraud. (“Shocking Attempted Fraud”)
The misreading of Appendix I as a genuine paper turns out to be the definitive reading that the author intends to invent. However, rather than closing the strange case, this letter discloses covert authorial intentions that seem to make the case even stranger.

McEwan’s confession appears puzzling since he chose to accomplish the hoax only eight months prior to the novel’s publication in September 1997. Appendix I was probably submitted to The British Journal of Psychiatry during January or early February 1997, because on February 4, McEwan received a faxed letter from the journal to “Dr Wenn” to acknowledge the submission (Armstrong). If Appendix I was conceived as parallel publication with Enduring Love, submitting the piece to different journals much earlier would have better ensured the success of the scheme.

Another intriguing revelation of the letter is the author’s anxiety about the hoax that, if it succeeded, would represent a double violation of both the ethics of writing and that of science. Admittedly, McEwan is not a scientist; yet he submits the fake paper to a real journal under the false identity as a real psychiatrist. Although novelists are equipped with poetic license to create imaginary characters true to life, the freedom of creativity cannot abrogate professional ethics. While it is not always possible to separate fact from fiction in creative writing, it is essential to be truthful in science. Once the fake paper was submitted to a real journal, it would not be poetical license that would govern the submission. McEwan would probably have recognized the paradox of publishing a fraudulent paper in order to enhance the plausibility of a novel whose protagonist is a self-proclaimed “parasite” (107) science writer capable of “spin[ning] a decent narrative” (79). If the fraudulent paper had been published, it would indeed be problematic for the novelist to defend his integrity in “spinning” a fictional construct that tries to pass itself for real science in the living world.

McEwan’s belated revelation suggests that the strange case of the appendix involves more than a textual problem. The strange case can best be solved if it is approached as a complication created by the authorial reaction to a real-life fraud coinciding with the later phase of the novel’s composition: the Sokal hoax. In order to probe deeper into the case, it is pertinent to explore the cultural context contemporaneous to the novel.

Soon after Sokal’s self-revelation of his hoax in the May issue of Lingua Franca, on May 18, 1996, The New York Times promptly covered the news of the scandal, which was quickly picked up by The Observer in London the next day. On May 21, Stanley Fish wrote an angry article to denounce Sokal’s “bad joke” (“Professor Sokal’s”). Fish’s swift criticism sparked a wildfire of debates on the “sham that shook the academy” across the United States and Europe that summer (Editors of Lingua Franca). On August 8, 1996, the celebrated Nobel physicist Steven Weinberg, whose Dreams of a Final Theory is cited in the Acknowledgements of Enduring Love, wrote a powerful defence of Sokal. Weinberg defended in full force “the objective nature of scientific knowledge,” as he maintained: “We will need to confirm and strengthen the vision of a rationally understandable world if we are to protect ourselves from the irrational tendencies that still beset humanity” (“Sokal’s Hoax”). Weinberg’s article provoked such fervent debate among the readers of The New York Review of Books that a series of heated exchanges were later published in the October issue. Still, Weinberg held firm to his belief in the irrefutable objectivity of scientific knowledge (“An Exchange”). In the following weeks, the debate broadened the division between scientists and humanities scholars, while the issues brought up by the hoax were overshadowed by the cross-accusations from both sides.
On October 30, 1996, Sokal gave a talk at a forum at New York University to “plea for reason, evidence, and logic” (“A Plea for Reason”).

Six weeks later, on December 13, 1996, philosopher Paul Boghossian wrote an article in *The Times Literary Supplement* to support Weinberg’s ideas. Confronting postmodernist lionization of relativism, Boghossian retorted: “How could a claim and its denial both be true?” He identified a fundamental issue that McEwan, finishing a novel about rationalism at that time, would presumably have been interested in. As Boghossian writes: “The crucial question concerns what we are to say when what I believe – what’s true according to my perspective – conflicts with what you believe – with what’s true according to your perspective” (Boghossian).

In the later months of 1996, the bitter exchanges about the Sokal hoax in the American media attracted extensive media coverage in Europe. The fervent debates on objective truth would surely have drawn attention from McEwan who, at the time, was preparing *Enduring Love* for publication. The central conflict in the novel is precisely my perspective versus your perspective, a conflict of beliefs similarly debated in the Sokal controversy. As McEwan would most likely have found, the blatant resolution of the novel, in which the narrator’s rationalism triumphs over the relativism of his wife, forcefully presents what Weinberg had called “the vision of a rationally understandable world.”

In particular, McEwan would probably have been astounded to read Weinberg’s article on the danger of irrationality and the maestro’s subsequent defence of scientific objectivity – two core beliefs to be entertained in *Enduring Love*. McEwan would presumably have observed that Weinberg expressed a belief magnificently elucidated in *Dreams of a Final Theory*, in which he astutely asserts: “It would be foolish to expect that any discovery of science could in itself purge the human race of all its misconceptions, but the discovery of the final laws of nature will at least leave less room in the imagination for irrational beliefs” (240).

Acknowledging his indebtedness to *Dreams of a Final Theory* in the Acknowledgments of *Enduring Love*, McEwan implies that he shares with Weinberg the same faith in scientific rationalism. It is significant that Joe, proud of his “powers of rational analysis” (235), is trained as a physicist with “a doctorate in quantum electrodynamics” (80). His research into Parry’s disorder is supported by the psychiatric study in Appendix I that presents itself as if it were “the final theory” to prove the case. Joe eventually manages to show that, to use Weinberg’s words, “the correct answer when we find it is what it is” (“Sokal’s Hoax”). Clarissa’s lost faith in rationalism discloses a conflict between rationalism and relativism that Joe seeks to overcome. A similar battle was fought in the Sokal debate by Weinberg and his followers in the name of science. In December 1996, Boghossian’s article in *TLS* would presumably provide McEwan with a strong incentive to find a way to present the immediacy of his coming novel. The altercation in the media may have triggered McEwan to carry out a literary fraud as a drastic gesture to engage with topical issues. It is this linkage with the cultural context of the Sokal hoax that sheds new light on the strange case of the appendix.

In a newspaper interview on August 16, 1999, McEwan revealed that the appendix was designed to authenticate his novel since it “gives the fiction an added authority and unsettles the factual” (Burkeman). Although McEwan did not openly comment upon the Sokal hoax, its direct influence is obvious since, as McEwan said, writing the appendix brought him “linguistic exuberance”: “I just wanted to show that I could do it too” (Burkeman). Yet, as the interviewer noted: “McEwan insists that he
didn’t set out to make fools of the journal’s esteemed editorial board, and contrasts his fraud with that of Alan Sokal” (Burkeman). As Derrida, Sokal’s most famous target, mockingly puts it: “Poor Sokal. His name remains linked to a hoax” (70). McEwan, being a respected novelist, perhaps would not wish to be associated with the notoriety of a fraud. Nevertheless, in late 1996, an emerging preoccupation for the novelist would probably be how to better express his belief in rationalism pertinent to contemporary issues. The extensive debate on scientific objectivity at the time would most likely trigger a reaction from him to experiment with a hoax to proclaim a faith in science without engaging in any open debate.

As Dominic Head points out in passing, the Sokal hoax is “a flashpoint in the art and science debate that Enduring Love seems clearly to respond to” (139). Yet, it is an ambivalent response complicated by McEwan’s belated exposure of his unsuccessful hoax. The appendices seem to present themselves as part of the narrative components in the novel; nevertheless, the full picture of their role can only be appreciated in relation to McEwan’s pursuit of a literary hoax. As Stanley Cavell says, “the correct sense of the question ‘Why?’ directs you further into the work” (qtd. in Farrell 40; emphasis in original). The fundamental question for the reader is why McEwan would preserve Appendix I as the textual vestige of his failed fraud while keeping his scheme in the dark for more than two years. This pragmatic question is compounded by the textual questions engendered by the suspicious ethics violations on the part of the narrator. For a better understanding of the strange case of the appendix, the next section will examine the narratorial intention to commend scientific rationalism.

**McEwan’s Will to Narrativizing Science**

According to Farrell, there are three types of authorial intentions necessary for producing a literary work: communicative intentions to transmit linguistic meaning (45-6); practical intentions “that motivate the composition of literary works” (48); and artistic intentions to create “literary effects” (50). There is, after all, something meaningful outside the text. As Farrell contends, since an author’s practical intentions to compose a work may result from “egoistic or idealistic ambitions” (48), an understanding of authorial intention is crucial to interpretation. Moreover, Farrell rightly notes, “Knowledge of the artist’s ulterior motives may affect our attitude toward the work” (50)

Most readers will recognize McEwan’s communicative intention in presenting the appendices to authenticate Joe’s findings. Still, not enough attention has been paid to the author’s practical and artistic intentions to compose these materials. As the previous section has shown, it would seem that Appendix I is the product of McEwan’s practical intention to pursue “linguistic exuberance” in reaction to the Sokal debate. This section will show that an understanding of McEwan’s artistic intentions, as in the case of Sokal, may affect the reader’s ethical judgement not only on the fraudulent work, but also on its creator. The narrative impact produced by the appendices results from the unwitting overlapping between the author’s practical intention to accomplish a literary hoax, and his artistic intention to narrativize science.

*Enduring Love* was written in a period of McEwan’s writing career when he was especially fascinated by science. Writing in the 1990s when the world saw remarkable advance in evolutionary biology and particle physics, McEwan believed that “a writer is bound to be interested in the possible consequences of such things” (“An Interview” 72). For him, the most significant legacy of modern science is
rational thinking. In 1995, he revealed his intention “to write a novel in praise of rationalism” (“An Interview” 73). Later, he recalled his wish “to write a novel that rather celebrated the rational” (“Interview with Ian McEwan” 17). Enduring Love, McEwan proclaims, embodies his “novel of ideas” in which “ideas were dramatized or played out” (“Interview with Ian McEwan” 23; “The Art of Fiction” 103). The main “dramatized idea” in the novel purports to confirm scientific rationalism as the best defence against the danger of irrationalism in modern society.

McEwan’s artistic intentions are resolutely fulfilled by the dénouement of the novel, as he said: “I wanted Clarissa to be wrong” (“Interview with Ian McEwan” 17). If Clarissa had believed in Joe, Parry’s domestic terror attack could have been foiled. Clarissa remains reluctant to believe in Joe’s rational analysis of Parry, and her doubts have never been fully resolved in the main narrative. The appendices serve to verify the object reality of Parry’s disorder by establishing its “nosological entity” (249). As a result, the appendices dramatically fulfil the thematic purposes to validate Joe’s ideas. The punctilious intertextuality among the academic references in Appendix I points to the research communities comparable to those suggested by Clarissa’s research on Keats or her godfather’s “Human Genome Project” (175). If Clarissa has her godfather as the archangel of science, Joe finds his own in Dr. Wenn and other psychiatrists on an equal footing.

As critics have found, Appendix I is closely based upon “The Pathological Extensions of Love” by P. E. Mullen and M. Pathé (Childs 22). What is equally interesting is the fact that this paper was published by The British Journal of Psychiatry in 1994, which may explain McEwan’s choice to submit Appendix I to the same journal three year later. Making use of numerous references cited by Mullen and Pathé, Appendix I follows their thesis on “pathological love” to foreground the connection between “male erotomania and dangerousness” (257) – the connection that Joe is to find through his sufferings under Parry’s stalking. Moreover, Mullen and Pathé’s paper will lead to a vital reference by the same authors – a paper entitled “Stalking and the Pathologies of Love” published in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry the same year. The fact that this paper is not cited by Wenn and Camia suggests that it is probably one of McEwan’s secret sources for fabricating Appendix I. This paper focuses on the danger of erotomaniac stalking behaviours, such as “following, loitering in the victim’s vicinity, approaching, telephoning, and sending letters” (469), that will corroborate Wenn and Camia’s argument on the overlooked dangerousness of male erotomania. The genuine cross-referencing among these real papers provides McEwan with a solid model to construct Appendix I for an authentic depiction of Parry’s mental disorder and its impact on victims of stalking.

Appendix I also draws many references from Uncommon Psychiatric Syndrome by M. D. Enoch and W. H. Trethowan, a classic study also cited by Mullen and Pathé, to establish the diagnostic criteria for erotomania. To Wenn and Camia, the objective reality is the one antecedently established by Joe’s authentic narrative that, in turn, confirms the narrative space of psychiatrists that would offer greater authenticity. The intertextuality in Appendix I and its references creates the conditioning framework for Joe to advocate scientific rationalism. Consequently, Appendix I doubly fulfils the narratorial and authorial intentions to extol rational thinking.

Another conditioning framework to fulfil narratorial purposes is established by another real paper cited in Appendix I: “The Pathology of Love: Some Clinical Variants of de Clérambault’s Syndrome” by Lovett Doust and Christie. Some
obviously unacknowledged citations and verbal similarities indicate that Wenn and Camia may have read this paper. For example, Lovett Doust and Christie report that “cases have been described by Hippocrates, Erasistratus, Plutarch, Galen” (99). Similarly, Wenn and Camia write: “The earliest references are to be found in Plutarch, Galen, and Cicero” (250). Lovett Doust and Christie find that “the primary, or ‘pure’ type had an explosive autochthonous onset” (105). Likewise, Wenn and Camia observe: “in the pure form of the condition onset was precise and sudden, even explosive” (250). Moreover, Joe may also have read this paper that records a Greek patient seeing himself as “a dog who had to follow his master” (Lovett Doust 102). The same analogy is used by Joe to describe Parry: “He looked wretched, like a dog about to be punished” (22). This image of an underdog is later highlighted by Joe to describe Parry’s stalking: “He was always there, staring at the entrance like a dog” (82). The overt use of the underdog image, borrowed from the real world of medical professionals, enhances the authenticity of Parry’s abnormal behaviour.

Threatened by Parry’s obsessive behaviours and ignored by the police, Joe investigates the cause of Parry’s stalking with a vigilante-style ardour, as he says: “When his story was closed, it would be important to know something about Parry” (63). Previously, Joe saw himself as a failed scientist; this time, his desperation drives him to turn himself into a real scientist as if he had “at last been offered that research post” (134) denied in his younger days. Creating an aura of clinical discovery, Appendix I ostensibly presents itself as the result of Joe’s research. Appendix II, as the actual ending of the novel, envisions the “enduring” danger of Parry’s syndrome that, as Joe purports to prove, can only be explained through a rational analysis of the mind. However, as the next section will show, Joe’s rational analysis involves a suspicious act of story-telling that will make his motives questionable.

“Fabulation Run Riot”: Necessary Pathology
Working on “the death of anecdote and narrative” (44) in modern science, Joe demonstrates that his ability to “spin a narrative” is not much different from the narrative skills required for presenting a clinical case study. Such narrative talent brings to mind what McEwan had said about Appendix I: “Psychiatric case studies are like small novels . . . To base a psychiatric theory on what one person says she or he discovered of another person is fantastically unscientific and owes much to a certain kind of literary interpolation. So why not go the whole way? Why not subject the characters in your novel to psychiatric study?” (Burkeman). Appendix I generates the authoritative space of psychiatric study whose narrative thrust to describe a case is in line with both McEwan’s artistic intention and Joe’s narratorial compulsion to tell stories. For the author and the narrator, therefore, the inclusion of Appendix II represents an aggressive strategy to ensure the double subjection of Parry to the “literary interpolation” in the main text and the psychiatric explanation in Appendix I.

The uncompromising narratorial intention for character subjection can also explain the problematic breach of confidentiality in Appendix II that manifests a potential conflict of interest. Appendix I suggests that Dr. Wenn may have been inquisitive about Joe’s personal life, as the doctor notes, “R and M were reconciled and later successfully adopted a child” (259). Since Parry’s case involves an unusual disorder, it is highly possible that, during the course of his continual research into the “victims of de Clerambault patients” (258), the doctor develops a close patient-physician relationship with Joe. Such a bonding would be strengthened by Joe’s wish to do real science for the reinvigoration of his career. Joe’s fresh
enthusiasm in psychiatry, and his role as the victim of a rare disorder, would presumably lead to frequent meetings with Dr. Wenn. The professional exchanges between a doctor and an ardent researcher could easily turn into gossips, leading to the unethical sharing of confidential information. However imaginative this intimation may seem, it is not groundless, and is perhaps the most credible explanation for the ethical problem created by Joe’s appropriation of the letter-file.

McEwan’s authorial comments offer another clue to understand the suspicious conflict of interest on the part of Dr. Wenn. McEwan reveals bluntly in an interview: “I devised what they call in Hollywood a back story for Wenn and Camia: that they are a couple of homosexuals, who are only interested in homoerotic behavior” (Byrnes 265). The dubious relationship between Wenn and Camia playfully mirrors the homoerotic behaviours as shown by the pathological bonding between Joe and Parry or between Steve and Xan. It is no surprise that McEwan later admitted that he “had fun writing that appendix” (“The Art of Fiction” 102).

Therefore, the latent homophilia interactions between Joe and Wenn would likely lead to a form of research activity that preoccupies itself with conditioning Parry by his illness – instead of finding a cure for him. As Appendix I’s case history concludes: “The patient will continue to be followed” (255). This untold story, embedded in the appendix, implies that the research into Parry’s syndrome would be as “enduring” as Parry’s life-long obsession with Joe. Within Joe’s primary narrative framework that intends to affirm the healthiness of the rational mind, the two appendices register a strong narratorial impulse for self-legitimization in face of a pathological condition. It is thus significant that Appendix I, despite its guise as a clinical paper, lacks extensive discussion on the treatment of the syndrome as offered by Mullen and Pathé or Lovett Doust and Christie in their genuine papers. The ostentatious disclosure of Parry’s identity in Appendix II, inseparable from the narratorial urge to confirm an illness in Appendix I, exposes in effect a potential professional misconduct on the part of Dr. Wenn and also a suspicious violation of narratorial ethics on the part of Joe.

Earlier in his musing on narrative in science, Joe reflects: “What, in fact, were the typical products of the twentieth-century scientific or pseudo-scientific mind? Anthropology, psychoanalysis – fabulation run riot” (53). Joe is a keen observer of contemporary news specifically occurring in 1995: for example, the 25th anniversary of the Human Genome Project (175) in October (NHGRI); the paranormal events such as Virgin Mary’s weeping blood (196) in February (Bohlen) and Ganesh’s drinking milk (196) in September (McGirk). February 1995 also saw the publication of An Anthropologist on Mars – Oliver Sacks’s popular story-like account of case studies. Like his notable predecessors Freud and A. R. Luria, Sacks envisions narrative as the core to clinical case studies that depict various “tales of survival, survival under altered, sometimes radically altered, conditions” (Loc. 115). October 1995 saw the publication of Arthur Frank’s The Wounded Storyteller that develops Sacks’s insights into a concept of “illness narrative” in which the patient tells survival tales capable of producing therapeutic effects (53-74).

Contextualized with these contemporary works, Enduring Love illustrates the same preoccupation with narrative as the means to understand the psychological impact of an illness. As Mullen and Pathé observe, “[t]he case material usually included extensive data gathered from the objects of the patients’ unwanted attentions, often in the form of victim impact reports” (616). Joe is precisely a “wounded storyteller” whose first-person narration constructs a hybridized narrative that
resembles a “victim impact report.” On the one hand, his main narrative records the prognosis of Parry’s condition; on the other, the main text presents itself as if it were an extended “case material” supplementing Appendix I. Therefore, Joe tells the story of a double survival: Parry’s survival under the altered reality of erotomania, and Joe’s concomitant survival as the victim in an erotomaniac case. It is thus significant that Joe begins his story as if speaking in an interview: “The beginning is simple to mark” (1). As psychiatrist Ronan McIvor comments on the semblance of authenticity manifested by Joe: “The terse first chapter describes the accident and aftermath with visceral reality, reminding me of the traumatised patient retelling his story in therapy” (61).

Joe’s narrative as a story-like case material represents what Sacks has called an “intersubjective” (xix) approach to explore the altered reality of the mind. Sacks’s aim to present clinical cases through narratives, as he proclaims in Foucauldian fashion, is “to see the pathological world with the eyes of the patient himself” (xix). Sacks’s idea on the need of alternative, “pathological” perspectives can be traced to Georges Canguilhem, who is singled out by An Anthropologist on Mars as the representative “post-war rationalist thinke[r] on health and disease” (297). Canguilhem’s renowned The Normal and the Pathological tackles the correlation between the normal and the pathological, as he asserts: “The general problem of the normal and the pathological can be defined as a teratological problem and a nosological problem” (35). Shortly before Canguilhem passed away in September 1995, the June issue of The Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine published an article on his unique philosophy of disease (Horton). Canguilhem’s ideas obviously influence Wenn and Camia who claim that their paper can “ad[d] to recent literature supporting the view that [de Clerambault’s] syndrome is a nosological entity” (249). Like Wenn and Camia, Joe would probably have read this article to perceive the pertinence of pathology as the reference point to understand the normality of health.

Yet, for the reader of Enduring Love, it remains problematic if such an intersubjective narrativization, originally intended to undermine the demarcation between health and disease, would in reality reinforce the distinction. Seeing Parry’s condition as “a dark, distorting mirror” of health, Joe would recall Canguilhem’s seminar work that proposes disease as a concept “existentially first” (243). To Canguilhem, “an unconscious search for disease” is necessary for construing the normality of healthiness, as he declares: “There arises in the normal man an anxiety about having remained normal, a need for disease as a test of health” (286). Joe shows the anxiety of a normal man who searches for a disease for the defence of the healthy, rational mind. His appropriation of Dr. Wenn’s letter-file attests to his urge to confirm the illness of Parry “as a test of health” – a necessary pathology.

Joe’s investigation into the symbiosis between the normal and the pathological is uneasily counterpointed by Parry’s own research. In his obsession to comprehend Joe’s rational mind, Parry studies all the thirty-five articles by Joe in a research fervour not incompatible with that of a true scientist. Confirming Joe’s own frustration of his “sense of failure in science” (107), Parry discovers the triviality of Joe’s career as a science writer, as he tells Joe: “It’s all shopping” (147). Still, Joe’s self-declared career failure is a redemption for himself. If it were not for the extensive readings in science required by his job, he would not have had the eclectic knowledge to conduct independent research upon an esoteric psychiatric disorder. The appendices satisfy the narratorial need to prove its value in explaining a disorder in a rationalist fulfilment that eclipses irrational cravings.
Joe is aware of the unscientific aspect of psychoanalysis when he says: “Using the highest methods of storytelling and all the arts of priesthood, Freud had staked his claim on the veracity, though not the falsifiability, of science” (53). Trained as a physicist, Joe must have known the concept of falsifiability proposed by the eminent Karl Popper whose *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* famously establishes falsifiability as the key to demarcate science from pseudoscience. According to Popper, “it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience” (18). While Popper criticizes Freudian analyses for their apparently unfalsifiable hypotheses, Joe adheres to the principle of falsification in presenting his own thought process that remains open to the possibility that others may be right. Therefore, the conflicting perspectives in his narratives are not meant to create indeterminacy as some readers would find (Randall 63-5). Instead, the alternative views offered by Parry, Clarissa, and the police are created as the mechanisms of falsification for the test of Joe’s hypothesis that must withstand such a falsification in order to be scientifically true. In the end, defending “the highest methods of storytelling,” Joe seems to become a true scientist who accomplishes a rationalist inquiry decisively evidenced by the appendices of his narratives.

**Conclusion: “Could this person be blamed?”**

The strange case of the appendix, resulting from the narratorial determination to confirm scientific truth, prompts the reader to scrutinize the narrator’s seemingly impeccable performance in producing a narrative equipped with authentic, corroborative evidence. If an inquisitive reader explores the narratorial mindset, a malevolent aura of blame would then emerge amidst the ostentatious air of rationalism upheld by the narrator. Significantly, Joe suggests that his investigation of a psychiatric disorder is motivated by his wish to “blame” Parry, as he angrily reflects: “Parry, of course, was to blame for coming between Clarissa and me” (95). As this article argues, Joe’s use of clinical materials contributes to an idea of necessary pathology to condition Parry in the name of a disease. The disorder of Parry proves beyond cure, since, as Wenn and Camia proclaim, pharmaceutical treatment or therapy “were observed to have no impact” (249). For the reader, the disinterestedness of the original clinical observations in the appendix is compromised by Joe’s vigorous interests in pathologizing Parry, whose lasting blameworthiness is substantiated by an incurable syndrome. Such a reasoning on the part of a narrator would lead to ethical question as to why a rational analysis of a psychiatric syndrome would enhance the apparent blameworthiness of the patient.

In his study of blame, George Sher finds that to blame a person “is not just to believe that he has acted badly or has a bad character, but is also to want him not to have acted badly or not to have a bad character” (119). Therefore, according to Sher, “anyone who fully accepts a moral principle must react to wrongdoing and vice by having the relevant blame constituting desires” (127). In *Enduring Love*, Joe entertains moral concerns by providing the reader with instances of unresolved moral transgressions that would trigger ambivalent “blame constituting desires.” For example, reluctant to blame “the morally responsible agent” (58) in the balloon accident, Joe suggests that the instinct for self-survival would make the anti-altruistic individual less blameable, as he rhetorically asks: “Could this person be blamed?” (58). Similarly, Mrs. Logan’s anger in blaming her husband for his “transgression” (125) turns out to be misplaced. Likewise, James Reid’s shameful confession of his affair with a student problematizes the blameworthiness of his fault. Still, however
sensitive Joe may have been to the “blame-constituting desires” of others, he is morally unambiguous about his own: Parry is surely the person to be blamed for stalking him.

Joe’s key finding about the blameworthiness of Parry as a stalker is that it is not of “psychotic” origin, but is “with the pure form of the disease” (160). A review of literature enables Joe to confirm his fear that such a condition can lead to “real danger of violence” (169). Joe’s idea is endorsed by Wenn and Camia who envisage that the psychopathology of Parry’s religious frenzy will aggravate his dangerousness, as they report: “A search of the literature did not reveal another case of pure erotomania in which religious feeling or a love of God is similarly implicated” (249). Joe would have found Wenn and Camia’s paper particularly appealing in raising “the issue of dangerousness” (249) vital to the criminal inquiry into Parry’s case. Wenn and Camia seem to support the court’s decision to incarcerate Parry in order to prevent him from harming others when they point out: “As long as P’s delusion continued unremitting, his potential for violence remained, and admission to a secure hospital was appropriate” (249). It seems that the “blame-constituting desires” of Joe towards Parry are therefore entirely legitimate.

However, real-world psychiatrists may dispute such allegations on “a clinical variant of de Clerambault’s syndrome” (249). In April 1999, a month prior to McEwan’s self-exposure of his attempted fraud, psychiatrist Kenneth Granville-Grossman wrote to The Psychiatric Bulletin to caution against “a danger that the novel – and particularly its Appendix 1 (a case report on which the book is clearly based) – will unreasonably become an accepted part of the psychiatric literature on de Clérambault’s syndrome” (242; emphasis added). Granville-Grossman rightly detects a potential problem in reading if the fictitious use of authentic citations in the appendices are to be read as real-world psychiatry. Indeed, for the reader, it remains problematic whether to see the psychiatrists listed in Appendix I as fictional characters or genuine professionals. If fictitious, the narratorial integrity of Joe would be severely discredited by his spurious pastiche. If genuine, Wenn and Camia would implicate real-world psychiatrists in a true-to-life case in which a patient suffering from a rare form of mental disorder is unapologetically confirmed to be ethically blameable.

Furthermore, using psychopathology as an aggravating factor to increase the culpability of an offender would probably trigger legal debates among real-world professionals. As far as criminal responsibility is concerned, mental disorder is often seen as exculpatory factor that can preclude or mitigate the culpability of the offender (Schopp 262). The narratorial drive to blame Parry is perhaps understandable; but in the courtroom, such a blaming would require tortuous deliberations. When a crime is committed by a mentally impaired offender, it is often debatable whether or not the disorder would mitigate or aggravate his or her liability (Loewy 287). While Parry’s culpability may be confirmed in the fictional world, the genuine references in Appendix I unwittingly expose the “blame-constituting desires” of the narrator to be scrutinized by the professional ethics of real-world psychiatrists and jurists intimated by the appendix.

As this article has pointed out, the breaching of patient confidentiality in Appendix II betrays possible ethical misconducts on the part of Dr. Wenn in a suspected collusion with the narrator. Such suspicious ethics violations in the fictional world, compounded by McEwan’s attempt to publish Appendix I in a real journal, seem to suggest that the novelist’s practical intentions may surpass his artistic ones.
The disclaimer on the novel’s copyright page perhaps should not be taken too literally: “All of the characters in this book are fictitious, and any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.” The strange case of the appendix is created precisely by the author’s factualization of his fiction by way of deliberate resemblance to the real world – even at the price of potential ethics violations.

In the context of pseudoscientific factualization, scientists may feel particularly antagonistic to the inherent ethical misconducts involved. For example, in 1979, scientist J. D. Bromhall brought a lawsuit against the publisher of David Rorvik’s In His Image: The Cloning of a Man that made unauthorized use of Bromhall’s name and ideas in a suspected hoax that, for Bromhall, had damaged his reputation as a scientist (Manning 131). In Enduring Love, it remains unclear whether or not real-life psychiatrists cited in Appendix I would dispute the appropriations of their clinical citations in a novel whose narrator pathologizes the ill at the price of ethics violation and whose author attempts to pass part of novel writing for real science. Still, the ethical ramifications of the strange case are as tangible in the fictional world of the narrator as they are in the real world of the author. For the reader, the perusal of Enduring Love as a true-to-life fiction self-perpetuating the factual nature of its literary truth would lead to unresolved ethical complications in reading. For instance, the untold future of the novel leaves open the question about Parry’s possible legal action if he is to be informed about Dr. Wenn’s suspected ethical misconducts and Joe’s dissemination of confidential information. After all, Parry “suffers no hallucinations or cognitive defects” (249) as Appendix I emphatically notes. This thorny issue of potential lawsuits against Dr. Wenn and Joe, legally and ethically legitimate for Parry, would redirect the narratorial “blame-constituting desires” back to the narrator himself.

The ethical complications of the strange case of the appendix are perhaps to be redeemed by the reader’s knowledge of extraordinary coincidence in the real world of Enduring Love. While the narrator is entrapped by “[c]oincidence of time and place” (10) or even “meaningless coincidence” (195), the author may have encountered a real-life coincidence prior to the novel’s publication. In January 1997, concurrently the month when McEwan was presumably preparing for the submission of the fake paper to The British Journal of Psychiatry, the same journal saw the publication of Mullen and Pathé’s paper entitled “The Impact of Stalkers on Their Victims” which explores the severity of social and psychological damage suffered by victims of stalking to highlight the lack of support and protection for the victim (16). Their paper calls for the need to divulge the psychological trauma of victims since “there have been virtually no data published on the psychological toll that stalking itself inflicts on the victims” (12). McEwan would probably have come upon this reference during his preparation for the hoax designed to enhance one of the main themes of his coming novel – to depict the powerlessness and trauma of a stalker’s victim. Once again, McEwan would likely have been amazed, as he was the previous year, when he found a real article tackling pertinent issues to be covered in his novel.

In early 1997, McEwan would have found himself at the front line of novel writing that could complement endeavours in the real world of psychiatry to enhance understanding of how stalking takes its toll on the victim. From March to June 1997, the UK parliament passed various sections of Protection from Harassment Act 1997 that focuses attention on the reaction of the victim of stalking, rather than the behaviour of the offender, to gauge the culpability of the stalker (Gowland). Therefore, when Enduring Love was published in September 1997, most readers would...
empathize with Joe in a social climate that saw “an ‘explosion’ of legislation” (Enduring Love 249; Perez 264) across the Atlantic to protect victims of stalking. These real-life events in 1997 would most likely cancel McEwan’s initial need to factualize his fiction through a literary hoax. His abandonment of subsequent attempts to accomplish the hoax could be explained by the fact that, perhaps for him as a novelist, the real world seems seamlessly to erase the division between fact and fiction in his novel. In light of such amazing synchronicity, the strange case of the appendix evokes the vestige of a novelist’s attempt to engage himself with the real world.

Nevertheless, as this article has shown, it is an engagement at the price of potential ethics violations for all the parties involved – Joe, Dr. Wenn, and McEwan alike. The strange case would be a less complicated issue of textual anomaly if it were not for McEwan’s “shocking attempted fraud” that seeks to redirect the cross-referencing between literary narrative and scientific fabulation from the fictional world to the real one. Since such a redirection depends upon a potential deception, the truthful nature pursued by the novel would be gravely tarnished by the knowledge of the author’s covert design. While the author intends to seal his novel by conflating fact and fiction, such an effort can be justified only in the fictional world of the narrator. In the real world of medical professionals, the author only succeeds in enhancing the division he tries to erase. In the imaginary world of Joe and Dr. Wenn, Appendix I may epitomize a successful work of scientific inquiry; by contrast, in the real world of medical journals, the pseudoscientific paper manifests a misleading urge to pathologize the ill. In the end, Joe appends to his story a clinical paper whose narrative thrust is devoid of altruistic nature, and whose sole aim is to blame a psychiatric patient for his disorder.

The strange case of the appendix, in conclusion, uncovers a clue for the reader to detect the narratorial obsession with the deceptive aesthetics of pseudoscience. It is an obsession that would subvert the objectivity of scientific ideas in the novel because the author’s failed fraud inadvertently confirms the potential spuriousness of scientific narratives in his novel. Unmasking “a dark, distorting” nature of pseudoscientific ventures, the strange case of the appendix divulges a pathology of narrativizing science – a pathology that points to a distinctly healthier way to do science excluded by the narratorial framework but detectable in the genuine references cited by the appendix. The thesis of Joe’s “piece on narrative in science” (51), therefore, would uneasily illuminate the predicament of its creator, as Joe writes: “The meanderings of narrative had given way to an aesthetics of form; as in art, so in science” (52). Although Appendix I succeeds in replicating the structure of scientific discovery, it undeniably registers a novelistic, rather than scientific, impetus. Despite the narratorial commendation on the power of scientific rationalism, what Enduring Love procures for the reader is an impeccable theory on a rare psychiatric disorder. As this article has shown, the thought process to prove this theory is as rational in the world of the author as it is pathological in that of the narrator. The issue of altruism in the opening chapter will thereby continue to haunt the reader. Joe, after all, only cares for his integrity as a pseudoscientist surviving domestic plights. As he memorably says, “altruism had no place; Being good made no sense” (15). For the reader, reading the novel in combination with the appendices, Joe is probably not a good scientist.

On February 4, 2007, 10 years after the Sokal hoax, Chris Mooney and Alan Sokal wrote an op-ed in The Los Angeles Times to appeal to the public to “take the spin out of science” (Mooney). As the reader of Enduring Love would recall, Joe,
while taking little pleasure in “spinning” science stories, is eager to spin an engaging narrative out of a clinical case. The attempt to publish Appendix I in a genuine journal, McEwan’s own spinning, is a forgotten failure that would testify to the common narrative impetus of science and pseudoscience – a silent failure that, in its failings, also divulges the dividing nature of such a common impetus. The strange case of the appendix, with hindsight, is a lucky failure indeed.
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